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P R E F A C E 
Besides being a detailed study of the causes, course and 
consequences of the 1890 Maritime Strike in New Zealand, this 
thesis is also an overall account of the trials and tribulations, 
and the successes and failures of the labour movement in New 
Zealand between the passage of Stout's Trade Union Bill in 
1878, and the enactment in 1894 of the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act sponsored by Reeves. As such it has 
attempted to place that strike in its perspective as one of 
the really important events in labour history. From it I 
hope it can be seen that the 1890 Maritime Strike ha~to a 
certain extent, influenced the structure of the labour movement 
from the time that Reeves 1 s bill was passed. 
If I have been vague in places or left out details that 
some might consider to be necessary or interesting, that is 
largely because the information was lacking. There are 
apparently no official union records of the period in existence 
today, with the exception of the correspondence book of the 
Cooks 1 and Stewards' Union in Dunedin. Unfortunately they just 
were not kept, or were lost at some later date. The Lyttelton 
Waterside Workers• Union records prior to 1951 simply 
disappeared after the strike that year~ 
In the case of the other protagonist, the Union Company, 
,- L 
(viii) 
their records for 1890 were, when I visited their Wellington 
office in 1967, still confidential. While they were kind 
enough to supply me with excerpts on the strike period from 
8 history of the company written, I was told, from official 
records, they were otherwise not very helpful. The secrecy 
with which they still shroud the event leaves the suspicion 
that they have something to hide. 
The absence of official records forced me to rely heavily 
I on newspapers. The failings of newspaper account·s of events 
is well known~ They are partial; only reporting what their 
journalists happen to notice or want to report, or are able 
to report~ In the case of the Maritime strike, many vital 
meetings were not open ·to the press. Then, too, the newspapers 
in 1890 were strongly biased for or against the strikers~ 
In App~ndix GI have tried to show the biases of the main 
papers, and where .ever possible, have pointed out the likely 
bias when using uncorroborated or diverging reports~ Because 
of the lack of precise information on a number of points, I have 
had to surmise what happened, and I make no apology for the 
frequent use of qualifying adverbs and adjectives such as 
probably, undoubtedly, most likely, and so on. 
The selection of what material was included and what 
excluded was partially determined by space. I left out several 
topics such as comparisons between the 1890 and the 1913 and 
1951 strikes; a fuller comparison hetween the strike and its 
-i 
(ix) 
consequences in Australia and New Zealand; and a section 
dealing with public opinion on the strike in New Zealand 
because the thesis would have been even longer than it now is~ 
1 chose, on the whole, to use the notes I had and leave what 
can be discovered from other works to the readers~· 
Some may think that I was repetitious~ I hope I was 
not unnecessarily so, but the partial topical approach that I 
adopted made some repetition· unavoidable~ Others may think 
that I spent too much space dealing with relatively minor events 
such as the unloading of coal from the Tekapo in Lyttelton. 
1 did that deliberately because I believe that history can 
be more than a bare analytical chronology of events! It can 
also include interesting sto:i::ies with a human interest, and that 
I tried to do to break up the dry sequence of occurrences~ 
That is my own personal opinion from which others will no doubt 
beg to differ and are entitled to. 
Others have dealt with the maritime strike, all of them 
part of a larger account of New Zealand history! Nearly all 
of them I believe give a partial, and indeed misleading 
interpretation of the strike from which mine differ on a number 
of points!' Salmond's thesis, in particular, seems to be 
largely a paraphrasing of the Dunedin newspapers of 1890, 
making it dull reading~ 
(x) 
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C H A P T E R 1 
NEW ZEALAND I AN AUSTRALASIAN COLONY IN 
TRANSITION 
Background of the 1890 Strike 
1. Fluctuations in the Eponomy 1879-95 
(a) Introduction 
THE LIPP.Al, y 
UNIYU\SITY OF CANl tL .. UIW 
CHRISTCHURCH, N.7.., 
In 1878 trade unions were legally recognised for the first 
time in New Zealand, when Parliament passed the Trade Union 
Act, which was sponsored by Sir Robert Stout~ Stout, at the 
time a 'radicali politician from Dunedin, was one of the 
Leading spokesmen for the 'labour partyO during the 1890 Maritime 
Strike. 1 Amongst other things this Act made it possible for 
Unions to register for the first time in a similar way to 
friendly societies; and it also legalised certain of their 
practices. Trade unions had in fact grown up in the boom 
conditions of the early seventieso To this extent Stout's 
measure merely recognised their existence. It was not in the 
least designed to foster their growth as were the measures w.P. 
Reeves sponsored in the 1890's. The Act also owed a large 
amount of its inspiration to almost identical British Acts of 
1871 and 1876 0 
However, the year after the .Act was enacted, severe 
depression in most parts of the country wrought havoc on the 
1. See P•P• 75 ff 
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newlY recognised trade unions. Although it did not become a 
nation wide depression until 1887, nevertheless the accompanying 
' 
unemployment destroyed many of the uriions of the seventies and 
weakened those that survived 0 A significant upturn in trade, 
in 1889, together with the spread of the •New Unionist• ideology 
to this country from Australia and Britain that same year, 
brought about a revival of trade union activity, as the 
depression receded for a time. Thus Stout•s measure was not 
fully utilised until eleven years after it was passed. The 
intervening depression and the social and economic problems 
and changes it brought in its train, together with the struggle 
to establish viable trade unions in the eighties, and the 
remarkable revival and growth of unions at the end of that 
decade, were the most distinctive features on the stage on 
which the 1890 Maritime Strike took placeo This, the first 
full scale industrial conflict that the country had sustained, 
had lasting and profound repercussions on the political and 
industrial life· of New Zealando It also helped many people 
in this country make up their minds on the then vexed question 
of whether their country should join the proposed Australian 
(or Australasian) federation or noto 
(b) Depression and Affluence 1879-95 
The Vogelian boom of the seventies ground to a halt in 
many parts of New Zealand in 1879 following a reduction of 









in London the previous year, and government pressure on the 
Bank of New Zealand for more funds. Furthermore doubt about 
hoW long the boom in land values could last became overwhelming 
in 1879.
1 
Confidence in New Zealandis economic future waned 
and all but disappeared. Bank advances and government loan 
expenditures, which together had 'acted as a kind of double 
pump of prosperity' that had sustained and even heightened the 
boom since export prices began to fall in 1874 lost most of 
. 2 
their persuasiveness, and the long feared crash came at last. 
The dose of economic reality which the banks administered to the 
New Zealand economy in 1879 marks the beginning of the final 
trough in what Sutch called 'The Long Depression' (1865-95) and 
the start of what Sinclair and Mandle term 'New Zealand's Great 
Depression 11. 
While these two accounts agree in many respects about the 
causes of the depression, they differ in certain fundamental 
ways which have an important bearing on how the period is to 
be interpretedo Sutch, who tries to fit the depression into 
a general description of New Zealand's economic growth between 
1871 and 1895 emphasises the way in which the depression 
retarded New Zealand's economic growth to maturity. He also 
1. Keith Sinclair & W.F. Mandle, Open Account pp.87-90 







seems to want to show how the 'depression forced the state to 
1ntervene in the economic life of the community, passing 
tariffs and lbusting up the big estates•, and how it was 
forced to intervene in the social life of the community to 
alleviate the suffering that the depression brought to the 
workers in the form of long hours, low wages and poor work 
conditions. Sinclair and Mandle on the other hand try to 
describe the depression as it was seen by Bank of New South 
Wales staff in their writte.n records. Hence their account is 
more detailed about the course of the depression, high-lighting 
main trends within the 1879-95 period. They also try to justify 
the actions their patron bank took during the period, but 
fortunately do not let the ideological aspects intrude into 
the descriptiveo 
The continuance of low prices for wool and wheat exports 
from the early eighties until 1895, apart from during the 
exceptionally bright 1888-89 period meant ·that the New Zealand 
section of the world wide 'Great Depression• (1875-95) was 
lacute and prolonged•. 1 However, the depression did not, as 
Sutch seems to imply, affect every part of the country at the 
same time or equally severely, ~or was it without its breathing 
spaces. The 1879 crash, which did indeed mark the end of the 
boom of the seventies, and did give the country a taste of 
depression for the first time for many years, did not mark the 
beginning of a continuous •1ongl or •Great• Depression as sucho 
It did weed out some smaller farmers who had relied on loans 
1. Sinclair and Mandie, op.cit. p.99 
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to pay their interest and other overheads in bad years; and 
a number of merchants and businessmen were ruined when economic 
e,cpansion ground to a halt. But depressed conditions had all 
but disappeared by the end of 1880, and for two years the country 
enjoyed economic health again, though without the dynamic 
vitality it had had before the crash. Confidence returned 
gradually and virtually everyone began to look forward to a 
brighter future. It was during this breathing space in the 
depressed eighties that the first shipment of frozen meat was 
sent to London and a new avenue for economic expansion was thus 
opened. However, the upturn in fortunes was only temporary. 
In 1883 depresson returned to many parts of the South Island 
and in the following few years spread like a cancer throughout 
the rest of New Zealand. The depression, which blanketed the 
whole country from 1887 onwards was most acute and severe in 
1887 and 1888 with even frozen meat prices plummeting downwards. 
I 
Then following the first significant upturn in wool and wheat 
prices for over a decade 1889 was an exceptionally bright year. 
Exports per head, a good measure of the wealth of New Zealand 
rose from £12.16.7 in 1888 to £15. 4. 5 in 1889. 1 The 
relative prosperity of 1889, helps e~plain why trade unions revived! 
and grew up in New Zealand that year more vigorously and 
prolifically than ever before. Then in 1890, the year of the 
1Maritime Strike' the economy relapsed slightly and became 
depressed again remaining so for the next five years. After 
1. See Appendix C for Table of Exports per Head 1879-90 
r. 
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!895 rising export prices helped dispel the depression and 
set the country on the road to prosperity again. Hence the 
1890 Maritime Strike broke out just when the New Zealand 
economy was sinking again into depression after practically 
climbing out of it the previous year. 
z. Labour Conditions and Economic Change in the Depressed 
Eighties 
Even in the booming seventies unemployment was never 
completely eliminated from the New Zealand social scene, though 
its magnitude had been greatly reduced. It was in that period 
more a seasonal and regional problem and less a general one. 
The decline of unemployment and the prosperous conditions 
generally stimulated the growth of trade unions. Inspiration 
to form them came mostly from Britain. Some unions such as 
those of the engineers and carpenters considered themselves to 
be merely branches of 1home 1 unions. Nearly all these unions 
of the seventies were what were later known as •old 1 unions, 
functioning as both mutual benefit societies and trade bodies. 
The former function often predominated, and on the whole they 
seemed to lack real militancy and drive. Strikes did occur, 
but for the most part they were isolated affairs, confined to 
the trade and locality in which the dispute broke out. 






about an improvement in the wages and working conditions of 
many people. 
However this happy state of affairs came to an end in the 
1ast years of the seventies. Unemployment increased as a 
result of declining government expenditure on public works in 
1s71 and 1878, and the depression which followed the 1879 crash 
I For the first time for many years I 
The ranks of ! 
pushed it up even further. 
it became a more general and permanent problem. 
i 
the unemployed 1 working men were, after 1879, swollen by those farmer[ 
and employers who had been ruined by .the contraction of bank credit I 
I 
I 
that year. Increasing unemployment was the cause of much of the 
misery and suffering evident in that period. As no government 
aid was available, voluntary soup kitchens and relief depots 
were established in the main towns, but those affected demanded 
. . 1 
iwork not so~p t O Apart from the better years of 1881 and 1882 
it appears that unemployment was chronic and quite high in many 
parts. Hundreds of men were out of work in Christchurch and 
Dunedin in 1883, a particularly bad year in those places. The 
problem was then so serious that 700 were known to be out of work 
in Christchurch in the middle of the normally busy summer season .. 
The government was prompted to appoint a Royal Commission to look 
into the problem but its recommendations did not do much to 
2 alleviate the problem .. 
1. W.B. Sutch, The Quest for Security in N.Z. (1966) p.61 
2. Ibid p.62 See also W.H. S_cotter, A History of Canterbury 
Vol III pp. 61-2 . 
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Those who could afford the passage emigrated to Victoria or 
NeW South Wales, which were both expanding rapidly for most of 
the eighties. In 1885 unsuccessful moves were made by the 
unemployed in Dunedin to petition the Victorian Government 
asking it to assist them to emigrate. Up until 1887 the jobs 
that were still available in the North Island attracted many 
people from the South Island. 
After 1887 depression blanketed the whole country, and 
apart from during the more prosperous year of 1889 jobs became 
even harder to find. The seriousness of the problem at that 
time can be seen by the migration figures. In the 1887-90 
period the llexodust of people to Australia became so great that 
total emigration exceeded total immigration from all sources by 
over 19,000. \The bad 1890 employment situation was highlighted 
by Sir Harry Atkinson, the Colonial Treasurer, who in March that 
:1 1 
year claimed, 'Two men are in fact competing for one man's work./ 
Like most of his contemporaries Atkinson believed that the 
unemployment problem could be solved not by industrial development 
but by settling them on the land. Hence the importance of the 
land question in the 1890 General Election. Therefore in the 
depressed eighties, unemployment was generally a problem in many 
parts of New Zealand particularly in Canterbury and Otago. It 
became much more widespread and serious after 1887, and except 
1. · AJHR 1890 B - 6 p.19. This figure must have been m-erely 
an impression for no details were kept thene 
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in 1889, was a very acute problem from then up to the time of 
the 1890 Maritime Strike. 
The widespread unemployment by increasing competition 
for jobs tended to force down the wages of all those employed, 
and lengthen the hours they were required to work. Competition 
was also further increased by those manufacturers and other 
employers, who used women and children in place of men, at much 
lower rates of pay whenever they could. The flourishing trade 
unions of. the seventies, many of them so weakened that they faded 
out of existence altogether, were unable to do very much to 
counteract this trend. Trade unions, given the free play of 




positions during depressions 0 Those that survived into the eighties,' 
mostly craft unions, were for most of the time relatively weak and 
uneffective 0 They had to struggle to prevent wages falling even 
further than they did, and largely confined themselves to acting 
as benevolent mutual aid societies for their members. Wages as 
a whole fell faster than prices in the depression, and the 
condition of the workers 'deteriorated, particularly after 1887. 
Wages fell so low in this period that industry, based on 
cheap labour, actually expanded. Many manufacturers set up 
f . h" t" l actories at tis 1me. Manufacturers not only competed 
successfully with imported goods, without the protection of 
1 0 J.B. Condliffe, N,Z. in the Making pp. 162-6 
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tariffs, but also were able to ·export goods to Australia and 
other places. Gradually, however, pressure from manufacturers, 
supported by labour groups for protection of local industries 
became stronger. In 1888 Atkinsonls government, with the help 
of Opposition members, enacted New Zealand's first protective 
tariff measure. 
However, it must be emphasised that the expansion of 
industries at this time did not amount to anything like an 
industrial revolution. New Zealand remained basically an 
agrarian country, and indeed became more so after 1890. The 
urban population didnot exceed the rural population until the 
1911 census. The industries of the eighties were mostly small 
and rudimentary, with very little capital. They expanded then 
to exploit the cheap labour which was so plentiful, and not in 
response to a bustling economy. Even the President of the 
Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, G.F. Martin, believed in 1890 
. ,, 
that the prosperity of the country depended on the effective 
settlement of people on the land rather than on indus:rrial 
. 1 
development. Therefore, New Zealndls protective tariff was 
basically a sop to manufacturing and labour pressure groups, 
and was not, like the Victorian tariff, designed to encourage 
local industrieso 
One of the worst features of the growth of industries 
during the depressed eighties was the way it relied so heavily 





on the exploitation of cheap f·emale and child labour by unscrupu-
ious employers. The Reverend Rutherford Waddell, from Dunedin, 
brought this practice to the notice of the public in 1888. In 
8 series of sermons entitled 
1The Cheapness of Sin' he claimed 
that 1 sweating 1 , one of the most condemned industrial evils of 
the fold country 1 , was being established in Dunedin, particularly 
in the clothing trade. He sparked off a public protest which 
was organised into a full scale campaign against 'sweating'. An 
ad hoc committee found grounds for complaint. They recommended 
legislation be passed forbidding •sweating', and enforced 
conscientiously by the government. They also urged that the 
workers themselves form a union and negotiate with their employers 
for better wages and conditions. As a consequence of this 
report a tailoresseslt union was established in Dunedin with 
Rutherford as its President, J.A. Millar of the Seaments Union 
as its Secretary, and Stout as its Patron. It enjoyed wide 
public support and was eventually successful in fulfilling many 
of its founders hopes and aims. 1 
The Anti-sweating campaign also moved the government to 
appoint early in 1890 a Royal Commission to investigate sweating 
and labour conditions generally. After sitting in all four 
main centres to hear evidence, and visiting several factories 
I 
to investigate conditions for itself, the commission tabled its 
Report in May 1890. The majority of members agreed that ithe 
system known in London••• as "sweating"••• does not exist 1 • 
2 
1. See page 41 
2.. ~ 1890 H - 5 p. iii 
L 
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However, three of the nine members, Rutherford Waddell, D.P. 
fisher and Colin Allan disagreed strongly. In a minority 
report they said that a few instances •sweating' i.e. 'sub-
contracting! had been brought to the notice of the Commission. 
using the definition of the London social worker, Beatrice 
potter, they declared that there was •abundant evidence of its 
existence in the colony•. They ended by demanding prompt 
legislative action to put a stop to the practice in New Zealand 
! completely.· Report of the Sweating Commission had no immediate 
effect on New Zealand labour laws, but it did provide the 
Opposition under Ballance with a programme which they used in 
the General Election that year, and partially- enacted in the 
following few years. 
3. The.Trade Unions of the Eighties 
The economic crash of 1879 brought to ruin most of the 
trade unions of the seventies that Stout's Trade Union Bill 
of 1878 had legalised for the first time. Only a few of the 
stronger craft unions managed to survive the depression of 
1879-8011 For the whole of the ten years after the crash 
trade unions in New Zealand for the most part languished or 
moved ahead in a very low gearo Nearly all of the unions of 
the eighties were weak and managed to keep going only with 




great difficulty~ The majority of them seemed to function 
rimarily as mutual benefit societies, for the most part p . 
avoiding industrial action. They 1could do little more than 
protest against the existing state of things and afford assistance 
. 1 
to their unemployed members.,1 Unions were formed at various 
times, but were mostly ineffective and short lived. Apart 
from the seamen and some of the coalminers, all the semi-skilled 
and unskilled. workers, together with large numbers of skilled 
persons were unable to establish lasting or effective 
organisations in this period. Hence, during the grim years 
of the generally depressed eighties the efforts of those New 
! 
Zealand workers who tried to organise thei'r fellow workers into 
unions were only scantily rewarded if at all. But the harsh 
conditions that prevailed during the depression caused many 
seeds of unionism to fall into the generally fertile soil ready 
to spring to life after the climate improved in 1889. Two of 
the brightest spots on the generally bleak New Zealand labour 
scene of this period were the establishment c£ several seamen I s 
unions and two coal miners' unions~ These unions which went 
ahead and grew :in strength with each passing year, provided the 
forthright and active leadership the New Zealand labour movement 
needed during the trade union revival of 1889. 
Seamen's.unions were established in Port Chalmers, Wellington 
and Auckland after a visit to those places from a delegate 
I 1 0 J;D. Salmond, N,Z, Labour's &,neering Days ed. D, Crowley p.35 
l 
l 







of the Australian Seamen 1 s Union, G. Sengster in 1880. Three 
years later, after the Port Chalmers Union had had its log 
accepted by the Union Company, the other unions recognised 
that union as the New Zealand Seamen 1 s Union, and regarded 
themselves as its branches. 1 The seamen were able to establish 
a permanent union at that time partly because New Zealand 
shipping was then expanding rapidly in spite of the hard times on 
the land. The expansion of New Zealand 1_s leading · shipping line, 
the Union Steam Ship Company, after 1875 will be dealt with 
2 fully later. By 1890 its steamers plied the Tasman regularly 
and even carried cargoes between ports in Australia itself. Its 
position as an Australasian shipping line was made plain in 1884 
when it joined the Australasian Steamship Owners• Association 
(ASOA) to protect its trans-Tasman interests. The way the 
Union Company expanded and prospered throughout the eighties 
encouraged them to accept the unionisation of its seam.en. It 
also meant that they could afford to P.ay the rates the Union 
demanded and made them willing to do so. Thus, the seamen did 
not encounter the same hostility to trade unions from their 
employer as did many shore workers, whose employers were hard 
pressed to cope with the depression. Furthermore the task of 
forming a seamen's union in New Zealand.-was supported almost 
from the very start by the Australian Seamen 1 s Union. That 
body continually helped and sustained the weaker New Zealand 
2~ 
Salmond, op~cit. 
See PP• 25-7 
p.45 
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unions right up to the time of· the 1890 Maritime Strike. It 
most pro?ably helped them because the Union Company was an 
Australasian shipping line, competing with their own employers 
for Cargo and passengers. Hence, it was in the Australian 
Union•s int~rests to help the New Zealand seamen, who were their 
competitors for work, furm a Union and push their wages up to 
the level they enjoyed. These two reasons, largely explain why 
the seamen were able to form the strong unions they did in the 
I 
generally bleak eighties. 
The most well known dispute during which the Australian 
Seamen 1s Union helped the New Zealand body occurred in 1887. 
That dispute, later known as the tJubilee affair', started when 
the Northern Steam Ship Company, a small New Zealand coastal 
line, refused union demands for higher wages and other benefits. 
The union called out all its members. The company decided to 
fight the union by hiring ·non-union men or '.blacklegs• for 
. . 
its steamers. The depression meant labour was plentiful and 
soon the Company 1.s vessels were running again with their new 
crews. However the seamen's union was not beaten so easily. 
It joined forces with the Australian union and formed the 
Jubilee Steam Ship Company. Two steamers which were purchased 
for that Company, were run against the Northern Comp«;1,ny until 
I 
it surreridered in November 1888. Altogether the unions lost 
over £14,000 on this venture, with probably the greater part 
of it being paid by the richer Australian union. In the end 
the -'Jubileel venture proved to be an unqualified success for 
- 16 -
the secretary of the New Zealand Seamenls union here, J.A. 
Millar, who had been appointed not long before the trouble 
bleW up. Millar felt that the seamen had not received the 
support they should have received from the other unions, 
particularly the maritime and associated unions during this 
dispute. He therefore determined to try and set up a labour 
body, which by controlling all maritime labour unions, would be 
able to enforce its 1authority over ships at sea•. 1 From this 
idea of Millar 1 s was eventually to emerge the.New Zealand Maritime 
council, the body which probably would have fulfilled Millar 1 s 
.hopes '.had it not had ,one fatal flaw in its structure. More 
than any other event .the •Jubilee affair• revealed that the 
Seamen's Union was growing stronger in the eighties even as the 
depression deepened. Thus, it was very well placed in 1889 and 
1890 to provide the revived New Zealand labour movement with 
the leadership it needed. 
Like New Zealand shipping, which went ahead in mighty leaps 
and bounds during the eighties, the coal mining industry in this 
country also expanded rapidly at that time. The change over to 
steam ships on the coastal trans-Tasman and 1home 1 routes, 
together with the growth of local industries, particularly 
freezing works, and the expansion of rail traffic all stimulated 
the coal industry after 1880. - Between that date and 1890 
1. 1! 1 April 1890 
l 
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outp4t more.than doubled, soaring from under 300,000 tons 
annually to over 630,000 tons. 1 The largest mines were in the 
Grey and Buller districts of the South Island, with the 
Brunnerton and Denniston mines being the largest in each area 
respectively. It was at these two mines that the most 
important, and only enduring miners I unions of the eighties 
were established. The Denniston Miners t Union was set up 
in September 1884 and the Brunnerton one a few months afterwards. 
It seems highly likely that the men who helped form these two 
unions were guided by Australian examples. The Australian 
miners were at that time be~ter organised and had quite strong 
2 unions in many places. The New Zealanders•awareness of the 
situation in Australia was brought to light early in 1885 when 
the two unions combined to form the Amalgamated Coal Miners' 
Association of New Zealand, which then affiliated with the 
Australasian Minersi Association. Like the seamen the miners 
were able to rely on Australian help in times of trouble. 3 
The Miners' Association thus grew to be one of the strongest 
unions in the country by 1889, and along with the Seamen 1s 
Union was in the forefront of the labour movement during 
the trade union revival that began that year. The growth of 
the 'Newt unions of 1889 and 1890 which will be dealt with in 
I. N,Z, Year Boqk 1892 p.241 
2. R. Gollan Radical & Working Class Politics p. 102 
3. LT 31 March 1890 
- 18 -
the next chapter, was the most. promising development in the 
New Zealand labour movement during the eighties. It was 
one cf the corner stones on which the Maritime Council was 
constructed, and as such was an important part of the prologue 
to the 1890 Maritime Strike. 
4. Trades and Labour Councils and Working Men's Political 
Associations 
Those trade unions which managed to survive into the 
eighties or were set up then, although by no means strong or 
vigorous bodies, were nevertheless not completely inactive or 
without influence. The trades and labour councils that were 
set up then were a visible and effective form of labour 
· organisation in the eighties. The first was the Otago Council 
established during 1881. Otago led New Zealand in this field 
because its capital, Dunedin, was still then the leading 
industrial city of the country. Of the 1643 lmanufactories• 
listed in the 1881 Census, 424 of them were in Otago, (including 
Southland), while the Auckland province (including North Auckland, 
Waikato and Bay of Plenty and Poverty Bay) could only boast of 
366, Canterbury 296, and Wellington 189. Furthermore those 
in Otago employed 5545 .hands compared with the 6471 hands 
Auckland's 'manufactories 1 employed. In 1891 Otago with 705 
l 
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tmanufactoriest still led Auckland, which only had 650, but 
tuckland 1s by then employed 8299 hands compared with the 7825 
working in Otagols~ But seeing those in Auckland in 1891 
included butter factories and mines in the Waikato area, 
Dunedin was still probably the most heavily industrialised 
of New Zealand 1 s cities~ Therefore it was hardly surprising 
that Dunedin should have been the home of the first trades and 
labour council established in New Zealand during the eighties. 
Two years after the Otago body was set up a council was 
established in Wellington. The Auckland council was re-establi 
in 1884; first operating between 1876 and 1878. These early 
councils were both trade societies and political pressure 
groups; the political function often being predominant. No 
Council was set up in Christchurch until late 1889, but a Working 
Men 1 s Political Association performed basically the same 
functions there in the early eighties~ The Otago council 
participated ·in politics during the 1881 General Election 
campaign, drawing up a platform and endorsing certain candidates. 
Its platform included measures to. promote land settlement and 
industrial development, as well as laws to protect the conditions 
of working people. Working Men's Political Associations in 
Christchurch and Auckland conducted similar campaigns that year. 
As the depression increased in .severity after 1883 the 
counciis were seriously weakened. The Auckland body was the 
only one to continue through to the 1889 rivivale New Councils 
l 
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were set up in Wellington in 1887, Otago in 1889 and Canterbury 
for the first tim.e in 1889. At this later date the trade 
functions of the Council had come to the fore though political 
action was not completely ruled out. While not opposed"t6 
striking they were only prepared to resort to strikes if 
negotiations with employers broke down. During 1889 and 
1890 they .had contact with one another, and with the Maritime 
Council, which increasingly overshadowed them. They were 
weakened and rendered ineffective in the period after the 
Maritime Strike had collapsed; but they had enough vitality 
to organise the unionists to block vote for the lliberalt 
candidates in the 1890 General Election in December. In 
Christchurch a separate Working Men's Political Association 
was again formed to campaign for progressive legislation and 
I liberal t candidates~ All members of trade unions were 
automatically members of that Association, and its programme 
was submitted to labour bodies for their approval. 
T.heref ore, although the period between .the 1879 banking 
crisis and the 1889 trade upsurge was a bleak one for trade 
unions, nevertheless a number of those that were established 
were active, particularly in the political field. In this 
period the many new ideas that were tried out and new forms 
of trade union activity which were evolved, formed foundations 
on which the new invigorated trade unions of the 1889-90 period 
were a~le to build~ 
l 
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s. New Zealand as an Australasian Colony 
(a) Australasian Links Generally 
The other main facet of New Zealand history in the eighties 
w.hich had direct bearing on the Maritime Strike, and which was in 
important ways altered quite drastically by that strike was 
this country's status as an Australasian Colony. A large 
number of connections :increasingly drew this country closer 
to the Australian colonies in the years before 1890. Foremost 
amongst these, though of declining importance for New Zealand, 
was the large volume of trade which flowed across the Tasman. 
Migration to and from Australia rose steadily from approximately 
' 1 12,500 in 1880 to about 25,500 ten years later. Banks ,and other 
financial institutions operated widely in the Australasian region, 
with even the locally based Bank of New Zealand competing in 
Victoria and New South Wales during the ~ighties. 2', In the 
same period the Union Company of New Zealand expanded its 
services so rapidly that by 1890 it was one of the largest 
and most influencial Australasian shipowners. 3 The commercial 
and financial links between the Australasian colonies, prompted 
the various colonial governments to include in their published 
Statistics tables comparing the achievements and progress of 
the different colonies. The New South Wales Government, 
1. See Appendix B 
2. Sinclair and Mandle, pp. 97-142 
3. See p~ 25- 7 
I 
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possibly with an eye on the future, on various occasions 
starting in 1889 instructed its statistician, T0 A00 Coghlan, 
to compile A Statistical Account of the S·even Colonies of 
1 
. 1 Austra as1.a. The strong commercial contacts New Zealand 
had with the Australian colonies inspired certain trade unions 
and employers in this colony to link themselves with their 
counterparts across the Tasman in ways already described._2 
These links became closer in 1889 and 1890, and were largely 
responsible for·the spread of the Australian Maritime Strike 
to New Zealand waters~ Hence, this country was by the late 
eighties not only a British colony but also one of the more 
important Australasian colonies. Yet when the movement 
to federate the colonies of the region passed beyond the level 
of preliminary discussionafter 1891,New Zealand stood aloof. 
This coolness was the result of a number of influences, amongst 
the most important of which were the declining importance of 
trans-Tasman trade, and the impact of the 1890 Maritime Strike 
on New Zealand society~ Other factors, in particular Seddon•s 
opposition, were also very important but they are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 3 . 
Up until 1869 the greater part of New Zealand's exports 
went to the Australian colonies, and in a sense New Zealand was 
1. --Published in 1892, 1896 and 1902 (with New Zealand ommited 
for first time.) 
2. See pp. 14-17 
3. F 0 L0 W0 Wood. "Why did N11 Z. not join the Australian Commonwealth 









almost a part of the Australasi'an domestic economy. But 
after that date the total value of trade with Australia hardly 
increased at all, and indeed declined at times, while exports 
to Britain went up steadily. As a consequence, Australian 
trade fell sharply as a proportion of New Zealand's total 
trade~ By 1890, when Britain took seventy five percent of this 
country's exports and Australia only sixteen percent, the 1865 
position was more than reversed. In that earlier year exports 
to Britain. had made up only thirty-·two percent of the total and 
those to Australia sixty-five percent. The figures for imports 
to New Zealand followed a simila.r pattern in the last third of 
the century, with Britain's share surging ahead and Australia's 
1 . . 1 dee in 1.11g. The sharp fall in the proportion of trade with 
the Australian colonies made many New Zealanders conclude that 
few, if any, commercial advantages would be gained if this 
country joined the Australian federation in 1900. Only a 
very small group of people were prepared to argue that free 
trade within the proposed Australian Commonwealth would benefit 
this country. ihe Royal Commission on Federation, which 
Seddon set up to thoroughly examine the whole question, 
lunanimously arrived at the conclusion that merely 
for the doubtful prospect of further trade with 
the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand should 
not sacrifice her independence as a separate 
colony'· 2 
Hence.with a declining proportion of New Zealand exports going to 
I. See Appendix A 











Australia, this country was much less inclined to favour 
federation than it might have been 50 years before. 
While rrade with Australia as a proportion of total trade 
dwindled after 1868, nevertheless it has been one of the most 
important sources of overseas income in this country right up 
to the present day. The United States did not replace 
Australia as New Zealand's second largest market until just 
after the First World War. The value of exports to Australia 
fell from £2.7 million in 1866 to only £0.8 million eleven years 
later. During the years 1880-88 they averaged approximately 
£1.4 million, ranging from £1.7 million in 1886 down to £1 million 
in 1881. However in 1889, owing to a severe drought in many 
parts of Australia, there was such a strong demand for produce 
from this colony that the carrying resources of the Union 
Company were taxed •to their fullest extent•. 1 Over £2.1 
millions worth of exports were sent to Australia that year, the 
laTgest amount since 1871. In fact whereas the value of all 
exports from New Zealand rose by only nineteen percent in 1889, 
those going to Australia rose by forty percent. Therefore, 
the increase in trade with Australia during 1889 was largely 
responsible for the trade upswing of that year, which in turn 
enabled trade unionism to grow again here. 




{b) The Union Steam Ship Company of N~Z. Ltd. 1875 - 1 
Clearly the most tangible link between New Zealand and 
the Australian colonies· in 1890 was the fleet of the Union 
I Company. That company was established by James (later Sir 
James) Mills in Dunedin in 1875~ He was the managing 
director of the Company up to 1913 and its chairman until 1936. 
It was largely his foresight, initiative arid drive which explains 
the remarkable.expansion of the Company up to 1915, when it was 
taken over by the Peninsula and Oriental Line of Great Britain. 
The first service was begun with only five steamers, which 
together weighed only 2126 tons, and was at first confined to 
the South Island coastal trade. However, within a year the 
company had extended its operations to the North Island and 
to Australia~ By purchasing the fleet of Messrs. McMeckan, 
Blackwood and Company of Melbourne in 1878, the Union Company 
acquired a virtual monopoly over all trans-Tasman trade. In 
the same way it built up its fleet in New Zealand waters, until 
by 1890 the bulk of the coastal cargoes of New Zealand, and 
particularly the valuable coal cargoes travelled in its steamers. 
The red and black funnel of its ships soon became a familar 
sight throughout New Zealand and eastern Australia. From 
1881 Fiji and other Pacific Islands were visited regularly by 
steamers of the Union Line~ Four years later, together with 
11 • s.n. Waters, Union Line,, a Short History of u, s, S!Co 1875 - 1951 1 








the Oceanic Steamship Company of America, it was awarded the 
contract to carry mail from San Francisco to the Australasian 
• I colonies. In the years between 1875 and 1890 many new ships 
were ordered from Britain and the Union Company grew to be 
one of the largest in Australasia. Its expansion was possible 
largely because trade expanded substantially in volume in the 
eighties, though not nearly so fast in value~ For example the 
export of potatoes from New Zealand, nearly all of them going 
to Australia or the •.south Sea Islands I on Union Company vessels, 
increased from 29,000 tons in 1880 to over 42,000 in 1890, or 
f . t . 1 a forty- ive percen increase. Export receipts did not rise 
as fast in the same period because it was generally a time of 
stagnant or falling prices~ In the same decade passenger 
traffic, especially that between Australia and New Zealand, 
remained high, and indeed rose substantially during the 
•Exodust, further stimulating the Union Company. 2 · By 1890 
the Union Company had grown to be one of the largest shipping 
lines in Australasia, with forty-three steamers and sixteen 
hulks in its fleet~ Its largest ship at that time, the 
Tekapo had a larger gross tonnage (2,439 tons) than the whole 
of its original fleet. In 1884 it had joined the Australasian 
Steam Shipowner's Association (ASOA), and by the time of the 
1. N.Z. Statistics (1890) p. 237 
2. See Appendix B for trans-Tasman migration figures! 
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Maritime Strike six years later was one of the dominant 
members of that body. Its close connections with the ASOA 
was the main reason why.New Zealand became involved in the 
1890 strike!. But by the time the Union Company was such a 
large and influential Australasian business that it could 
not really withdraw from that Association without jeopardising-
. t. 1 its posi ion. 
(c) Australasian Labour 'in the Eighties 
The regular shipping services of the Union Company brought 
New Zealand labour into much closer contact with AustraLian 
I 
labour bodies. During the eighties Australian and New 
Zealand labour drew closer together than ever before~ The 
way in which the seamen's union and the coal miners' unions 
of New Zealand made contact with their Australian counterparts 
and maintained growing ties up to 1890 has been described 
already~· 
Early in 1890 the wharf labourers I unions, and the cooks I 
and stewards' union of New Zealand also affiliated with similar 
bodies in Australia. Then in the same period the comparatively 
new New Zealand Maritime Council affiliated with those in 
Melbourne and Sydney, drawing the bonds of Australasian 
unionism even tighter. A movement to form a larger Australasian 







1abour federation was gaining in momentum and strength in 
the months before the Maritime Strike broke out. However 
as will be seen later the Maritime Strike arrested this 
process and rent Australasian labour relations asunder~ 
But up until the time the strike broke out, Australasian 
labour was moving closer together. In this way also 
New Zealand was becoming even more fully one of the Australasian 
colonies~ Australasian labour unity and co-operation was 
another prop on the stage on which the 1890 Maritime Strike 
took place!' 
l 
C H A P T E R 2 
THE TRADE UNION REVIVAL OF 1880-90 AND THE 
RISE OF THE INEW' UNIONS 
1 •Newt Unionism • Its Origins and Nature 
The trade unions which revived and grew in strength and 
influence during 1889 and 1890 in New Zealand were largely in 
the 'new unionist' stream of labour history~ The leaders, 
and most of the rank and file held to the basic tenets of the 
•new unionism', which .had been evolved overseas, notably in 
Australia and Britain. The teaching and example of unionists 
from both those countries had a strong influence on the New 
Zealand workers in the period of the trade union revival here. 
'New unionism• in Britain grew up first in the ship building 
yards during 1887, following, an uvturn in trade returns the 
previous year. The New Zealand unionists heard about the 'new 
unionists' of Britain two years later during the London dockers• 
strike! The London Dockers t Union one of the •new unions t 
formed the previous year, struck during August 1889 for higher 
wages and improvements in their conditions of work. ·That 
strike received world wide publicity~ The union attracted 
sympathetic support from people in all walks of life in both 
i 
l 
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Britain and the 1Empire 1' particularly Australia and New Zealand. 
A strike fund was established in this country to help the 
Londoners, to which people from all classes contributed. 
Eventually, thanks partly to the support they received from 
the 'Empire', the London dockers were resoundingly successful. 
The impetus the London dockers• strike gave to New Zealand 
labour to form unions was attested to by Millar of the Seamen•s 
Union before the Sweating Commission in 1890. On that occasion 
he declared: 
•Since the big London dock strike has opened man's 
·eyes to the necessity of trying to protect thems.elv:es 
there has been a regular epidemic of trade unions 
throughout the colony.' 
Furthermore, the moderation of the London strikers helped make 
public opinion outside of labour circles more favourable to 
labour organisations than it had been for some considerable 
time~ 
INew unionism t was also becoming the predominent stream in 
the Australian labour movement in the same period. Indeed, 
L!G. Churchward claims that the British example .had little 
influence in Australia, which tended to precede the 'hornet 
· years 1 country by several/in this development. According to him 
aid Gollan •new unions' were established in Australia after 
1885, mostly amongst the semi-skilled and unskilled workers 
in industry, transport and commerce. The two most important 
l~ R.N. Ebbels, The Australian Labour Movement 1850-1907 





and influencial 1New unions• were the Amalgamated Miners• 
Association and the Amalgamated Shearers•. Union both led in 
their early years by Guthrie Spence~! The other main union 
in the school was the Federated Seamen's Union. Those unions 
,--
were distinctive in the way they sought to unite labour 
together by means of central trade union organisations and the 
federation of local industrial unions into bigger societies~ 
•It was a militant unionism that sought agreement by peaceful 
methods, but if they failed it was prepared and sometimes 
anxious to fight~ ID 2 It is .highly likely that the 1new unionist• 
mode of labour organisation, together with.its basic tenets 
came to·New Zealand as a result of the seamen and coalminers 
of this country both establishing close links with their 
respective Australian federations after 1885. 3 
'New unionism' like many other trends in labour thought was 
not a precise body of principles .and rules which all had to 
adhere to. Rather it was a generally accepted group of 
ideas on which wide diversity in the degree of acceptance 
was permitted. It was often commented on at the time of the 
1890 Maritime Strike though never precisely spelt out in detail. 
'Even after the experience of the great strikes (1890-94 in 
Australia) there was a good deal of confusion and even contradiction 
1. Gollan, op.cit~ p. 102 
2 • Gollan, P• 104 
3. See p. 27 
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in the way the different unionists ref erred to New Unionism Ude] 
0 
Even Spence, who was the most prominent leader in the process 
of building up new unions was· not at all clear on the matter 
in 1891. t 1 Likewise, in New Zealand there was no orthodox 
position regarding •new unionism•. Each labour leader here 
bad his own ideas on what were the most.important aspects of 
•new unionism•. Nevertheless, certain features can be isolated 
as the essential characteristics of the teaching. 
The first feature of note was that the unions of the semi-
skilled and unskilled workmen were the backbone, and included 
almost the entire body of the *new uniont movement. Lacking 
the strong bargaining position that many of the craft unions 
possessed, these less skilled unions attempted to compensate 
for their weakness by banding together in labour federations. 
The 'tnew unionists' encouraged all workmen to join unions, and 
then fostered the linking of these individual unions together 
in national trades unions and federations of those national 
unions. In New Zealand, the Seamen•s Union and the coalminers• 
union, together the spearhead of •new unionism• here, wanted to 
bring lall trade unions under one head•. 2 The Maritime Council 
was partially set up to fulfil their ambition of un~ting the 
labour movement of New Zealand. The leaders of that body hoped 
I. Ebbels, Po 15 
2. 1I 1 April 1890 
I 
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it would become the lone grand unionO of this _country, with 
authority over every working man. They wanted it .to be strong 
enough to be able to resist any attempt that a combination of 
1 employers and the government might make to reduce wages. This 
was borne out by J. Lomas, the Treasurer, who early in 1890 
declared, IIf they were to be strong as.working men they must 
have a union which embraced every toiler in the colonye>t This 
objective, he believed, could be achieved if every union affiliated 
with .the Maritime Council. 2 As wilt be seen later attempts 
were made to fulfil the Onew unionists• objective during 1890, 
3 but these were thwarted by certain emp_loyers. Millar, 
expresse~ similar ideas later that year when he said that with 
the fnew unions', 'instead of each trade fighting its own battles 
singly as in the past, they lsic] were now united along the whole 
line, and could not be attacked without attacking the whole 
lot.14 -"'Both Millar and Lomas seem to have hoped that the 
Maritime Council would be the head of an all embracing labour 
federation in New Zealand, that was closely linked with labour 
unions in Australia. But owing to events, neithei· was ever 
given the chance to spell out his ideas or put them into 
practical terms. 
lo LT 1 April 1890 
2. Ibid 
3. See P• 54 
4o LT 13 October 1890 
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The 1new unionistsi were aiso distinctive in that they 
wanted their bodies to function primarily, if not solely,as 
trade bodies, and not as benevolent societies. 1 Millar for 
one in New Zealand, declared that he was firmly against the 
tmixing up of trade and friendly society functions•. 2 On 
this score Lomas held slightly more m~derate views. He wanted 
to see an insurance company set up and associated with the 
trade union movement to provide benefits for the members of 
the unions. However his adherence to the new unionist school 
is seen by the way he wanted the functions each performed by a 
different though associated organisation. While not all the 
•new unionistsl were prepared to go as far as Millar and reject 
the benefit providing function of trade unions altogether, most 
seemed to have agreed that they should be subservient to the 
task of improving workersD living standards and work conditions 
by industrial action. 
Because they emphasised the importance of industrial action, 
the lnew unionsD tende.d, on the whole, to be more militant 
organisations than the lrold unionll of the seventies. The 
leaders of the movement in New Zealand openly 'deprecated 
strikes whenever they could be avoideda. 3 Nevertheless their 
willingness to use the strike weapon, where necessary, to enforce 
their.demands; and the setting up of a 'defence• (strike) fund 
1. See Ebbels, p. 119 
2. QDT 8 July 1890 
3. 11 1 April 1890 
.. 35 -
run by their executive shows the nature of Onew unionismD 
better than all their w,ords 0 Their aggressiveness was also 
evident in the significant increase in the number of strikes 
that occurred in the period of 'new unionistO ascendency. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, the tnew unions• were 
quite aggressive bodies, and certainly showed more willingness 
to strike than the unions of earlier periods. 
·----------"---------~-
20 Trade Unionism Revived in New Zealand - The 'New Unions' 
After ten years or more of struggling to survive, if at 
all, the trade union movement suddenly, almost without warning, 
revived during 18890 New unions were established for the first 
time, and old societies were re-established0 By the middle 
of 1890 the movement had become s:tronger than ever before. 
No figures of trade union membership before 1889 are available, 
but it is likely that less than 5,000 people were members of 
labour bodies in 1888. 1 According to Salmond, this number 
had grown by the end of 1889 to 20,000, and by the middle of 
2 the following year to all of 60,000. However this later 
1. Estim~te calculated from figures given by 1I 1 April 1890 
- taking most of skilled unions listed together with seamen's 
and miners' unions. 





figure is probably grossly inflated, for even the Maritime 
council claimed in July 1890 that between 30,000 and 40,000 
workers belonged to unions. 1 The Lyttelton Times three months 
earlier had put the strength of the trade union movement at 
the more modest figure of 21,230. 2 From this figure it 
appears that just before the 1890 strike began there were 
between 25,000 and 30,000 trade unionists in New Zealand. The 
fivefold to sixfold increase illustrates how quickly the 
movement had grown in the previous eighteen months, and .how 
strong it had become by August 1890. Even so it still had a 
long way to go for, on the figures in the 1891 Census total 
trade union membership only amounted to between seventeen and 
twenty percent of all wage earners. 
~~--~-------~-------
The upswing in the New Zealand economy that took place 
during 1889 was by-far the most important reason why trade 
unions revived .here that year and the next on~o The depresssion 
suddenly seemed to be waning and unemployment, that perpetual 
foe of trade unions, was all but dispelled from New Zealando 
1. Labour July 1890 p. 1 (See bibliography) 
2. 1I, 31 March 1890 
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As a direct consequence.of the rise in affluence many workers, 
particularly those in the less skilled occupations, were able 
to organise themselves, for the first time for more than a 
decade, without fear that they would be dismissed by hostile 
employers for union activity. As on all rising markets, labour•s 
bargaining power increased and trade unions become viable propos-
itions again. Not only was it possible to establish a large number, 
!, 
of trade unions at that time, but also most of those that were 
set up actually did achieve improved conditions and wages for 
their members. The Wellington Trades and Labour Council 
noticed at the time, the tie up between the falling unemployment 
and the rising trade union movement. In its annual report of 
March 1890 it said that in the past year, 
ithe state of trade has been such as to enable 
workmen to obtain nearly constant employment, 
and secondly, with improved trade an opportunity 
has arisen for many workers to better their 
conditions, or at least regain for themselves 1 some of the advantages lost in former times. t· 
Thus, the significant increase in export receipts and the 
consequent growing pro~perity of New Zealand in 1889, by 
virtually eliminating unemployment for a time, provided a more 
favourable space in which unionism was able to revive and begin 
growing againo The slight fall in exports in 1890 did not 
arrest this process until the time of the maritime .strike. 










The sweating agitation and the London dockers' strike 
also both helped the growth of trade unions in 1889. 1 The 
I 
revelations made in Dunedin shocked a number of influencial 
employers and public men out of their complacency and moved 
them to support the growing union inovement. Trade unionism 
became for men such as Stout, H.S. /ish, 2 Bendix Ha..lenstein, 3 
and others not merely a tolerated form of 1:bour activity but 
indeed a desired form of activity. The extent to which unionism 
had come to be accepted by the beginning of 1890 was revealed 
when Hallenstein, at a Chamber of Commerce Conference during 
January read a paper on trade unionsim. In it he openly 
sympathised with trade unions, and expressed the belief that 
!they could not only be a benefit to the employed but also to 
. 4 
the employers 0 I Other speakers supported his contentions, 
one going so far as to say that ltrade unions were a matter 
of absolute necessity in the community. 't 5 Commenting on these 
remarks, the Otagb Daily Times declared that, 
'Merchants and manufacturers have at last accepted 
trades unions, not merely because they must, but 
because by experience they .have come to recognise 
their utility 0000 The battle of the trades unions 
has been fought and won 00 .i 6 
But the sweating agitation was not alone in bringing public 
opinion around to favouring trade unions. The London dockersO 
See Po 12 also Po 29 4. Quoted in Salmond, p.61 
MHR for Dunedin South s. Quoted in Salmond, p.61 
Managing Director of the N._z. 6. Quoted in Salmond, p~61 
Clothing Factory. 
; ...... , 
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strike helped also. The moderation and lack of violence 
with which that strike was conducted did a great deal to make 
people here less fearful of trade unions and their activities. 
TheY saw unions, not so much as conspiracies aimed at upturning 
their way of life, but rather as bodies of men seeking to 
. redress genuine grievances. In this way the London dockers• 
strike also helped make public opinion favourable towards unionsm 
in the later part of 1889. Furthermore, the very success of 
the London Dockers' Union, and also that of the Tailoressesll 
Union in Dunedin, no doubt both stimulated unorganised men to 
form unions. Millar•s testimony on this matter has been dealt 
1 with already. The tailoresses in Auckland and Wellington 
both tried, though not so successfully, to fallow the Dunedin 
example and form unions. Therefore, it can be seen that the 
sweating agitation and the London dockerst strike together 
induced a favourable reaction towards unions from influential 
sections of the New Zealand public and at the same time stimulated 
the formation of trade unions in this country. 
---------------------
Alone the factors listed above PFobably would have been 
< 
sufficient to bring about the revival of trade unions. The 
1. See Po. 36 
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full-time trade union organisers, who came onto the New 
Zealand scene in the late eighties gave those factors added 
weight. These men provided the labour movement in this 
country with the first overall guidance and direction it had 
had ever, and in that way were instrumental in its developing 
as much as it did then. Of them all, J.A. Millar was the 
1 
giant~ The son of a Major-General in the Indian Army, he had 
migrated to New Zealand in 1870 where he worked as a master 
mariner on Shaw Savill and Albion Company steamers to Britain, 
and on coastal vessels. Then in 1887 he retired, to become 
general secretary of the Federated Seamens• Union. As such 
he was probably the first full-time paid trade union secretary 
in New Zealand labour history. His organising ability, 
originality and firm leadership were all convincingly displayed 
soon after his appointment when he succ_essfully conducted the 
battle against the Northern Company using the Jubilee Steamship 
Company. 2 Then when the tide of unionsim turned in 1889 Millar 
stepped forward to provide the movement with the zest and 
direction it needed if it were to achieve real results. He 
was in that year an outspoken •new unionist•, who travelled 
extensively getting as many workers as possible to form unions, 
' 
and encouraging unions, particularly those of the less skilled 
1. G.H. Scholefield A Dictionar of New Zealand Bio rah Vol II 
pp. 83-4. Millar was an M.P. 1893-1914 and Minister of 
Cu:stoms, Labour, Marine and Railways ( 1906-1912). 
See also P.A. Mitchell J 1 A1 Millar & N,Z, Labour Movement 
Thesis Otago University 1947. 1 




workers, to federate together. He energetically played a 
prominent part in the •sweating agitation' and was largely 
instrumental in the forming of the Tailoresses 1 Union in 
punedin, of which he was the first Secretary. His patience 
and skill as a negotiator were seen in the way he managed to 
persuade the various clothing manufacturers to accept that 
union 1 s log without a strike. Then October that year, when it 
was agreed that a Maritime Council was to be established here 
in New Zealand, his initiative in bringing that body into being 
was justly rewarded when he was elected as ~s Secretary. 1 In 
that position he soon became the most influential labour leader 
that New Zealand had ever seen. Later during the Maritime 
Strike he was even accused of being the 1tsar 1 or the 1dictator 1 
2 of labour in this country. 
Millar was -ably supported in 1889 by J. Lomas, President 
of the Denniston Miners• Union since its inception in September 
1884 andalso of the Amalgamated Miners• Association after it 
was established later that year. 2 In 1889 and early 1890 he 
also toured tne colony helping to organise unions in many of the 
coat mines. By the end of March that year the AMA had 2,000 
members, and twelve branches compared with the two it had had 
a year before. Lomas 1 efforts for unionism were recognised 




See pp. 43 ff 
Mitchell, P• 61 
Salmond, pp.65-8 and Mitchell, Chap. 4. 
appointed by the government to inspect 
mines in N,Z., and afterwards became a 
Department of Labour. 
Lomas in 1891 was 
and report on all 
top official in the 
l 
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of the Maritime Council. Another man who also fostered, 
encouraged and worked for unionism during 1889 ~as W.J. Edwards, 
secretary of the Auckland Branch of the ASRS. He also travelled 
extensively at that time, and thanks to his efforts a colonial 
ASRS based on Auckland was established early in 1890. These 
three men, and several others too, not only added fuel to the 
fire of trade urlonism which burned increasingly more fiercely 
as 1889 progressed, but they also tried to ensure that the energy 
so generated was used to the best advantage of working men 
everywhere. They were particularly instrumental in making the 
j 
trade union federations of 1889 and 1890· viable and effective 
organisations, and not just discussion platforms as the trades 
and labour councils often seemed merely to be. 
Therefore, trade unionsim in New Zealand, and indeed 
1trade unionsim 1 or federated labour revived in 1889 and grew 
stronger during that year and the first three quarters of the 
next than it had ever been before. It did so primarily because 
rising export incomes all but dispelled the depression of the 
previous few years~ Its accompanying unemployment problem 
largely disappeared putting labour in a stronger position, in 
l 
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which it was able to organise itself. The movement was 
stimulated by the sweating agitation and the London Dockers' 
strike, which together swayed public opinion in favour of 
unions, and also opened menls eyes to the necessity of forming 
unions to protect themselves. ·Another impetus was given to the 
rising tide of unionism by the professional, full-time trade 
union organisers of the time, particularly Millar, Lomas and 
Edwa~ds~ 
30 The New Zealand Maritime Council 
(a) How it Was Established 
During October 1889 a very important series of trade union 
meetings were held in Dunedin. Nothing is known about the 
course of these meetings~ for the press was completely excluded 
from them and no records of them seem to have survived. The 
public first heard about what was going on in Dunedin on 21 
October when it was announced that a Federated Wharf Labourers' 
Union had been formed. At first only the unions from the four 
main ports were members, but it soon expanded until by the 
middle of 1890 virtually every wharf labourers' union in the 
I 
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country was a member~ D~P~ Fisher from Wellington, not a 
particularly prominent figure in the New Zealand labour 
movement, was elected president of the Federation. 1 ·,rn March 
1890, delegates from New Zealand took part in an International[siaj 
Wharf Labourers' Conference held in Sydney. The following 
month the New Zealand wharf labourers voted in favour of their 
Federation affiliating with an International[sic] Federation which 
joined it to the unions in the various Australian.ports. Apart 
from that, the whB:rf labourers• Federation. did not feature in 
the newspapers, which were for the most part reported Maritime 
council news after that body was formed. 
The day after the ·Federation had been formed, delegates 
from it were joined by those from the Seamen's Union and the 
Miners• Association and discussions about a proposed Maritime 
Council were begun in earnest~ These talks, it appears, were 
started by Millar, who had determined to form such a body as 
a result of the poor support the Seamen's Union had received from 
the other Mari time unions during the iJubilee Affair•.~ 2 His 
efforts in that direction were plainly successful when on 26 
October it wa:s announced that the delegates had agreed in 
principle to form a council, and were teen drawing up a 
constitution and rules. u Then two days later the Maritime 
Council of New Zealand was formally established. It was the 
1~ 1I. 22 October 1890 






first 'federation of labour• in: New Zealand :in the sense· that 
it was the first colony-wide combination of trade unions not 
confined to one trade or occupation. However, it appears 
that Millar did not intend that the Maritime Council should 
become the 1head of all labour in New Zealand'. as J. Lomas, its 
1 treasurer hoped it would. In an interview on 18 May, 1890 
Millar stated that the Council was a body which did for the 
sea trades, and trades connectedwi.th the sea, what the trades 
and labour councils did for the shore uninns!. At that time, 
he went on to say, it repres·ented the coal miners 1 , the seamen as 
wharf labourersz, and the wharf carters 1 , expressmen~s and 
storemen 1 s unions as well as the Mercantile Marine officers, 
altogether having over 16,000 members~ 2 In July when the ASRS 
affiliated, the Maritime Council came to have over 19,000 
. 3 
unionists in its ranks. The Cooks• and Stewards•. Union, 
for a reasoh that was never made clear, was according to the 
I 
Secretary, W.J. Waters, refused affiliation on two occasions. 4 
The Council was seriously weakened by the fact that the most 
important men on the ships under the captain and chief officers, 
the engineers, were never brought under its banner. Why they 
remained aloof was~ever explained at the time~ Possibly they 
felt that seeing they were skilled men, it was beneath their 
1! LT 1 April 1890 See also Chapter 2, Section 4~ 
2. IT 19 May 1890 
3. ODT 8 July 1890 
4. 11 30 August 1890 
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dignity to join with the mere· seamen and wharf labourers~ 
Then again,.because they were such key men on the ships the 
owners might have made special efforts to ensure that they 
were content with conditions and hence had no need to join 
the Council. The separateness of the Marine' Engineer'.s 
Association was a serious weakness in the structure that 
Millar btought togeth~r. 
On 26 October it was reported that the basis of la 
constitution for defensive purposesl had been agreed upon by the 
delegates, together with rules for conducting the business of 
the Council and rules to settle all disputes and strikes that 
might arise between members and their employers! 1 The Council 
was formally established at a public meeting held two days 
later in a Dunedin Hall. On that occasion it was armounced 
that the Council was to be, ta deliberative and representative 
body 1 , which by ;virtue of the special knowledge it had about 
the affairs of affiliated unions, and which, by sheer weight of 
numbers would be able lto enforce the carrying out of legitimate 
and necessary reforms, where a single union might find the task 
beyond its individual strength 1! More specifically, the 
Council was intended to function as a board of conciliation 
and arbitration in all disputes with employers in which a 
member union became :involved! It was also intended to draw 
up and carry out a policy which would 1 secure the best possible 
advantages t for maritime labour in those areas the Council had 
l~ .OnT 26 October .1890 
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set itself to work in~ Thirdly, it was ~o discuss, consider 
and put into force when approved,· any scheme which might be 
brought forward in the interests of trade unionism, and to use 
its influence in support of, or in opposition to, any bill or 
bills affecting maritime labour, which might be brought before 
the Parliament @icJ of New Zealand. • 
hoped that: 
Finally the founders 
1By a judicious use of these functions the Maritime 
Council of New Zealand might become an organisation 
of such importance and power that the societies incor-
porated cannot fail to obtain any just and reasonable 
concessions which they may be obliged to ask for from 
the employers of this country.'. 1 
Fisher of the Wharf Labourers' Federation was elected President 
of the Council, Millar, Secretary, Lomas, Treasurer. No 
mention was ever made of any ether executive members if there 
were any. 
Because the aims of the council as elaborated in Dunedin 
were moderate and reasonable, no hostile voices were raised 
against it a.t the time it was formed~ Some employers and 
their friends were no doubt disquieted by its appearance, but 
they were-prepared to remain silent and see how it worked out 
in practice~ 
Although the purpose of bringing those particular unions 
together into one organisation was said to be 'defensive 1_, 
in fact the council, as finally established was potentially 
a forward-going and aggressive body~ Its founders expected 
that it would, by sheer weight of numbers, 
QIU'.. 29 October 1889 
i· -. - , 
- ' --- ··--· - -~-~-- . -.,,~-----·,,· .. . .. 
be able to force 
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its legitimate demands on any or all employers. However, 
it was intended that the council should use its tremendous 
power judiciously and cautiously •. Indeed, it did do so for 
most of its life, mostly because the two most influential and 
active executive members, Millar and Loma~ were both moderates. 
Neither of them wanted to overthrow the capitalist system and 
replace it, but rat.her they wanted to improve the system so 
that working men received a fair share of its rewards! They 
were content to press employers to grant higher wages and shorter 
hours to their employees, and never advocated that the r.capi talist 
employers should be eliminated from the social system! They 
also pressed the state to legislate for the benefit of all people 
in the community, particularly the working men, and not just 
for the employers and ·farmers! 
They were in fact 'state socialistsl or 'Fabians•, and not, 
as some of their twentieth century counterparts were, 
lrevolutionary socialists t or '_Marxists'• Al though they 
spoke in class terms, the fact that they talked about the 
'working classes' rat.her than tthe working class•, and the 
1employers 1 rat.her than the lbourgeoisie 1 shows that they were 
not adherents of scientifi~ class conscious socialism~ 
" 'Syndicalism•_, a catchiry of some of their counterparts in 
Australia, and of the leaders of the Red Federation of Labour 
during the 1912-13 strikes, was never mentioned by the New 
Zealand unionists in the 1889 and 1890 period. 
I 
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Over four months before the maritime strike began, M~llar 
and Lomas set forth their viewpoints to a large audience of 
unionists and others in Christchur·ch~ They both argued that 
disputes between employers and unionists should, on virtually 
every occasion, and certainly whenever possible, be settled 
bY conciliation and arbitration and not by striking. Lomas 
went so far as to say that the leaders of trade unions were 
sometimes to blame for strikes, letting members strike without 
giving the matter in dispute sufficient consideration. He 
urged them to try all other means of settling any dispute 
before going on strike! 
However, in spite of their pleas to avoid strikes, neither 
man was preapred to repudiate the use of them altogether if a 
negotiated settlement could not be reached~ As far as can 
be ascertained, these two men had views which were typical of 
those of most unionists in New Zealand in 1889. These men 
set up the Maritime Council of New Zealand, mtending it to be 
basically a defensive body, or at least one which advanced in 
a moderate way by negotiations. But its preparedness to use 
more extreme forms of industrial action meant that it was 
potentially more militant and more aggressive than the lold 1 
craft or benefit unions I Its extensive membership meant that 
there was a danger that strikes could become widespread if 
they broke out at all. Everything would depend on the 
circumstances in which it operated, and in all circumstances 





(b) Expanding Membership and Changing Ideas about the 
Functions of the Council to May 1890 
For the first six months of its life, the Council was 
not used in the industrial field to coerce reluctant employers. 
instead, the officers of the Council concentrated their energies 
on increasing its strength by bringing more unions under its 
By May 1890, according to Millar, there were over 
16,000 members in affiliated unions, and t!is was swollen to 
over 19,000 in July when the ASRS linked up with the Council. 1 
The Maritime Council was by then the largest single grouping of 
unions in New Zealand, with over half of the country •.s trade 
unionists in its ranks. This was a formidable force, and 
many employers naturally enough were uneasy about such a 
powerful body~ 
The leaders of the Maritime Council did not intend to rest 
on their laurels. At the end of March 1890, addressing the 
Canterbury Trades and Labour Council, Lomas mentioned that a 
scheme was on foot to extend the operations of the Council so 
that it would embrace all wage-earners of New Zealand, through 
the various trad~s and labour councils. 2 At a public meeting 
the next night he reiterated the suggestion. He said then 
that he thought they could achieve the much •.desired end of 
having one head by affiliating with the Maritime Council', 
which he described as ta very powerful body 1 ~· 3 
See p~ 36 
LT 31 ·March 1890 L g 1 April 1890 




This suggestion was discussed at great length at the 
first .half yearly meeting of the Maritime Council held in 
Wellington in May 1890. ·The question arose when applications 
for affiliation were received from several trades and labour 
councils, including the Canterbury body. A scheme was 
proposed, under which a new body would be set up to control 
all labour in the colony. Each trades and labour council, 
and each union affiliated with the Maritime Council, would be 
able to send two delegates to the new organisation. Some of 
those present in Wellington thought that the Maritime Council 
might best be the proposed controlling body. After a great 
deal of discussion it was finally decided that the question 
was too important for them to decide there. Consequently 
the qustion was left openf and referred back to the trades and 
labour councils for their suggestions. It was confidently 
f expected t.ha t a decision would be reached at the Council ts next 
meeting in October; a meeting which because of the maritime 
strike that was never held. 1 Explaining the decisions made 
in Wellington, Millar said that delegates .had thought the 
question as to whet.her the trades and labour councils should 
be allowed to affiliate was too great for them. Consequently 
it was left for the general body of unionists to decide. As 
he saw it, the question was a difficult one, as the new memb~rs 
were likely to swamp the council and divert its attention from 
1. 1.! 9 May and 14 May 1890 
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purely ma.ritime matters. However, he went on to say rather 
confidently, that this was a matter of detail. He hoped to 
see all the unions of the colony combined together in the near 
1 
future. In many ways it was a significant loss to the New 
Zealand labour movement that the maritime strike broke out, and 
prevented the October meeting of the Council from ever being 
held. As it was, no comprehensive federation of labour was 
established in this country until 1937, forty-seven years after 
Millar and Lomas had first mooted that such a body be formed. 
---------------------
At the same May meeting that the affiliation issue was r 
discussed, decisions were made on a number of other important 
is8ues. Delegates from the three affiliated federations 
were present though exactly how many was never stated. 
deciding on what criteria should be used to determine w.ho 
should affiliate, the Council accepted the affiliation 
applications of the Federated Wharf Carterst Expressmen 1 s 
and Storemen•s Union and the Mercantile Marine Officers• 
Association. It then considered the dispute between the 
After 
Typographica1 Association and Whitcombe and Tombs of Christchurch 
1. 1I, 26 May 1890 
l ... ------------------~--------- - ------- ---
l 
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0 ver the decision ·by that firm to run its business on non-
union lines. By the time the Council intervened all the 
union men had been withdrawn and the printing works were 
being run by non-unionists or free labourers. After lengthy 
discussion the Council -d"ecided that the union ts claim that 
only unionists should be employed was justified. Hence it 
was resolved to circularize all affiliated unions, asking them 
to take the steps they thought were necessary to enforce 
the union's demands. 
Attention was then turned to the Shag Point Miners' 
dispute. The men .had left work after the company had 
dismissed, allegedly for union activities and nothing more, 
three leading members of the local uniono Instead of throwing 
the weight of the Council behind the men on strike, the 
delegates reacted surprisingly moderately. They merely 
decided to telegraph the-secretary of the Amalgam~ted Miners' 
Association asking .him to investigate the points at issue 
thoroughly and report back. While the investigation was 
being conducted the strikers were asked to return to work. 
The next business considered had to do with the railways. 
It was decided that a deputation from the Council would wait 
on the Railway Commissioners and ask them to support a new 
rule that would prevent anyone other than unionists being 
engaged as casual hands in all railway sheds and trucks on the 




the request • Nothing more was 'heard about it, so it seems 
to have been acceded to. 
After discussing what they believed to be very desirable 
amendments to proposed labour bills, the delegates decided to 
1ay them before the Premier. He received the deputation and 
promised to look into them thoroughly, but did not promise to 
do anything definite about them. Then it was decided that 
a defence fund would be established at once to which each 
union affiliated would pay four shillings each year for each 
member. Finally the delegates agreed to hold the next meeting 
in Auckland in October, and the conference was formally closed. 
The actual decisions reached in Wellington have been 
described in detail not because they were necessarily significant 
or interesting in themselves, but chiefly because they show 
that the Council at that time was indeed a moderate and 
reasonable body. Those delegates present 'there urged concil-
iation to settle disputes, and pressed only for ends which they 
believed were fully justified. Their actions were not guided 
by any desires for changes that were based on abstract principles 
of t socialism t. The Council in this period can hardly be 
described as anything but responsible and cautious. It was 
in no way a firebranding, revolutionary body, nor even a radical 




4. The Activities of the Maritime Council before the 
Maritime Strike 
The first dispute in which the Council actively intervened 
was settled relatively easily. At a conference arranged by 
the Council, the Directors of the Petone Wooll~ Mills and 
the Wellington Trades and Labour Council reached a satisfactory 
agreement! The Directors, in effect, capitulated, recognising 
the right of their women workers to organise a union. 
The Shag Point Miners I quarrel was a more difficult 
dispute to settle~ Early in June, after the owners had rehrned 
to accept arbitration, and had threatened to work the mine 
with non-union labour if the miners did not return to work, 
the Council brought bigger guns into the fray. Unions 
affiliated with it were instructed to refuse to handle any 
goods belonging to either the Shag Point Mine owners, or the 
two companies, Ross and Glendinning, and Mackerras and Haylett, 
in which the owners had separate shareholdings~ Rather than 
involve their business partners in the dispute, the owners 
surrendered. They- agreed to re-instate the men who had been 
put off. This was the first application of a new strategy 
of trade union activity, the •complet~ boycott', which was 
to become very popular the following month. It appeared 
that as Millar and Lomas had hoped it would be, the Council 
was strong enough to enforce demands that were beyond the 




trade unionists that this was.so, but at the same time the 
outcome must have caused considerable disquiet in the camp 
of the employers. 
Early in July, Millar advised all unionists, not onLy 
to vote in the next election, but also urged them to vote·for 
the men who were pledged to support the interests of labour. 
This was one of the first signs of the unionists actively 
interesting themselves in politics, as they did to some effect 
at the end of that year. It helps discount·the idea that 
has been put forward by various writers, that they turn~d to 
politics only after being shown by the failure of the mar,itime 
strike, the futility of industrial action to achieve better 
conditions. 
Later that same month, the essentially moderate nature 
of the Council as well as its desire to avoid open confrontation 
with employers where ever possible, were both revealed by its 
actions during the Mercantile Marine Officers I Associationls 
dispute with the shipowners. The officers made certain claims 
regarding pay and conditions to the owners,·wlio declined to 
consider them. As far as is known the Officerst Association 
in New Zealand was only connected with Australian labour 
through its membership in the Maritime Council, and not in 
any direct way~ Hence, these claims seem to be only 
indirectly connected, if at all, with those made by the Officers 1 
Associations of Melbourne and Sydney at about the same time. 
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soon after the officers here received a negative reply from 
the owners, th~y _ threatened_ to strike~ A telegram was sent 
to Millar asking ·for support from the Maritime Council if 
theY went out. At that time the executive of the Federated 
seamen's Union .happened to be in Dunedin. After consulting 
them, Millar replied to the secretary _of the Officers' 
,Association, Captain J. Highman, warning him that the Council 
would not support such drastic action unless ample proof was 
provided that the demands made were reasonable. He said that 
the general feeling in Dunedin was that the demands were too 
numerous and too large to be made at once. He advised them 
to arbitrate on the questions in dispute. Soon afterwards 
he submitted a set of points that were agreed to by both sides, 
and the trouble was settled without a strike~ 
While the Council was successfully settling all the 
above issues, it was making no .headway whatever with the 
Whitcombe and Tombs dispute! George Whitcombe, the managing 
director, stood firmly by his decision to run .his business 
with non-un1on labour. Consequently, soon after the May 
meeting, the Council began to organise a •complete boycottt 
on all the activities of that Company. The public was asked 
not to buy any goods produced by Whitcombe and Tombs, nor 
any sold in their shop. The doors of their premises in 
Christchurch were picketed, as were the doore of all those 
firms known ·to be dealing with them. School Committees 
L 
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were asked not to deal with th.em, and later in the year an 
unsuccessful attempt was made to get people sympathetic with 
the Council's cause elected onto those bodies. Agents of 
the company in other towns were persuaded to stop selling 
their products, but Whitcombe and Tombs merely opened branches 
of their own in those places. Then on 31 July after no 
progress at all had been made, the newly affiliated ASRS was 
asked to direct its members not to handle any goods belonging 
to that firm. At the same time the Union Company was informed 
that its seamen would not work on ships carrying Whitcombeis 
goods! The Railway Commissioners flatly refused to be coerced 
by the Council. They replied that as 1common carriers I they 
were bound by law to convey all goods, no matmr who they 
belonged to. Consequently they declined to refuse to carry 
goods from that firm, and made it plain that any employee 
who obeyed the.union~s directive would be dismissed. George 
Whitcombe quickly took up this point and threatened to sue 
the Commissioners or the Urion Company for damages if either 
of them refused to carry his goods. After some railway men 
in Christchurch were dismissed for obeying the unionls ruling, 
the ASRS reversed its decision and ceased to co-operate with 
the Council in enforcing a •complete boycottt on Whitcombe 
and Tombs~ 
Rebuffed in his efforts to enforce a 1complete boycott• 
against that company, Millar then began considering the 
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possibility of completely closing the port of Lyttelton in a 
iast desperate effort to bring the company to the conference 
table. Such action was generally conceded as being likely 
to lead to a strike of all maritime unions throughout the 
colony~ H0 wever, the mild hints he dropped on that subject 
received a very unfavourable reaction from people in general. 
Finally the ,idea was publicly abandoned on 16 August after 
the ASRS execu,.tive had again refused to co-operate with the 
council. His announcement that no general strike would be 
called caused a considerable sigh of relief. It was generally 
argued at the time,,and possibly with some justification, that 
-- the mere fact he had actually considered such drastic action 
to correct what many considered was a small matter, alienated 
a number of moderate, uncommitted people from the Council. 
The failure of the Whitcombe and Tombs •complete boycott 1 
and Millar's having to back down from calling a general 
strike over that issue, were grievous setbacks for the 
Maritime Council Executive~ It put paid to their hopes 
that the Council would be strong enough to be able to enforce 
labour's legitimate demands on even the bigger employers~ 
They were no doubt left more anxious than ever to prove the 
strength of their organisation in a struggle with some 
employers, and less inclined to negotiate a face saving 
compromise or back down in the futture~ Their impression was 
strengthened it seem,s, that a trial of strength between 
_._ .... _____ ------- ------~-- - ~-~------- ---~--
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organised labour and a combination of employers was fast 
8
pproaching, and that probably nothing could or should be done 
to avoid it, by the way the Railway Commissioners stood by 
Whitcombe and Tombs. Then again, because they felt that 
their organisation was weak after 16 August, they be~ame 
extremely suspicious of any move by employers that could be 
construed as an attack on labour bodies. At this point the 
Maritime Council became entangled in the Australian Maritime 
strike, and it appeared to them that the Union Company was 
combining with the Australian owners to crush trade uniorism 
in New Zealand~ They reacted tow.hat they thought was 
an attack.on them by counter attacking strongly. Exactly 
how New Zealand was drawn into the Australian Maritime Strike 
must now be examined in greater detail. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MARITIME STRIKE - AN AUSTRALASIAN AFFAIR? 
1. Industrial Relations in New Zealand early in August 1890 
On the surface, relations between employers and employees 
in New Zealand at the beginning of August 1890, were reasonably 
happy and quieto The tranquil scene was disturbed only by the 
then localised Whitcombe and Tombs dispute, and an isolated 
strike at the mines of the Grey Valley Coal Company. But 
uodernea~h there existed certain latent tensions, which only 
became fully manifest after the maritime strike began later 
that montho The Whitcombe and Tombs dispute intensified in 
the early part of August bringing some employers and the closely 
united unionists into .open conf licto 
Evidence that the unionists were not completely happy with 
the state of industrial relations early in August is slight. 
However, the Lyttelton Times, a paper closely attuned to labour 
opinions and attitudes, alluded to increasing restiveness in 
the union ranks when it reported on 9 August: 
IAn impression is abroad that a number of 
capitalists and friends of capitalists, are anxious 
to have it out with the unionsoi 
Further expressions of unionist apprehension about the 
intentions of employers in the early part of August were not 
l .... -..... --------------·-~---- ·-· 
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made openly until after the strike began here. The day after 
be had called the seamen out, Millar characterised the s~ruggle 
.as la friendly trial of strength between the partieslol He 
.also said that it had 1 long been a moot question as to the 
respective powers held by capital-and labour! which this dispute 
would settle .. He, at the same time, said the Maritime 
council was prepared for the struggle even if it lasted several 
months or more. 2 Then, the day the strike began in this 
count~Y, the Lyttelton Times reported that in Wellington, lthe 
feeling here is of satisfaction that the trial of strength between 
.the parties has come at last, for it was inevitablet·. 3 While 
the report tends to overstate the case, its wording terids to 
confirm Millaris analysis of the situation 0 
From these statements, it appears that although the unions 
seemed to be on the whole content with their material conditions 
and wages, they were apprehensive about the intentions of 
employers generally .. The unionists feared that the employers 
were combining too, to counter attack and take away most of 
the gains the unionis had made in the previous year or more. 
As has been seen already, deteriorating economic conditions 
4 gave them cause for concern .. 
The employers, on their part, do not appear to have 
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gressiveness of the unions and the high level of wages s.g 
they had to pay, which came out after the beginning of the 
strike~ How the Union Company felt immediately before the 
strike is described in an Official History of the Company 
which says: 
~For some time past Labour (sic) had been organising in 
all directions, and had gradually assumed a hostile 
attitude towards employe:r;:s,.and shown a disposition 
to dictate its own terms~1 Unions of various trades 
were established, and by their affiliations with 
each other, became a menacing power, which it was 
evident would one day have to be reckoned with!~ 1 
Though this account was written in 1913, and probably to some 
extent represents later interpretations of the Company t_s pre-
strike attitude as conditioned by the strike itseif, it was 
written from official compa~y records, particularly minutes 
I 
of ]3 oard of Directors meetings!' Because the sources were so 
close to the centre of company policy -making, it probably also 
strongly reflects the actual opinions of the timef 
. . 
Statements made by Union Company officials just after 
the strike began confirm that they were fearful of the 
growing strength and self-assertion of the labour movement 
in early Augustl J! Mills, the Managing Director, said in 
London the day after the strike started that he thought the 
Maritime Council had. become 'altogether too aggressive'. 
The leaders of that body, .he believed, had caused trouble, 
b h . t . . d d d k . th . •t t• t2 ecause t eir _position epen e on eeping up e agi a ion. 
l~ 
2. 
See Appendix E 
London Eyenin~ Mail 28 August 1890. Quoted in ODT 4 Nov 1890 
Mills was on holiday in London when the strik'e"13egan. 
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f,. director, G~ McLean, spoke in a similar vein a few days 
tater~ After emphasising, as he oft,en did during the strike, 
that the Union Company 1.had no dispute with one', he went 
on to say that al though he sympathised with the unions, he 
did not approve of their aggressive actions~ 
The above statements show plainly. that relations between 
the Union Company and the Maritime Council in particular, 
while outwardly appearing quiet and contented, were underneath 
far from calm!', Mutual suspicions about the other party's 
motives left relations strained and tense!. The possibility 
of industrial conflict was considerable, and seemed to 
increase with each passing day of August 1890. However, 
the parties in New Zealand, given time,may .have been able 
to settle their differences peacerully had not their respective 
affiliations with Australian bodies forced them into a 
conflict at the end of that month!' Hence, to fully under-
stand why the Maritime Strike started in New Zealand, it is 
necessary to examine in detail the course.of events in 
Australiai which brought about a maritime strike there in 
August 1890. 
2~ Australian Industrial Relations and the Outbreak of 
the Maritime Strike 
In Australia at the beginning of August, the labour 
unions and the employers were not as outwardly contented as 
l 
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those in New Zealand basically were. The maritime unions 
in the previous two months had successfully made, or were 
in the process of making, certain demands on the shipowners 
for increased pay, shorter hours and other improvements in 
working conditionse The owners in Australia, faced with 
severe competition from overseas lines and operating over-
capitalised businesses, were for the most part either losing 
money or in precarious financial srraits, and hence not 
inclined to look favourably on the demands of all the unions 
or even most of them. They had conceded the claims of the 
Wharf Labourers 1 Union on 26 June, after that union had 
threatened to strike. In the following month most of the 
demands of the Seamen 1 s Union were met. A ballot was being 
-conducted by that union to ascertain whether they should 
strike in favour of their insistence that eight hours a day be 
the maximum any man be required to work on any day. However, 
this canvassing of opinion was never completed before the 
maritime strike broke out 0 It was later revealed that the 
. . t f th t t d · t t · k' l maJori yo e voes coun e were agains s ri ing. 
The claims for increased pay and better conditions, 
necessary if they were to maintain their margin over other 
workers on board ship, were first made by the Marine Officers 
Association at the end of June. Nairn has shown that the 
owners from the start were determined to resist these claims 
1. N0 B. Nairn "The 1890 Maritime Strike in NSW" NSANZ Vol. 10 
No. 37 p. 8 
l 
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if they possibly could, by isolating that Association from 
·1 
other labour bodies! After delaying the reply fur several 
weeks until 19 July, they then declared that they would 
consider holding discussions about their claims only after 
the officers had severed all connections with other labour 
unions. 
The reason they offered for these conditions was that 
the officers were viewed by them as part of the executive 
structure of their organisations and not as mere labour~ 
As the representatives of the owners on board ship, it was 
not right, they argued, that the officers should be connected 
with any labour organisation~ Whet.her these objections 
were real ones cannot be determined from the evidence available 
here, for no details of the common practice aboard ship are 
to be foundf Nairn clearly believes that the argument was 
to a large extent fabricated by the owners to enable them 
-2 
·to resist the officers' demands! His argument is supported 
by the fact that while the Victorian Officers·' Association 
had affiliated with the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, it is 
unclear whether the seamen were in any way connected with that 
body~ 
But even so, the Officersl Association had affiliated 
in April previously and no objections were raised at that 
1. N.B. Nairn "The 1890 Maritime Strike in NSW" NSANZ Vol. 10 
No. 37 p.17 
2!·, Nairn p.10 · 
l 
- 67 -
time by the owners! On the other hand the. Sydney basec;l 
Officers 1 Association merely had close informal connections 
~th th~ Trades and Labour Council there~, The only maritime 
union that was affiliated with the Trades Council was the 
W}1arf La.bourersi Union. Practically all the other maritime 
and associated unions, with the exception of the marine 
engineers, were members of the Maritime Council, as also 
were the vtlarf labourers. The officers never answered the 
owners criticism of their associating with labour bodies, but 
countered them by claiming the right to affiliate with whatever 
body they chose to outside· of work hourse At this point the 
dispute changed from being a material issue over the wages of 
the officers, to one over the vital principle of unionism ·on 
which a compromise would be difficult to reach~ 
The situation remained indeterminate and on edge for some 
time! In that time both the Cooks t and Stewards• Union and 
the Marine Engineers•. Association had lodged claims against 
the ownersf This made them more determined than ever to 
( . 
resist the officers I demand's!' The dispute came to a head on 
31 July, when the shipowners set up a bogus union, the 
Mercantile Marine Service of Australasia, and granted it pay 
increases smaller than those asked for by the official union. 
As far as can be determined nobody in this country commented 
on the fact that the bogus union was Australasian, and hence 
could equally have applied to New Zealand, where the officers 
l 
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had already won increases~ 
For the Australian officers that was the last straw~ 
After discussing the matter thoroughly with the other 
unions in the Sydney Trades Council, and no doubt ·getting'a 
promise of support from that body, the officers in both 
New South Wales and Victoria sent the.owners an ultimatum 
on 7 August~ In it they insisted that unless their demands 
were met by 15 August they would be forced to leave their 
The owners, who had not been prepared to risk the 
wharf labourers stopping work in June, had by this time 
accepted the possibility of a strike. There is no evidence 
that any new conciliatory proposals were made by either side 
in the int·ervening week. On16 August the officers left 
their ships, precipitating the largest industrial conflict 
the Australian colonies had ever experienced up to that time. 
From this point the strike escalated qui~kly until all 
the maritime unions except the Marine Engineers Association 
were involved! It spread firstly through the ranks of the 
New South Wales unionists, then to the other Australian 
colonies, and finally to New Zealand~ The motives of the 
various unions for going out changed in emphasis substantially 
as the strike progressed! The Sydney Wharf Labourers• Union 
went out on the 19th, basically as an expression of sympathy 
with and support for the striking officers~ The owners 
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then carried the dispute a stage further by hiring nnn-union 
or scab labour on the wharves~ This forced the seamen, and 
cooks and stewards to go out. They mostly left because, 
as unionists, they could not work with non-unionists and still 
remain true to the principles of unionism~ This refusal 
of unionists to work alongside non-unionists,· or to work 
for employers who hired such men, was the main reason for 
the spread of the-strike from this time onwards~ As will be 
seen shortly, it was the reason especially that it spread to 
New Zealand~ The feeling of sympathy for fellow unionists 
on strike, while it influenced the decision of the Australian 
unionist:Eand also those inLNew Zealand to stop work, was not 
the main reason they did so. 
The spread of the strike to unionists in other ports in 
Australia has not been clearly chronicled, but it seems that 
most of the men who went out were on strike by 25 August. 
That day a Steam Ship Owners Association meeting was held at 
Albury, at which the owners declared that after the strike 
they would remain faithful to the "free" labour that worked 
for them during it~ In this they implicitly declared that 
they were against the basic principle of unionism : that only 
unionists i.should be employed, or at least given pref e:i:::ence in 
any firm or industryr Strenuous efforts we~e made by, the 
Australian owners both before and after the Albury meeting 
to man the wharves and ships left idle by the· striking unionists, 
~ith non-union men~- Their endeavours in that venture met 
l 




So it was that the Australian colonies became involved 
in the largest, most widespread,-and bitterest labour dispute 
theY had ever known up to that time~ This strike has to 
some extent at least, affected the political and labour 
relations history of Australia ever since! Within a 
fortnight of its beginning in'Sydney, the strike had even 
spread to the colony of New Zea~and, and the reasons for 
this extension must now command 1our attention! 
3!- How New Zealand Became Involved in the Australian 
Strike 
The Australian Maritime Strike first affected New Zealand 
shipping on 19 August, when the Sydn.ey -Wharf Labourers I Union 
stopped work on all ships belonging to the members of the ASOA~ 
The Union.Company was included in the strike, not because its 
officers had left their ships, ,{ut primarily because that 
company was. a dominant member :.; of the ASOA!J The first Union 
Company vessel affected by the strike in Sydney was the 
Waih9£.s., which had been there for several days before the 
1' • Nairn p~4 
l 
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daY that work on the wharve; wa·s stopped!-1 ~he next day, 
the Sydney agent of the Company cabled Dunedin asking for 
t . i'i 1nstruc ions. The Acting Managing Director, D~yJd Mills, 
met Millar and discussed the matter at length~-. Millar 
afterwards cabled Sydney and instructed the seamen on the 
Wailp ra to discharge the vessel themselves, and to continue - . 
working as long as non·-union labour was not hired to work 
on the ship. Non-union men were allowed to receive the goods 
on the wharves, although that was technically a breach of the 
rule which forbade unionists to work with non-unionists~· 
Millar also cabled the Sydney Maritime Council asking that New 
Zealand ships be exempted from the strike; provided they were 
worked only by union labour. 
Most newspapers in New Zealand hoped that this country 
might be able to keep out of the Australian Strike~-1 George 
McLean, a director of the Union Company later admitted that 
Millar had in fact tried to keep iew ~ealand out of the qua~rel 
at first!'1 The 'ctew of the Waihora finished discharging its 
cargo and the ship sailed for Newcastle on 21 August! The 
day the Waihora sailed, the Taieri arrived in Sydney, and also 
began discharging with its own crew in the holds! Later, 
justifying the decision to hire free men in Sydney to work 
that ship, D~ Mills claimed that the rate of unloading was so 
slow it would have taken a month to complete the job instead 
of the usual few daysf However he then very curiously went 




to declare that delay was not'caused by the seamen being 
unable to get cargo out of the holds fast enough, but rather 
~as a result of 1free men being engaged on the wharf to carry 
,-1 
cargo into the stores 1 ~ The 9hfil! arrived in Sydney on 22 
August, and was, according to Com~any spokesmen, 'subject to a 
similar delay~-, These assertions were .never contradicted 
bY the Maritime Council here, and can hence be taken as an 
accurate picture of events in Sydney at that time!. 
The next important development in the Australian strike, 
and one which the Lyttelton Times saw would '_probably be felt 
in New Zealand 1 was the ASOA conference held in Albury on 23 
and 24 August. Several motions were adopted there which 
provided part of the basis for the Unionists• •_employer plot 
thesis•: to explain the strike! Fi.!:9.tly the owners decided 
that 1no officer would be given command of a vessel if he 
was connected with any association affiliated with a labour 
union 1 ~ This was obviously a continuation of the effort 
by the owners to isolate the Officers' Association and refuse 
its demands!· However, it ~as also an attack on what was 
considered by the 'New Unionists' to be a vital principle of 
unionism: that every uni.on had the right to affiliate with 
other labour bodies to form large, strong, federations of 
labourf Certainly that was how the unionists in both 
I!! 6 September 1890 




}.ustralia and New Zealand saw it~ They thereafter honestly 
believed :hat the owners, by breaking up federations a 
iabour unions, intended to crush each union individually in 
This in essence was the 1employer plot thesis•. which 
was propounded at great length in many varied forms during 
the two and a half months of the strike, and for some time 
(· 
afterwardse The plot thesis was further strengthened by 
the next motion passed at Albury in which the owners openly 
rejected the basic principle of unionism : that unionists 
cannot work with non-unionists"--except when there was a 
shortage of union labour~ They unanimously agreed: 
•No free labour engaged during the strike would 
be discharged at the termination of the struggle, 
provided it was competent and of good character~•. 1 
This motion was the stumbling block on which all attempts at 
negotiating a settlement fell down, as far as the unions were 
They could not agree to work with non-unionists 
and still remain effective organisationsf The owners in such 
a situation could easily refuse union demands by hiring non-union 
labour on their own terms! These two motions further show 
that while, as Nairn says,.the owners had largely, though 
often grudgingly, accepted unionism in the early part of 1890, 
by August of that year, as times became harder in both 
Australia and New Zealand, they seem to have decided that they 
would have to crush the unions if they were going to cut costs, 
1! 1! 27 August 1890 
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and.hence reduce their losses~ 
Finally at Albury, the owners requested newspapers to 
cease using the abusive term~ 1.blacklegs •. and use instead the 
term •.free labourers•. to describe the non-unionist employers!-
Apart from the very strong, labour-supporting, Dunedin paper, 
the Globe, all New Zealand newspapers compliedf 
The above resolutions were a direct attack on unionism 
itself, and not only an attempt to resist the increasing 
demands of the unions in Australia~ In fact the Albury 
Conference marks a turni~g point in the whole drama! By its 
.') 
pronouncements, the Australian conflict was explicitly 
mmsformed into a fight over principles and ceased to be in 
any primary sense a dispute over wages or conditions~' On 
points of principle compromises in industrial disputes have· 
been in the past extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
arrive atf The owrers seemed at Albury to be saying, and 
indeed did try to say, as it turned out, that they were 
determined to continue the struggle to the bitter end, and 
crush unionism completely!-, The ~ustralian strike spread 
to New Zealand directly after the Albury Conference, largely, 
if not entirely, because the Union Company, on its steamers in 
Sydney, decided to join the Owners•. Association in whatever 
·1 
they might require of them~ 
The Union Company •.s ship Tarawera arrived in Sydney on 
24 August! It also W:!. s delayed through being denied union 
1. 11 6 September 1890 
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¢larf labour; At that time in Sydney, each shipping company 
o¢ied its own wharves, for which it hired labour directly 
from the pool of men offering~ The day after the T.arawera 
a,rrived, the Union Company head office cabled its Sydney agent 
that .it was •_prepared to fall in absolutely with the ASOA 
in future action'. and as a result free -labour was employed 
·1 
to discharge the Tarawera! The most detailed and only 
first hand account of events in Sydney that was published here 
came from the Sydney correspondent of the •_Argus 1,!·, According 
to him, the Union Company on 25 August asked the union seamen 
to work with non-union men to speed up th~ unloading! Why 
this was done is not clear, for Mills claimed the bottleneck 
was on the wharves, not in the holds worked by the union 
r seamen. The seamen, adhering firmly to union rules, refused 
( 
to co-operate. An attempt was made to get around the 
difficulty by sending all the crews onto one ship, and 
discharging the others with non-unionistsi This arrangement 
was not agreed to!. The Company, claiming at this point that 
the seamen had refused duty, proceeded to hire non-union men 
-2 
to discharge al 1 three of its ships in Sydney l 1 It did so, 
knowing, according to Sir Robert Stout, that •_if this were 
done a strike would ensure !' •• The Union Company 1 ; he went on 
to assert, •therefore, with its eyes open, practically invited 
. 3 
a strike~• The Otago Daily Times also saw the significance 
TI! 6 Septembe:- 1890 - statement by D. Mills 
Reprinted in....QQI. 3 September 1890 
1I 23 September 1890 
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of these events in Sydney when.it commented: 
•The overt act of the Sydney agent in employing 
non-union men was understood by the Maritime 
Council and the Trades and Labour Councils in 
this colony as distinctly identifying the Union 
Steam Ship.Company with the Australian 
shipowners~'• 1 . 
Millar likewise believed that 1the strike was brought about 
bY the determination of the ASOA to employ non-union labourf• 2 
The manifesto of the Marttime Council, issued the day after the 
strike began here was more explicit as to why the seamen were 
called out in ,Sydney! It asserted: 
"We admit that no direct quarrel with the Union 
Company exists at present, .but the Union Company, 
being a portion of an Association which has openly 
expressed its intention of crushing Labour Unions 
(sic), cannot be expected to run free, and thus far 
they sh~re the responsibility for causing the present 
crisis !~~. Had the Union Company not employed 
blacklegs, the ~ydney w.harf trade might still have 
been kept open! •• but having thrown in their 
lot '(sic) with the Association and determined to 
assist in the crushing of Labour Unions, they cannot 
any longer expect us to work for them~1•. . 
The manifesto ended with the assertion that the unions took 
the action they did purely in self def ence~·J Thus, the unionists 
here interpreted with a certain amount of justification the 
Union Company •.s hiring of free labour in Sydney as an attack 
on their organisations, and so counter attacked in defence of 
unionism~ That they had been tense and uneasy about a 
possible attack can be seen in the way the Lyttelton Times 
2
1.t, QQ1 3 September 1890 
LT 19 September 1890 
3. ~ 28 August 1890 
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reported that, 1The feeling here (in Wellington) is one of 
atisfaction that the trial of strength has come between the s . 
parties at last;' for it was inevitable~ •1 Because of this 
almost fatalistic attitude about the possibility of an 
industrial conflict, they were probably less inclined to seek 
8 negotiated settlement than they might otherwise have beenf 
Therefore, the underlying tense state of industrial relations 
here in early August 1889, the connections of New Zealand 
labour and capital with Australia and certain events there all 
contributed to the strike of the union seamen in Sydneyf That 
strike spread rapidly through the ranks ·of New Zealand labour 
until practically all the unions affiliated with the Maritime 
Council here were out~ 
The Union Company on the other side hired free labour in 
Sydney, so it said, because the rate of unloading was going 
too slowly. However the speed of work there appears to have 
been only a minor factor behind their decision~ The main 
reason they fell in '.absolutely with the ASOA in future 
actionR was because the Association put pressure on them by 
threatening to run ships against them· on the trans-Tasman 
run, over which they had virtually a, monopoly! Sir Robert 
Stout and a number of unionists including Millar frequently 
blamed them for that,and these allegations were ne'V:er denied 
-2 
by the Company! The Timaru Herald, a paper which on several 
26 August 1890 
30 August and 23 September 1890 
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occasions openly stated its opposition to the Maritime Council 
.and its strike, thought that this was not an impossible 
situation, for as it asserted: 
'Whether the Australian owners win or lose, they 
will have to reduce the cut-throat competition 
they have kept up for sometime, and this will set 
some of their steamers freeo The high freights 
in the New Zealand trade would no doubt be very 
tempting 0 r 1 
Naturally enough the Union Company never directly admitted 
these accusations to be true, for to have done ·so would have 
given the labour party a propaganda victory. As it was the 
company tried, and did successfully show that the Unions went 
out on strike for Australian and not New Zealand reasons. 
Such an interpretation of events lost the labour side a large 
degree of public support" However, D. Mills did hint that 
the unionist taunt was true when he wrote after the Australian 
seamen had gone out in support of their officers 1 claims: 
•At this point our position became critical, as 
we had to choose between breaking our affiliations 
with ASOA, and joining them in whatever they might 
require of us.t 2 
He later denied that the Union Company had any thought of 
1crushing the unions', which adds further weight to the 
suspicion that they were to .some extent pressured into the 
strike by the Australian owners. However, as Sir Robert 
Stout well stated, 2How far they were coerced into such action 
1. TH 2 September 1890 
2. I!! 6 September 1890 
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· bY the ASOA only the correspon.dence and cablegrams of the 
1 union Company would show. 1. But unfortunately the official 
records of the Company are still not available for inspection 
bY historians, although seventy-seven years have passed- since 
the strike ended~2 One is therefore left with the strong 
impression that there maybe an element of truth in the 
allegations~ If, as seems likely, the Australian owners 
did put pressure on the Union Company to fall into line, then 
it alters the traditional interpretation of the strike, which 
says that the strike spread to New Zealand primarily because 
the Maritime Council called out its members in sympathy with, 
and in support of the striking Australian unionists~ Rather, 
it appears that the strike spread here partly as a result 
of the Union Company forcing a dispute on the New Zealand 
unions rather than face competition from the other members 
of the ASOA. Such an interpretation also· modifies the more 
blatant iemployer plot thesis' in so far as the Union Company 
was unwillingly coerced into the dispute. 
The decision of the Union Company to hire free labour in 
Sydney, even if pressure was applied by the other owners, was 
not, it seems, unwillingly made. As "1as shown earlier, the 
Union Company had apparently become worried by the middle of 
August 1890 about the way the trade union movement in New 
Zealand was then becoming stronger,more united, and more 
1. 1! 23 September 1890 
2. Based on personal visit to Company Head Office, Wellington, 
in May 1967. 
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aggressive than ever before. Reports appearing in the press 
500n after New Zealand labour had become involved in the strike 
confirm the impression that the Union Company had, by the 
time of the strike, pecome to some extent anxious to have 
it out with the unions. The Oamaru Mail asserted: 
•The [Australiaaj steamship owners .view with 
apprehension the universal combination of 
labourers th~t is taking place, because they 
realise it means the exercise of an absolute 
power in a way that might prejudice their interests. 
Because of this, it is not hard to see why other 
capitalists are involved in the attempt of the 
owners to crush out unionism in Australia.t 1 
This statement. can equally be applied to the New Zealand 
situation at that time. The manifesto of the Union Company 
clearly set out its attitude! It shows that the Company was 
becoming entirely dissatisfied with its relations with the 
unions, and wanted them put on a different footing~ 
it declared: 
•the present policy of the Labour Unions of all 
Australasia, which has led to imminent paralysis 
to trade in all tf::te colonies, and which has kept 
In it 
up constant irritation and unbearable uncertainty 
in all departments of trade for some months past, 
is the outcome of a general determination on their 
part to try their strength with all employers of 
labour~ There .has been no dispute of any serious 
character in New Zealand, and the disputes in 
Australia cannot be considered to bear any ?::elation 
to the measures adopted by the Unions (here)! The 
Directors therefore have no alternative left but 
to fall in with the ASOA and other employers of 
labour, and support them to the utmost of their 
power in opposing the encroachment of the Labour 
·unions by every possible means, until it is found 
that negotiations can be reopened with some prospect 
1. OM Quoted in LT 28 August 1890 
____________ ___:___,_ ___ ----~-------------~------! 
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of such a settlement as will enable them to 
conduct their business with some degree of 
comfort and confidence~' 1 
. 
This, the most forthright statement of the Company's position 
confirms that it was becoming increasingly uneasy about the 
growing power and increasingly aggressiveness of the trade 
unions of New Zealand!. Furthermore the Company was well 
prepared for a conflict by late August!' At that time, 
in spite of the fact that the winter when coal was most in 
demand had just ended, they had over 11,000 tons in hulks. 
The .1:£ttelton Times reporter who revealed that commented:-
1The company has been preparing for a lqng time 
for a trial of strength with the unions, and is 
not at all sorry, ·r hear, that the time.has come. 
In fact that is not even an open secret, but 
notorious! 1 ' 
Even allowing for the pro-labour bias of that paper, the report 
is a further indication that by the end o.f August, the 
! 
Company was moving, so it seems towards an open confrontation 
with the unions. No doubt their desire to have it out 
with the unions at that time was strengthened both by the 
fact that Whitcombe and Tombs had humbled the supposedly 
mighty Maritime Council less than a fortnight earlier, and 
also by the slackness of trade, which made it easier to 
maintain services. Hence, it can be seen that even if the 
Union Company had to some extent been coerced into forcing 
its men out, it was probably not really unwilling to join in 
the Maritime strike at that time! 
-------------------




















4. The Escalation of the Strike in New Zealand 
(a) On the Waterfront 
The day after the seamen from the three vessels in 
Sydney refused to work with the free wharf labourers hired 
to work those ships, Millar, as secretary of the Seamen's 
Union, conferred with the manager and the managing director 
of the Union Company. After ascertaining, he later said, 
that there was no prospect of a speedy settlement in 
Australia, he called out the men from all the other inter-
colonial steamers belonging to the Company. He wired Captain 
J'.~ Highman, Secretary of the Marine Officersl Association, 
informing him of what had taken place, and expressing 
confidence that the officers would take similar action. 1 
Strike action had been decided on, .he declared, because the 
Union Company was connected with the ASOA, which had vowed 
to crush unionism. This was the first of the effects of 
the Albury Conference to reach New Zealand. 
At that stage Millar insisted that a settlement could 
only be reached after the Union Company had seceded from the 
ASOA and agreed to pay the rates the Australian owners had 
f 
.2 re used. This latter demand was soon dropped~ It seems to 
have been made on the spur of the moment without investigation, 
for the New Zealanders were already then getting more tp.an the 
1. QQI 28 August 1890 
2. 1I. 27 August 1890 
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. 1 
iustralians were demanding 0 The former condition was 
modified soon after the strike began 0 Millar then insisted 
ttiat he realised the Union Company could not break away 
from the Cwners 0 Association because of its Australasian 
services. Instead of secession, he then demanded that the 
Union Company dissociate itself from the policy of that 
issociation as propounded at Albury. 2 His insistence through~ 
out the dispute on this point shows once again how the New 
Zealand unionists stopped working Union Company steamers because 
they felt that Cqmpany was, by associating itself actively 
with the Albury resolutions, deliberately attacking the basis 
of unionism. This was the pivot around which the entire 
dispute here revolved. 
Immediately' the order went out, the eighty seamen on 
ta:>ard the Wairarapa, which happened to be in Dunedin then gave 
twenty-four hours notice., and duly left at the end of that 
period 0 At the time he called out the men from the Wairarapa, 
Millar stated quite plainly that the New Zealand coastal trade 
would not be interfered with as long as the Union Company did 
not replace the striking union crews, or even attempt to, with 
non.union or 'free@ labour0 But the officials of the Company, 
encouraged no doubt by the large number of telegrams they claimed 
to have received from men seeking employment, seemed by that 
1. CDT 27 September 1890 
2. CDT 29 August 1890 
l 
.. 84 -
stage to have made up their minds to escalate the dispute even 
further; ·hiring free labour for the inter-colonial steamers 0 
Ad~ertisements for firemen and trimmers were placed in Dunedin 
newspapers straight away 0 Replacements were found for the 
H,Airarapa, and before the officersG twenty.four hourst notice 
had expired, the ship sailed. 
Frequent complaints were made at the time about the poor 
quality of the crew so hired but nothing was ever done about 
it. The officers, like the seamen, strongly objected to 
workipg with non-unionists and they were from then on also 
drawn into the strike. 
As soon as the free labour went onto the Wairarapa the 
dispute was carried a stage further by Millar, who immediately 
called out all the seamen and firemen working on the Company's 
steamers, no matter how small or large they were, as he had 
threatened to do. Highman soon afterwards advised the rest 
of the officers to stop working for the Union Companyo Those 
in Lyttelton met, and the majority decided to stop work. To 
the delight of the anti-labour press, a small, though relatively 
insignificant number of officers remained with the Companyo 
Many of those who decided to strike turned their masters! 
certificates over the Stout, as a guarantee that they would 
remain loyal to the unionist cause to the end of the conflict. 1 
The next .fo go out were the wharf labourers. 




not cease working the Union Company's vessels all at one time, 
but rather, in each port: .met and decided for themselves when 
snd to what extent they would stop work 0 Increasing pressure 
was gradually applied to the Uninn Company by the wharf 
iabourersO unions at each stage of the conflict. To begin 
with they refused to load any inter-colonial steamers 0 Then 
wtien free labour was put onto those ships the wharf labourers 
stoutly refused even to discharge them. It was not until the 
company had advertised for free labour for all their steamers, 
and to work as wharf labourers on their inter ... colonial ships 
that the various wharf labourersl unions applied the Dcomplete 
boycottO to themo Then, the Cor:npany made a vigorous attempt 
to hire enough free labour to keep the cargoes flowing across 
the wharves of New Zealand and over the seaso It was quite 
successful in this endeavour, man,aging to keep goods moving, 
though at a considerable cost. 
The other sea-going Union which went on strike, the 
. 
Federated CooksO and StewardsD Union, was not affiliated 
to the Maritime Council. This body consulted the Australasian 
Cooks• and Stewards' Federation before taking any action. 
Then a ballot was conducted which revealed forty ... three in 
favour of going out and only fifteen against ite. Consequently 
on 1 September all the cooks• and stewards~ on the Union 
Company vessels stopped work. Unlike the other unions, who 
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the d)Oks• and stewards= strike was basically an expression 
f sympathy with their 'federated "(sic) brethren in Australial,· 
0 . 
s.nd secondly lin rupport of the principles of unionism 
11 a 1 genera Y • 
Even before the rooks and stewards went out, the strike 
had spread inland from the waterfront to the other unions 
affiliated with the Maritime Council. They all became involved 
either because they had to refuse to work with non-union labour, 
or by taking part in the effort to enforce a complete boycott 
·against the· Union Company0 After the wharf labourers, the 
strike spread to the w.harf carters, who refused to carry any 
goods to tl:B ships being loaded by free labour. They were 
dismissed for disobedience, and where possible, replaced with 
free labourers. Several farmers brought their drays into the 
ports to help keep the produce moving. The storemen in turn 
refused to load carts driven by nonaunion labour, and were 
disni..ssed, and replaced by free labourerso 
In Christchurch, the w.harf carters, because they carted 
goods to the railway goods sheds, and not right dow.n to the 
wharves in Lyttelton did not have to strike rather than work 
with non.unionists 0 The tnion railwaymen who did not go out, 
acted as a buff e:t whi'ch insulated them from the free labour in 
1. Letter Book Federated Cooks' and Stewards• Union 
1 September 1890 p 0 688 
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But the merchants and master carters there, 
obviously wanted to crush the Wharfcarters 1 and Storemen•s 
On 28 August they ordered all the.men belonging to 
that body to leave the union or face dismissal. The vast 
majority chose the latter case, and were dismissed!. This 
was a blatant case in which employers tried to crush unionism 
by forcing the men to strike!' However, it was not planned 
before the strike began, but was an example of opportunism of 
the first order. 
(b) The Railways 
The ASRS, which had only affiliated with the Maritime 
Council just over a month previously, and which had refused 
to sanction strike action during the Whitcombe and Tombs 
dispute, was only marginally involved in the maritime strike~ 
The attitude of that Union had not changed materially in the 
fortnight after 15 August! The railway unionists alone 
assessed the true strength of unionism in August 1890. They 
realised, or at least the executive of their union did, that 
their places were likely to have been filled if they went out, 
and it would have been difficult for the men to obtain suitable 
1 employment later. However, they did support the strike to 
the extent of refusing to work in place of striking unionists~ 
Hence, when 150 permanent way men were put into the railway 
trucks on the wharves of Lyttelton, the national executive had 
l~ f 2 September 1890 
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no hesitation in ordering them to stop work. The Railway 
commissions dismissed these men and hired the free labourers 
offered them by the.Canterbury Chamber of Commerce instead.I 
As a consequence of this a mass protest meeting of over 
2,ooo men was held in Christchurch on 3 September 0 There, 
8 
resolution was unanimously adopted expressing admiration of 
and unqualifiedly approving the way the men in Lyttelton had 
gone out. -.. -Those present pledged themselves to stop work to 
8 man if cal led upon to do so to force the reinstatement of 
2 
· the dismissed men. The Commissioners replied that they could 
not reinstate the men who had _been put off for disobeying their 
orders. They also asserted that they intended to remain 
neutral in the dispute, as they had been up to that time. 
But the Commissioners did not seem to·be neutral when on 
10 September, they dismissed four prominent members of the 
Canterbury branch of the ASRS executive, El vines, Owen, Winter 
and Newton, allegedly for moving and seconding the above 
mentioned motion, and for inci~ing railway men to disobey 
their employers 0
3 This was clearly an attempt on their part 
to weaken the ASRS for as the chairman of the second mass 
protest meeting held on 11 September declared, •·These men were 
dismissed as scapegoats, as the opinions they represented were 
those of the society as a whole.• At that meeting the rest 
1. LT 2 September 1890 
2. 11 4 September 1890 
3. LT 11 September 1890 
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of the men were urged not to strike •as the commissioners 
,, 
spparently wanted them tol. Rather they were told that. they 
should press continually for the reinstatement of all the 
dismissed men w.hile carrying on working as usual 0 
The railway plate layers in Westport were also called 
out when they were put to work on the wharves. Soon afterwa1:ds 
everY railway man in the district stopped work in protest at 
the dismissal of the platelayers 0 Train services were 
suspended and Denniston was virtually isolated0 The very 
1ow unemployment in the Buller district consequent upon the 
1ack of seasonal work meant that free labour was very scarceo 
The wage offered for men was 5/- an hour compared with the 
2/ ... an hour paid in most other parts of the country" The 
Union Company manager, his clerks and a few townsmen worked 
on the wharves as best they coulde It was feared that 
provisions might run short. However the Anchor Line continued 
to run on union lines and was able to get fresh supplies in 
before shortages became acute. Both the Anchor and.the Union 
Companies raised freights by fifty per cent soon after the 
strike began. The Buller rail strike was not settled until 
mid-October, when the dismissed men were reinstated after 
agreeing to obey the Commissioners explicitly in the futureo 
The railway dispute, because it involved men who were 
employed by the government, was raised in the H0 use, and 
became a political issue for a time. John Ballance, the 
- 90·-
Leader of the Opposition, accused the Railway Commissioners 
of trying to crush unionism~ It was their det.ermination to 
do so, he claimed, 1that caused the whole thing 1_. 1 Various 
other urban 'Liberal I speakers asked the government to intervene. 
aut E~ Mitchelson, the Acting Premier, replied that the 
Railway Commissioners were independent, and he did not want 
the government to interfere in the running of the railways~- 2 
I 
HcMever, the Opposition was by no means united on this issue. 
J. McKenzie, later Minister of Lands in the Ballance Government, 
thought that the,railway servants should disband their union 
altogether. He defended the Commissioners' action of dismissing 
t . b ,·3 the four execu ive mem ers. Nothing came of this eebate. 
But it did give members a chance to air their views on the 
strike in general and the railway strike in particular. 
The Canterbury execu~ive sent a petition to the 
Commissioners early in October requesting them to reinstate 
the dismissed men~ The Commissioners had moderated their 
stand considerably by that time for they replied that no 
applications for reinstatement had yet been received; no 
longer insisting that the men could not be given jobs again. 4 
up 
They had in the meantime kept/ their attack on the ASRS. G. Newton, 
President of the Dunedin branch and L. Harris, the Secretary, 
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the rules and not incite the railway men to disobedience. 1 
Furthermore, in an ultimatum circulated on 18 September, 
the Commissioners attacked the ASRS Executive for affiliating 
that body with the Maritime Council, thus drawing the public 
servants into a quarrel which did not af eect them in the 
ieast. . They went on to decalre that they would not, in the 
future, recognise or deal with an executive 1whose influence 
and judgment had been so bad r. They suggested that if the 
ASRS wanted their recognition and co-operation it should 
alter its constituion in various ways. 1Amongst the 
alterations it suggested was the addition of a stipulation 
that the society should not affiliate with the Maritime 
Council or any other union. Furthermore only railway men 
should, they went on, be members! This provision was aimed 
at, amongst others, C.J. Rae, Christchurch secretary, who 
had never worked on the railways, No members should at any 
time, incite other employees to disobey the Commissioners• 
rules! ·· Then the society would have to decentralise and give 
prime authority to the local branches. Finally, theysaid that 
•rt must be open to all employees either to join or withdraw 
from the society at pleasure, under reasonable regulations~ 12 
In other words the ASRS was called upon to abandon the closed 
shop principle altogether. At that time the national executive 
1. ,1I 20 September 1890 
2. ,1I 19 September 1890 
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~ejected these proposals outright, for it realised that 
acceptance of them would have left the society virtually 
1 crippled. The Commissioners won a victory over the 
1.SRS in the middle of October when they agreed to take back 
the dismissed men, provided they signed a declaration 
admitting the decision to strike .had been wrong, agreeing 
to obey the rules implicitly; and severing their connections 
with unionism as it was then constituted. Many applied for 
.. • 1-.2 re-appointment on these conditions. In doing so, these men 
effectively reno~nced the ASRS as it then existed~ The ASRS 
was powerless to prevent this erosion of its power. Finally 
on 3 November, the executive capitulated and allowed the men 
to apply for re-appointment on the Commissioners' terms 
without prejudicing their position as unionists. Hence, the 
ASRS was defeated without a full-scale fight~ 
---------------------
(c) The Miners' Strike 
The coal miners who were members of unions affiliated with 
the Maritime Council went on strike early in the dispute. 
Their strike was almost entirely an attempt to enforce a 
1. 
2 • 
1! 20 September 1890 
~ 23 October and 27 October 1890 
l 
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•complete boycott• against the Union Company for employing 
. • t I~ non-unionis s. As early as March 1890 Lomas had proposed 
that a reluctant employer could probably be coerced into 
negotiating a settlement to a dispute, by starving him of coal. 1 
Soon after the Union Company hired free labourers for 
its steamers in August, the Maritime Council called for a 
coal miners boycott of that firm! Each union sought guarantees 
from its employers that the Union Company would not be supplied 
with coal~ When these demands were rejected all work in the 
:2 
mines stoppedl~ 
Partly because labour other than the union miners was 
scarce in mining districts where there was little or no seasonal 
work, and partly because the owners were reluctant to force 
their employees out of their homes, the mine owners were 
slower than other employers in hiring free labourr However, 
in mid-September the Westport Coal Company provided a lead and 
h . 1·.J advertised for men to replace t e strikers.1 By the end of 
the month sufficient men had been hired to start working the 
Denniston mine again!- A fortnight's delay resulted when the 
inexperienced free labourers smashed a brakedrum on the incline. 
-
A replacement, which was quite costly, had to be brought from 
Australia~ In mid-October the old miners, with no work they 
could do, and turned out of their homes, which the Company 
1 April 1890 
29 and 30 August 1890 
14 September 1890 
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o¢1ed, began drifting out .of the district~ The Globe lamented 
that the Denniston Brass Band, which it described as the best 
on •the coast• had to be disbanded~! 
The Grey'Valley Coal Company also advertised for men at 
The Brunnerton Union, realising that they were 
likely to find themselves beaten as soundly as the Denniston 
miners had been, tried unsuccessfully to reach an agreement 
with the owners 'Whereby all the strikers would be taken. back. 
This was refused, and they were forced to apply individually. 
By the time they applied some places had been filled, and 
only forty-six o; the sixty applicants were re-engaged~ 2. By 
the end of October the Brunnerton strike was virtually over 
also. The strike at other mines ended during the first part of 
October, when the various unions capitulated and went back 
on the owners• terms~ Hence the strike by the miners was a 
complete failure, with all the miners having to return to 
work unconditionally before the 'Maritime strike•. was officially 
ended~ 
(d) Effects of Miners• Strike 
li • 2 • 
The attempt to bring the Union Company to its knees by 
G 15 October 1890 
t'1:. 18 October 1890 
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starving it of coal had failed even before the first miners 
nad admitted defeat[ The Union Company had 11,000 tons of 
coal in hulks, which was more than enough to keep all its 
steamers running, except those laid up as a result of a short-
sge of work~l Coal was ordered from Newcastle in New South 
Wales, Cardiff in Wales and Japan to replenish stocks in 
case the strike dragged on. When the Rangatira arrived 
with 6,500 tons on 17 September, the Union Company announced 
that they had enough coal to be able to supply the 'home• 
steamers also. 2 from that time onwards the Union Company 
also sold some coal from its hulks to certain freezing companies! 
Hence the strike of the coal miners proved to be little more 
than a nuisance to the Union Company, forcing them to get 
coal from further afield than usual in order to supplement 
their large stock. It certainly does not seem to have helped 
to bring the company to the conference table~ 
The Railway Commissioners also had a large supply of coal 
when the strike started~ Probably the industrial troubles 
of the previous few months, notably the Shag Point Miners• 
dispute, and the attempt to enforce a Ucomplete boycott•. 
against Whitcombe and Tombs had encouraged them.to take 
precautions and build up stocks. Their coal supply was 
said to be heavy when the strike began, but steps were taken 
l~ 11'.. 28 August 1890 
2. i. e!. ships sailing to Britain! 
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to conserve it by reducing some train services. Otherwise 
~ork on the railways went on as usual except for disturbances 
in Lyttelton and Westport, and a reduction of one day in the 
work of the railway work shops. 1 
Coal for general purposes was not so readily available. 
seeing the worst of winter was over the Bhortage was not 
. 2 
serious. Prudent people had stocked up as well as they could 
during and after the threatened boycott against Whitcombe and 
Tombs only a fortnight earlier. Brown lignite coal from the 
Green Island, Kaitangata and Night caps mines, where many men 
were not members of a union was available in limited supply, 
but the price rose steeply to famine rates very soon after the 
strike beganci, While some manufacturers in Dunedin and 
Invercargill were able to keep going using coal from those 
sources, those in other centres and some gas companies were 
not so fortunate. In Timaru gas for street lighting was 
stopped on three nights a week to conserve supplies. 3 The 
freezing works in Christchurch, as well as flour mills, woollen 
factories, metal foundries and other ·t1manufactories 1 there and 
in other centres, all closed down completely after coal supplies 
had dwindled by mid-September. The Petone Woollen Mill was 
able to keep running by using wood to fuel its boilers. Other 
I. LT 29 August 1890 
2. ODT 29 August 1890 
3. TH 17 September 1890 
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evidence of the effects of the coal supply on innocent bystanders 
"as readily available and shows further that the strike of the 
coal miners did have some effects, though not the desired oneo 
such stoppages helped to further alienate uncommitted people 
from the Maritime Council. They also swelled the number 
unemployed tha~ the Union Company could draw on to fight the 
unions. Furthermore, the unions on strike were deprived of 
valuable contributions to their strike fund which the unemployed 
men might well have given 0 Thus, the strike of the coal miners, 
did nothing at a~l to bring the Union Company to terms as it 
was hoped it would. Indeed, it harmed the Maritime Council's 
cause more than it seems to have helped ito 
________ " ___________ _ 
(e) The Union Company liBoycottlrr and the More General eMaritime 
Striket 
Other shipping companies were drawn into the dispute 
mostly because they or their agents helped the Union Company 
in some way to break the Maritime Council's attempt at a 
•complete boycottO of that Company 0 The Lyttelton Wharf 
Labourers-I Union ordered its members to stop work on the 
Vessels of the New Zealand Shipping Company, because the 
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sgent of that Company in Christchurch, G.G~_Stead, was very 
prominently organising free labour for the Union Company in 
Lyttelton. Other •home• lines were also affected by the 
Lyttelton wharf labourers' ban,though exactly why was never 
1 ~ade clearo When those companies hired free labour in 
Lyttelton, the wharf labourers in every port refused to work 
their vessels. The Northern Steam Shipping Company became 
involved in the 1890 Maritime Strike by carrying free men for 
the Union Company from Auckland to Russell on 5 September. 2 
firstly all the of.ficers, seamen, cooks and stewards left 
without notice. Then, as soon as free labour was hired, the 
wharf labourers refused to work the Northern Companyts 
vessels also. 
In contrast, the Sydney"based, intercolonial Ellis Line 
was allowed to operate unchecked by the unions. It withdrew 
from the ASOA, and its steamer, Jubilee continued running, 
using Union labour for some timeo However, the Newcastle 
mine owners, who had close-connections with the ASOA, refused 
to supply the Ellis Line with coal. Consequently,early in 
October, the Jubilee had to be laid upo 3 Several New Zealand 
coastal lines, such as the Anchor Line, which plied between 
Westport, Greymouth, Nelson and Wellington, continued working 
on union lines throughout the disputea They were able to 
1. See p. 165 
2. 1I. 6 September 1890 
3. ~ 2 October 1890 
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dO so by abstaining from provocative statements, and not 
helping the Union Company. These incidents show the extent 
to which the 1890 Maritime Strike in New Zealand was, in 
fact, more correctly, the '1890 Union Company boycott•. 
-------------------
(f) Summary - Evaluation 
This change of label is more significant than it may 
appear, for it helps to explain exactly why the Australian 
maritime strike spread to New Zealand0 It spread here 
because the Union Company~s hiring of free labour in Sydney, 
in the eyes of the New Zealand unionists distinctly identified 
that Company with the ASOA and their determination, enunciated 
at Albury·, to crush unionism. The New Zealand unionists 
went out, so they believed, to defend their organisations 
against the Union Company's attack on it 0 This will come 
out more clearly later when the reaction of other non ... striking 
unions to the strike is dealt with 0
1 To defend their 
organisations the unionists here had to refuse work with non ... 
unionists in Sydney, or in New Zealand. Their.refusal to 
work with non-unionists was the main reason why the strike 
spread to, and in, New Zealand. However, the strike also 
1. See pp. i48-9 THE LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBUR'f 
CH"ISTCHUf1CH, N,Z, 
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spread as the Maritime Council attempted to enforce a •complete 
boycott• against the Union Company in an endeavour to get it 
to retract from the Albury resolution of the ASOA regarding 
the right of unions to combine. In essence, therefore, the 
}890 Maritime strike in New Zealand was from the start a 
struggle in which the Maritime Council was defending the basic 
principles of unionism, and the Union Company was trying to 
destroy them. 
The reactions of most of the ot.her employers here, and 
their allies, the farmers, to this struggle; how they 
attempted to cope with it, shows how the struggle over the 
principles of unionism was the central issue of the strike. 
C H A P T E R 4 
REACTIONS TO THE STRIKE AND ITS GRADUAL 
COLLAPSE 
1. Reaction of Employers and Farmers 
{a) Employers' Associations and 'The Employer Plot Thesis• 
The employers' associations, which were established 
during September 1890 in the main centres of population were 
the most enduring direct outcome of them aritime sttike. 
I 
They were set up soon after the struggle began as a counter-
balance to the affiliated trade unions, and, it was claimed, 
were not intended to be a!}tagonistic to .trade unionism as such. 1 
Their most immediate and, at that time primary, function was 
to organise the supply of free labour that worked the ships, 
wharves, carts and warehouses. As will be seen shortly they 
performed this task with a·reasonable amount of success. 




Ito secure f0r its members all the advantages of 
unanimity of action now enjoyed by the Associated 
Trades Unions; and to provide a recognised body 
having the authority to deal with the representatives 
of labour in all matters affecting their common 
interest, with a view to the adjustment of all 2 differences between the employers and the employed.I. 
11 September 1890 
6 September 1890 A Resolution of inaugural meeting of 
Canty. Emp. Assoc.~ See 1111 September 1890 for Otago 
Assoc. 
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Jt was this more general function which survived the turmoil 
of the 1890 strike and has since been the chief raison d 
1 
~tre 
of the employers 1 associations. They became important 
instru~~ts aft~r 1894 for achieving greater unanimity among 
employers, such as was necessary under the Industrial 
conciliation and Arbitration Act, which was passed that 
year. To a large extent their working under the Act was 
anticipated in 1890. The Otago and Canterbury Associations 
8 ach endorsed suggestions that a New .Zealand employers@ 
federation be established. As it was then envisaged, this 
( 
body, together with a similar body from the labour side, would 
lform a final Court of Appeal to determine all questions which 
Trade and Employers• Unions have failed to settle.ii 1 
However, as will be seen later their proposals were transmuted 
by W.P 0 Reeves, mostly because the employers refused to settle 
the 1890 strike by negotiationso Reeves probably saw that 
the system suggested by the employers would have perpetuated 
for them the advantages won in 1890, under the appearance 
of a balance between labour and capital. He, like 3:out, 
realised that the balance decisively favoured the employers 
after the strike; a situatio,n he determined to correct by 
t t t
. 2 s a e ac 1.on. · 
However important these later functions of the employers 1 
associations were, their main, and perhaps their only concern 
1. 11 4 September and 6 September 1890 
2. See PP• 209-19 
- 103 -
st the time they were established was to keep the ports 
open and the ships at sea by using free labourers and 
'\1 0 1unteers. For this labour bureaux were set up in the 
ports and in Christehurch, to which men seeking work were told 
to report. Prior to this, each shipping company had hired 
\/hat labour it required directly from the pool of men offering 
on the wharves, and had agreed that union men would be taken 
on first. Under the new system the labour bureaux, acting 
on behalf of the companies concerned, selected the necessary 
number of men anq allocated them to a particular job. The 
labour bureau system was so successful that, inspite of 
opposition from the former union men it continued after the 
strike, and is s_till a part of waterfront organisation today. 
As has been already shown, from the time of its May 
meeting, the Maritime Council had resolutely and forcefully 
intervened in labour disputes regardless of whether affiliated 
1 uni-ons were involved or not. Naturally many employers 
became restive about the more aggressive council, and the good 
labour relations that had been a feature of the period 
before May slowly deteriorated 0 The situation came to a 
head in the Whitcombe and Tombs dispute. The stage was then 
set for the maritime Strike which broke out in late Augusto 
With unemployment high and trade slack, many employers in New 
Zealand seem to have decided that the strike provided them with 
1. See pP• 55-60 
------------------~ 
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sn excellent opportunity to resist the Council and other 
\lllions, and hence to escape from union power forever. The 
need to keep their businesses running and hence avoid financial 
toss, while not without weight-(was not as important as the 
desire to· escape from union interference in their affairs. 
This is seen in two cases of employers who made pu"btic their 
reasons for rejecting union claims and ignoring the unions 
al together. Oen was Thomas Black, the manager of the New 
Zealand Hardware Company, who wrote to the Otago Daily Times 
explaining why he .rejected the demand of the Wharf Carters• 
Union that he reinstate a man dismissed for refusing to cart 
goods to the Union Company Vessel, Manapouri. The union had 
been told, he wrote, that the man 
'was dismissed for disobedience of lawful commands. 
If disobedience does not justify dismissal nothing 
will. You appear to think an instruction from the 
union necessarily overrides his duty to the firm 
which employs and pays him. I regret I cannot 
agree with this strange theory. I cannot concede 
that you have a right to interfere with the servants 
of my company, and were I to fall in with your 
suggestion and reinstate Downes, after what has 
occurred, he would be the master and I the servant, 
a change of position not at all acceptable to my 
mindo••• I am not against unions if run properly, 
••• but it is obvious that such high handed measures 
can never be submitted to eo• I am one of many with 
the same tale to tell. You introduced discord into 
business affairs~ No man can serve two masters, 
but you are trying to set yourself to believe such a 
thing is possible.• 1 
By failing to distinguish between negative disobedience or 
lo ODT 6 September 1890 
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plain insubordination, and positive disobedience to achieve 
goals set by the union, Black effectively denied the unions 
the right to strike. When he declared against .the union 
introducing *discord into business affairs2 he also denied 
that the union had any right to try and regulate any aspect 
of its members 1 work conditions or wages. Thus it is obvious 
that by Dproperly runt he envisages unions as mere tools of 
the employers handing down their conditions to the workers. 
At a meeting held in Timaru on 30 August the sheer 
opportunism of the.employers at the time was very clearly 
revealed in the following telegram from Nelson Brothers, owners 
of a large freezing works in Hastings: 
r 
•Will your company !South Canterbury Refrigeration Co. 
join us in declining to employ·union labour. The 
unions are becoming so oppressive in their actions we 
think the present an opportune time to knock down the 
whole system, for we shall never·have a better chance. 
General feeling throughout Hawkes Bay is to act in 
this direction. We are making similar suggestions 
to all freezing companies. Please reply promptly.' 1 
Besides the opportunism of the employers, this telegram 
shows how general was the desire to escape from union inter-
ference in,business, for the freezing companies were not directly 
affected by the maritime strike in that their men were not 
called outo The reference to knocking down lthe whole 
systemt reveals that they, like Black, were not against trade 
unions as such, but against trades unions or labour federations 
such as the Maritime Council. It is also obvious from the 




aate the telegram was read that no attempt had been made to 
organise the Timaru employers Ito have it out with the unions' 
until after the strike was a well established reality in New 
zeal and. This seems to have been true in most other parts 
of the country also. As a consequence of hearing the telegram, 
those employers present determined to reply to the Wharf 
Labourers 1 Union by pledging that they would llmake no distinction 
between union and free labour, and if any intimidation occurs 
they will dispense with union men altogether. t 1 Thus, they 
effectively repucl,iated the unionOs claim that only unionists 
should be employed on the wharves, the basis of unionism itself. 
Later in the same meeting they declared that •their sympathy 
was with the Union Companyt2 
From these two statements of employerst attitudes to the 
strike and to unionism in general it can be easily seen that 
they hired free labour primarily to escape from union inter-
ference in their affairs. They wanted to break the power of 
the labour federations and dispense with real independent labour 
unions altogether. The avoidance of financial loss as a 
result of the stoppage of business, while not altogether of no 
account, was not anywhere near as important a reason as the 
former reason. 
1. l'.!! 1 September 1890 
2. lli 1 September 1890 
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The Christchurch Press said that: 
•It appears to us that those responsible for the 
calling out of the men .have overlooked the fact that 
in thus compelling the employers to make use of 
non-union labour, they are inflicting a blow against 
unionism of the most damaging nature. Employers 
who realised their liberty from the Maritime Council 
were not likely to abandon it at all.' ·1 
BY striking at a most inappropriate time, when free labour was 
plentiful, the unions provided the employers with a golden . 
opportunity to dispense with unions altogether or make them 
subservient toolso The employers generally were very quick 
to take up this ~pporturtity. Thus, the unions exposed 
themselves to savage counter-attack, which left them so severely 
mauled that most of them failed to recover from it at all. 
(b) The CF'ree Labourers• 
Once the decison was made to employ non-union men, and to 
dispense with the unions altogether, it was vigorously put 
into effect. Probably the largest group of men obtained were 
those without' work when the strike begano It has already 
been shown that unemployment was quite high during the early 
part of 1890. It was probably at its highest level at the 
end of the winter just when the strike broke out. Probably 
many had been without a steady job for a-considerable time 
before August 1890. Hence they gladly accepted the offer 
of twelve monthsl steady employment, even though it entailed them 
lo f 13 September 1890' 
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acting as tblacklegs 1 during the strike. The 'blacklegs• 
~ere subject to a tremendous amount of abuse from the 
unionists and their friends, but few were greatly worried 
bY it, answering instead with counter-abuse and •chaffing•. 1 
The ranks of the free labourers were swelled by the 
volunteers: 1men of independent means, members of athletic 
clubs, bank clerks, schoolmasters etco•••' The·se men were 
soon to be •seen loading and unloading ballast, coal and general 
cargo, shunting trucks on the wharves, and in fact carrying on 
the whole work of the port [Lytteltoi;J•. 2 Although the 
volunteers publicly gave no explicit reasons for workin~ on 
the wharves, it seems clear that as professional and middle 
class people they were strongly distrustful of union power, 
especially since they considered that during the strike the 
unions were abusing their power. They were willing to help 
the Company fight the Maritime Council to prevent it dominating 
New Zealand. This attitude is seen most clearly in 
Charlewood 1 s article. Himself a volunteer in Lyttelton, 
he declared that the strike, 1 so far from being • • • an attempt 
on the part of capital to crush labour, exactly the reverse 
was the case., 3 While too much reliance can be placed on 
his judgment, it does at least make public his attitude 
towards the strike. 
1. w.T. Charlewood 'Labour Troubles in N.Z. 1 Economic Journal 
(1891) p. 717 
2. Ibid 
3. Charlewood p. 714 
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The unemployed and volunteers were not the only men to 
come forward as non-union labourers. Within a week of the 
cornmancement of the strike, they were joined, and to some 
e,ctent relieved or replaced, by gangs of men from country 
districts. Farmers groups worked closely with the nearest 
iabour bureau, helping to send labour from their regions. 
Exactly who were these men who went into the towns cannot now 
be determined" However it seems that besides the farmers 
who them·selves drove their drays into town and carted produce 
to the wharves, IIJ.any farmers& sons and non-unionized farm 
1abourers also went to town to work. In this respect it 
is interesting to notice the lack of solidarity between urban 
and rural labour. 
During the depression there was probably a certain amount 
of under-employment on the land. Furthermore the strike 
occurred in early spring at a time when work on far.ms was 
relatively slacko For both these reasons a plentiful supply 
of labour was available from the countryside. Charlewood 
was probably correct when he wrote: i!t was mainly owing to 
their assistance that the Union Company won such a complete 
victory 0 ~
1 The influx of men from the farms of the country, 
some of them ununionized farm labourers further eroded the 
union's bargaining position and helped to a large extent to 
restore trade and commerce, though by no means completely 
1. Charlewood p. 715 
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to restore them. 
Some farm labourers and farmers sons, attracted by the 
nigher wages and shorter hours, made known that they intended 
to stay on in the towns after the strike~ The Lyttelton Times 
iamented about this. trend, pointing out that it would only 
result in 1 the congestion of the labour market 1 in the towns, 
after years of effort had been put into directing labour outwards 
2 into the country. Such a view reveals what might be termed a 
•settler orientated view' in which the solution of urban problems 
was seen in greater land settlement~ While this trend cannot 
be denied it does not seem to .have caused the farmers any 
labour shortages during the following harvest. 
(c) Farmers• Opposition to the Strike 
The farmer~ were willing and eager to help break the 
strike mainly because they stood to lose heavily if it were 
prolonged in any way. Although a great deal of the last 
season's crops had been sold, according to the Otago Daily 
I!m~, over 55,000 bags of produce valued at over £50,000 was 
sitting on wharves throughout New Zealand awaiting shipment, 
mostly to Australia, when the strike began. Much of it, 
particularly the potatoes and onions, would have been ruined 
had it not been sent on immediately. 
I. LT 14 September 1890 
2. LT 20 September 1890 
The Times thought that 
- 111 -
t_he market for wheat and oats would probably have been lost 
to some extent. 1 The farmers• anxiety to end the strike 
as soon as possible was heightened by the knowledge that 
prices in Sydney were rapidly advancing to famine rates just 
before the strike broke out. 2 
The farmersl meeting held at Rangiora heard views along 
these lines most forcefully expressed. The Chairman, c.w. 
NicholLs, said that _the meeting had not been called to debate 
unionism or to argue about the rate of wages. Rather they had 
been called together, inmmpliance with an arrangement agreed 
to in Lyttelton the previous Saturday, specifically to arrange 
a supply of labour to load the perishable goods in Lyttelton. 
He firmly declared that •they had no intention of trying to 
injure the working man in any way, but the terrible waste that 
must ensure if the produce now in the trucks • • • was not shipped 
must be averted if possible.• Thirty-eight men prepared to 
3 work on the wharves gave hi_m their names after the meeting. 
Nicholls drew attention to another weakness of the union 1 s 
case: that whenever they struck they were likely to cause 
visible waste and thus alienate many people from them. 
On the same day as this meeting was held, the Lytte~ton 
I_imes Rangiora correspondent wrote: •The farmers appear unanimous 
upon one point, and that is they are quite prepared to, and 
1. Reprinted in R 29 August 1890 
2. Charlewood p. 717 Also see USS Co, History in Appendix 3. 
3. LT 3 September 1890 
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~ill supply a continuous stream of free labour from the country 
to load the steamers until the difficulty is ended.' 1 
Meetings were al so held about the same time in Cust, 
Sefton and Waiau at which similar views were expressed, and 
the names of more volunteers for work in Lyttelton were collected. 
The Waiau farmers resolved: 
1That this meeting strongly disapproves of the 
unwarrantable action of the Maritime Council 
in_ calling out labour without any grievance 
against the New Zealand Employers (sic), and 
promises support by labour or otherwise to 
keep the trade of the country from being 
paralysed~• 2 
This motion became the stock motion proposed and passed at most 
such farmers• meetings in Canterbury. That it was agreed 
to by virtually all farmers• groups without dissent shows 
the strength of farmer opinion on the situation. 
The only meeting where it- seems to have been disputed was 
that held in Ashburton at 'the end of the first week of 
September. Here, James Brown, a small farmer, objected to 
it on the grounds that he believed the actions of the Council 
were warranted. 3 He took a very strong pro-labour line, 
declaring that. the union system was a result of sweating, and 
that the unions had acted wisely and lawfully~ He then 
surprised everyone by moving an amendment which blamed the 
1. LT 3 September 1890 
2. Ibid 
3. James Brown of Netherby 400-500 sheep - Sheep Returns AJHR 
1892 H-30 
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union Company and other employers, who were attempting to 
crush unionism, for starting the strike, and declared that a 
satisfactory settlement could be arrived at if 1those 
capitalists• complied with labour's demands by submitting 
the matters in dispute to arbitration. His amendment ended 
by appealing to those present to 1endeavour by legislative means 
to do justice to both parties, and prevent such an occurrence 
from taking place in the future.• 1 Finally he asserted that 
both Whitcombe and Tombs and the Union Company should submit to 
arbitration. This is an interesting, but exceptional, example 
of farmer support for state interference in industrial relations, 
such as was to eventuate four years later. It is also an 
example of the radical undercurrent of Ashburton politics 
such as was revealed in the general election results in December. 2 
A leading Ashburton merchant, Hugo Friedlander, dismissed 
Brown's arguments by asserting once again that the New Zealand 
labourers had no grievances, and thus there was nothing to 
negotiate about. Only the mover and seconder (P.Maguire) 
voted for the amendment, after which the original motion was 
passed. 
It is obvious from the above examples that the farmers, 
whether large or small, were almost unanimously against the 
1. LT 8 September 1890 
2~ E.J. Wright, whom the 1I labelled a Conservative Ministerial 
candidate won by 37 votes. Two Liberal Opposition 
candidates including a J. Brown, w.ho came fourth, and 
another "Conservative Ministerial" man (third) also stood. 
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strike. They believed that there were no grievances that could 
justify such drastic action. and even more importantly they 
:realised that they stood· to lose if the strike was in any way 
prolonged. As it turned out they lost anyway 9 for all the 
shipping companies greatly increased freight rates soon 
afterwards. Whether these were to pay for the increased 
cost of free labour or whether the strike was used as an excuse 
a 
to do so is still today/debatable point. The fact that 
farmers• opinions were so universally opposed to the labour 
party clearly sho:ws that the small farmer, labour 1alliancel 
at the polls in December was in spite of the maritime strike 
rather than because of it. 
2. The Cost of Hiring Free Labour 
The free labourers and volunteers managed to get the 
ports working again in a comparatively short tine, but they did 
so only at a considerable cost. Naturally they were not as 
expedit:irus or as efficient as union men., This the allies of 
the employers readily admitted. Numerous examples of their 
inefficiency were reported, mostly by papers who were 
sympathetic towards the unionists. In Lyttelton, as will 
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be seen fully later, those unloading coal from the Teka20 
rna.de many blunders and spilt a large amount of it; while the 
rnen carrying sacks of grain out of the warehouses found the 
\>Tork so strenuous that they had to be rested every second 
1 According to one reporter, the officer in charge of daY• 
the free labourers who were discharging coal from the Orowaiti 
in Dunedin decided that the progress being made was far from 
satisfactory~ He ordered the six men on the job to only 
half fill the sling each time so as to give the appearance 
2 that the pace was as fast as usual. 
Eager though they might be to show results the free 
labourers and volunteers were just not able to keep the trade 
of the ports moving at the same pace as. the unionists had 
before the strike~ The shipping companies found free labour 
to be so costly that on 6 September, soon after the strike had 
begun, freight rates were increased substantially to make 
-3 
up the extra costs! While those increases might have 
been only routine, that they were made so soon after the 
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3 The tBlacklegs~ - Violence or restraint? . -
The free labourers, or ~blacklegs', a~-the uninnists and 
their friends abusingly called them, were not·at all popular 
with the 1 labour partyf 0 In fact they were probably more 
disliked than the employers who had hired them. However, 
apart from trying to win them away from the employers' fold, 
and failing that, picketing and 'chaffing' them at work, no 
official action was taken against them by the unions 0 
At first they were encouraged to join unions, either by 
being provided with food and lodging,or treating them to an 
afternoon in a local hotel. These tactics were often successful, 
but not entirely so. 1 When they failed and the free labourers 
went to work on the wharves, a line of union pickets were there 
to greet them. 
Fortunately the spirit of resentment, a great deal of it 
unavoidable and justified, among the strikers, was almost 
entirely kept in check by the union leaders themselves. 
Millar and his associates constantly urged members to remain 
calm and law abiding, for they realised that violence would 
lose them public support more than anything else. However 
on several occasions the resentment could not be completely 
restrained, and brief episodes resulted. A minor riot erupted 
in Dunedin on 1 September, and several groups of free labourers 
Were assaulted in Lyttelton and Christchurch later that month. 2 
I. Charlewood p. 719 
2. LT 2 September 1890 also see pp.175-7 
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J,n both cases the union leaders quickly disclaimed responsibility 
for these outbursts. Only in the later instance was it 
proved that several unionists were indeed involved. 
These incidents prompted the local authorities and the 
government to appoint special constables. Many union men 
offered themselves for duty as specials and were duly accepted. 
I.n Dunedin 60 of the 260 specials were union wharf labourers. 1 
Thus arose the paradoxical situation of union men protecting 
the men who were working to defeat them. The specials, 
together with th~ union leaders themselves, managed to maintain 
1aw and order for the rest of the srrike period. In consequence, 
the 1890 strike was remarkably free from violence, and unlike 
1913 was not marked by open battles in several ports between 
farmer specials and unionists. The restraint of the strikers 
in 1890 explains more than anything else why the urban 1 Liberals• 
were able to appeal to the 'working classes' in the towns during 
the general election that year, without alienating the small 
farmers from their rural colleagues. 
4. The Gradual Collapse of the Strike 
The process of collapse began early in September when the 
1. LT 2 September 1890 
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punedin wharf carters returned to work. When their stipulations 
that the master carters take them back as a body and dismiss 
8 11 free labour were rejected, they agreed to return to work 
unconditionally. Because many of their places were filled by 
free labourers, only a small number of them actually obtained 
jobs.1 Exactly why the Dunedin union decided to go back so 
early was never made clear for the wharf carters in other 
centres remained out until early October 0 
The following day the coastal trade from Dunedin was 
resumed when the Brunner sailed for Oamaru, Timaru and the 
west coast. Further evidence that the strike had failed to 
stop trade, business and industry was provided in the last 
week of September when it was announced that thirty-four of 
the Union Company's forty-three steamers were back in service, 
2 and over 2,140 men were working for the Company. The delay 
in re-commissioning the other steamers was more a result of a 
lack of trade than a shortage of labour. 
The ranks of the strikers were thinned further during 
the later part of September and early October when a number 
of the marine officers and cooks and stewards had gone back to 
work. Many officers asked for work after 23 September. On 
. 3 
5 October thirty-five of them applied together. Then on 
10 October the Globe reported that only twenty officers were 
1. LT 11 September 1890 
2. LT 24 September 1890 
3. ~ 6 October 1890 
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still out in Dunedin, the largest centre. Soon after that 
the Marine Officers 1 Association seems to have collapsed 
altogether for nothing more was ever heard of it after the 
Wellington conference. Those officers who rejoined their 
ships had to join the Shipmastersl Association. That body 
had been established by a group.of captains from the Union 
Company at the beginning of September 0 It obviously was 
intended to remove the officers from all contact with labour 
federation~, for the association denied itself the right to 
affiliate with any other organisation. Furthermore, by specifying 
that no member could belong to any other organisation, it 
ensured that all the officers left the ill fated Marine 
OfficersU Association. 1 
The Cooks' and Stewards• Union was troubled from the 
outset by members who refused to even go out at all. The 
union offenders at the start were the chief stewards and the 
stewardesses, who, after refusing to abide by its decision, 
were expelled from the Union. 2 From about the last week in 
September the cooks and stewards seem to have returned to work 
individually whenever it was offering. As far as can be 
ascertained, their strike was never publicly called off. 
The Globe reported, allegedly on good authority9 . that a 
steward who had offered to go back, was given. work only after 
he had pl€dged to leave the union and never to join another. 
But that paper, the only fully labour paper in New Zealand, 
I. ODT 3 September 1890 
2. Y&tter Book 13 September 1890, p. 817 
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~as not a very good authority 0 It used that report to support 
its contention that the 'employers were deliberately crushing 
. • 1 the unions • As unrealiable as that report may well be, it 
is further evidence that the Cooks' and Stewards• Union 
collapsed before the strike ended. 
The slow but steady collapse of the strike, which w~s 
evident by the end of the first week of September, moved labour 
union leaders to re-double their efforts to try and find a 
compromise settlement of the dispute. However, no progress 
in that direction was made until several politicians in the 
House of Representatives took~the question up and pressed the 
government to call a conference of the parties involved in 
the disputeo Some of the result·s of that move were very 
important, both for the strike and for later development and 
must be examined at some length 0 
~---~------~--------
5. Attempts to Find a Compromise Settlement to the Strike 
(a) Thoughts on Arbittation before the Strike 
The settling of industrial disputes by conciliation and 
arbitration rather than carrying them to the strike or lockout 
stage was suggested several times in New Zealand in the period 
lo Q 8 October 1890 
I 
l 
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before the 1890 Maritime Strikeo The increasing number of 
strikes and lockouts which were a consequence of •new union• 
militancy had prompted people in Europe, Britain and America 
to urge the setting up of boards to settle industrial disputes 
and prevent clashes resulting in strikes. The New Zealand 
employers and trade unionists were well aware of what had been 
said on the subject overseas. Although the suggestions made 
in this country in the early part of 1890 were of no avail, 
they did get people thinking on the subject, and provided a 
rough framework in which to act when the country was virtually 
paralysed by most of its transport workers going on strike. 
Several trade union leaders who gave evidence before the 
Sweating Commission in February and March of 1890 were decidedly 
in favour of boards of conciliation and arbitration. Millar 
advocated that an arbitration court, presided over by a judge 
capable of evaluating the evidence presented by both sides, be 
established. The judge, in his view, should be appointed by 
the state and assisted by three representatives from each side, 
and his decisions should be binding for an agreed length of timeo
1 
He was supported by R. Slater, president of the Otago Trades 
and Labour Council, and David Pinkerton, president of the 
Bo-otmakers I Union. 2 M.A. Baxter, secretary of the ·Tailors• 
Union in Christchurch argued in favour of boards similar to 
1 0 AJHR (1890) H-5 Po 12 
2o Ibid p. 14 and P• 15 
1 
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those advocated by Millar. 1 The Commission, amongst other 
things, recommended· 1 that steps should be taken to establish 
at an early date Bo~rds of Conciliation and Arbitration based 
on an equitable representation of labour and capita1.• 2 
At the end of March, Lomas told a meeting of trade 
unionists and others in Christchurch that arbitration was the 
best means of settling difficulties. He deprecated strikes 
when ever they could be avoided. 3 Commenting on Lomas 1 s 
speech, the Lyttelton Times said that 1far from picturing a 
universal strike, or anything else in the shape of a revolt 
of labour, Mr. Lomas set his face against industrial war of 
k . d 14 any 1.n. 
These and other advocates of arbitration had an effect 
on the political scene in the middle of July when William 
Downie Stewart, the Member for Dunedin West, introduced his 
Strikes and Boards of Conciliation Bill to Parliament. 5 
The bill provided for the establishment of voluntary boards 
of conciliation and arbitration by the government. But, he 
told the members that the measure could be made one of 
compulsory arbitration by simply changing the word 1may in 
the bill to 1 shall 1 while it was in committee. 
1. AJHR (1890) H-5 P• 51 
2. Ibid p. vi Number 27 
3. Lf I.April 1890 
4. PD 1890 
s. Ibid 
- 123 ... 
It ran into stiff opposition from Ballance, the Leader 
of the Opposition, and other acknowledged members of his party 0 
part of their objection was that a voluntary system would be 
ineffective. They also argued that the bill was in reality 
a disguised attempt to introduce a system of compulsory 
arbitration in New Zealand 0 With the Maritime Council, which 
they were in sympathy with, then still appearing to be 
growing stronger, they, along with the labour leaders them8 
selves, were against any measures which would take the power 
of striking from the unionso 
Pember Reeves, who was known to have favoured arbitration 
and compulsory arbitration at that, did not speak in this 
debate. He appears to have been isolated on this issue 
from the majority of the other Liberals and his trade uninn 
supporters as well. Above all else, thinking on the 
subject was confused, and everyone needed more time and more 
experiences to clarify their ideas. The bill was given a 
second reading and allowed to lapse in committee. 1 
In less than a month after the debate on W. Downie 
Stewart*s bill, the real we~kness of the Maritime Council 
was revealed when it failed to force Whitcombe and Tombs 
to abandon running their printing works with non.union 
labouro The Council tried by every means within its power 
1 Sinclair Reeves op.cit PP• 110-12 
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short of striking to get Whitcombe and Tombs to agree 




(b) The First Moves 
Before any progress at all had been made in settling 
that dispute, New _Zealand was engulfed in the 1890 Maritime 
Strikeo At first, labour leaders were confident of victory, 
believing as they did, that the progressive calling out of 
more and more men until the en.tire transport system of the 
country was paralysed, would bring the employers to the confer~ 
ence table., However, firstly the railway men refused to 
go out as a body, and the Maritime Council's power was to 
that extent weakenedo 
Then, employers began to succeed in getting sufficient 
free labour to keep services going,_ if not as well as before 
the strikeo By the middle of the first week of September, 
it appeared that labour might even lose the struggle. At 
this time the first of several requests for the. government 
to intervene in the dispute and concilate eetween the parties 
was made. On 4 September, a group of Wellington trade 
unionists petitioned the Premier asking him to intervene by 
1 
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arranging a conference. Atkinson replied ·that the government 
~as trying to remain neutral in the dispute and he could not 
therefore see how he could intervene. 1 
Reeves, who repudiated the idea that the government should 
remain neutral, saw the Governor, Lord Onslow the next day, 
and asked him to help arrange a conference. Reeves told 
Onslow that Atkinson was more inclined to mediation than his 
11 · C b" 
2 co eagues in a inet. However nothing came of these efforts. 
Sir Robert Stout and the Mayor of Dunedin, the Lyttelton 
Borough Council and the Christchurch City Council all tried 
vainly to bring the parties to the conference table early in 
September. However, the employers as bodies refused to talk, 
saying that there was nothing in dispute to discuss. They 
demanded that strikers return to work unconditionally, if 
3 their places .had not been filled already" Thus, a stalemate 
resulted. 
(c) Political Intervention 
At that point the House of Representatives intervened 
1 PD 1890 Vol. 69 P• 892 
2 Sinclair Reeves op. cito Po 113 
3 See p~· 92-3 
• 
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and set a precedent for future actiono The SLiberallJ 
member for Christchurch South, w.B. Perceval, moved on 15 
September that the government be requested to call a conference 
of all interested parties so that the dispute might be brought 
. 1 
to an end and future strikes prevented. In the ensuing 
debate, some 2 Liberals~ argued that •capital and labour' 
could be reconciled in virtually every case; if they were 
brought together in a friendly atmosphere at a conference 
table, or, if necessary, in arbitration proceedings 0 Others 
expressed the hope that some means of avoiding strikes and 
lock-outs for all time could be devised. 
The Acting-Premier, Mitchelson, said that the state might 
well need to arrange a conference _to help the labour party (sic). 
The government had reversed its earlier decision and dropped 
its opposition to sponsoring a conference, he told the house, 
because a majority of members ·desired that some attempt be 
made to end the •unfortunate trouble•. 2 
Only a few very conservative members were against the 
government calling a conference. M.J.S 0 Mackenzie (Mount 
Ida) firmly declared •the government is now travelling outside 
of its functions in interfering in labour disputesa. 3 He 
believed that such disputes, which involved only employers 
and their employees should not be discussed in parliament at 
1 PD 1890 Vol. 69 p. 892 
2 PD 1890 Vol. 67 P• 893 
3 Ibid Po 895 
1 
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all. However, Mackenzie was by that stage of the dispute, 
0 ne of avery small minority of vocal dissenters in the House, 
from the idea that the state should at least try and bring 
the parties together 0 
Richard Seddon, replied very eloquently to Mackenzie, 
5 aying that the House had: 
Othe bounden duty as representative of the people 
to endeavour to bring about a settlement of this 
1 dispute, which was injuring the country as a whole.~ 
He ended his speech in a rather surprising and unusual 
manner, by proposing th~t the government should nationalise 
the fleet of the Union Company 0 That suggestion was not 
made on the spur of the moment, for Seddon went to some 
length quoting figures to show that it would have been a 
very profitable use of state funds. It appears that Seddon 
introduced the suggestion then for one of three reasons. 
Firstly, it was probably an idea which he had been turning 
over in his mind for some time, waiting for a chance to test 
how much support there was for his proposal 0 Then again 
he may have intended to hold the threat of nationalisation 
over the Union Company if it failed to agree to settle the 
dispute0 Finally he might have merely intended it as a 
gesture to win electoral popularity, though this is the least 
likely ex-planation, for Seddon did not by that stage need to 
1 PD 1890 Vol. 67 P• 896 
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appeal in that manner; nor was it even an issue. The 
first reason is the most plausible, for it explains why 
Seddon never brought up the idea again0 He failed to win 
a single approving voice for his idea, and so quietly dropped 
ito But the mere fact that he raised it was sufficient to 
give Seddon the credit of being the first New Zealand politician 
who advocated that New Zealand should have a national shipping 
line. 
The motion was carried by 51 votes to 11, showing that 
an overwhelming I!lajority of members agreed that the government 
should at least try and arrange a settlement 0 In other words, 
the •Liberal' attitude was not merely to be found in the 
•opposition~ on that occasion. In so doing those members 
approved of the first state intervention, be it only rather 
hesitant, in a labour dispute in this country 0 The state 
intervened on this occasion not because the government wanted 
to meddle in industrial matters or thought it should, but 
because in the interests of the public generally, it felt it 
ought to. Few members, if any might have thought that their 
actions in 1890 would have been used in later years to justify 
more extensive government interference in industrial disputes • 
• 
(d) The Wellington Labour Conference, October 1890 
The Conference, which many people hoped would end the 
_1_:90 Maritime Strike, was arranged to start on the first day 
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of October. Exactly which labour bodies were invited was 
never made clearo But twenty trade unionists from fourteen 
tabour bodies, some of them not directly involved in the 
dispute itself, were present at the conference. Nearly 
all of the most influential and powerful union leaders in 
the country were there, including Millar, Lomas, Fisher, 
Brown, Captain Highman, Winter, Hoban and Elvines, Sandford 
and Parker. The only really noticable absentees were 
representatives from the most influential trades and labour 
council : Otago. 1 
The only employers' delegate to attend was George 
McLean, representing the Union Company and the Northern 
Steamship Company. The Railway_ Commissioners were not 
invited before the conference openedo The Premier, at the 
request of the conference, subsequently invited them, but 
they refused to attend, saying that they felt it !imperatively 
incumbent upon them and their employees to maintain the strictest 
neutrality in any trade or labour dispute which may arise 1 • 2 
They even went so far as to say that the ASRS had no right 
to attend, even though a large number of railway men were . 
on strike in Lyttelton and the Buller area. 
All the employers' associations also, in effect, refused 
to attend. They did not reject the Premierts invitation 
1 ~ 1891 H - 1 P• 1 See Appendix F and see P• 
2 Ibid Po 20 
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outright as did the Railway Commissoners, but rather 
specified a set of impossible conditions the unions would have 
to agree to before the conference begano Those included 
one that the unions admit the employers 1 right to retain 
free labour already hired, and to hire it indiscriminately 
after the strike. In addition they had to agree to work 
1 
with free labour. These were the very points at issue, 
and for the unions to have conceded them would have precluded 
the real issues of the dispute from being discussed. Hence 
it is plain that the employers never.intended to sit down 
and' talk over their differences with the unions. They 
remained as firmly against any compromise settlement as 
they had been from the first day of the strike. 
The intransigence of the employers at that time, as 
will be shown more fully later, decisively influenced the 
Liberals decision to enact in 1894 the most comprehensive 
and at that time only compulsory system of arbitration in . 
the worldo The refusal of the employers! associations to 
even participate in the conference, together with the weakness 
of the labour movement after the strike were the peculiar 
circumstances which motivated politicians in this country 
to act in such an original and indeed revolutionary fashion. 
Reeves, the architect of the arbitration court in New Zealand 
1 11 22 Sept 1890 
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declared that these events were indeed the main factors 
behind the decision, when he was-introducing the measure to 
the House almost two years after the conference. 
The Government itself did nothing more than arrange 
the conference, invite the various parties to be present in 
Wellington, and provide clerical staff for ita 
to the conference Atkinson wrote: 
In a letter 
ilfThe Government are of the opinion that they 
should in no way become a party to the present 
disagreement; their duty is to impartially 
maintain law, and do anything that may be in 
their powers to facilitate a settlement.~ 1 
In adopting such a forthright attitude, the Atkinson Government 
clearly showed that they did not want their sponsorship of 
the conference to be interpreted as involvement in the dispute. 
But they were the last government in New Zealand to stand 
calmly aside from a major industrial dispute and let the 
parties fight it out. However, it is likely that if the 
employers had been the weaker side in 1890, Atkinson and his 
colleagues would have been much more hard pressed to become 
involved in the dispute. But they maintained their 
neutrality to the end, losing favour with the unionists and 
not positively endearing themselves with the employers and 
farmers. They were condemned by the labour side for their 
failure to act, and not for their active hostility to their 
cause, but won very few favourable comments if any from the 
other side" 
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(e) Proceedings at the Conference 
McLean went to the conference, not to discuss the issues 
in dispute:in order to arrive at an amicable settlement of 
the dispute, but rather to foster a more favourable public 
image of the Union Company and at the same time to reiterate 
the terms the unions would have to agree to when they 
surrendered. He did discuss the main events that were 
disputed by the labour side, but only very brieflyo 
The first part of his opening speech was devoted to 
praising the companyls actions, and was obviously aimed more 
at the general public than the other delegates. He told 
them that the Union Company had paid the men who left their 
ships right up to the time they went ashore even though at 
1aw it was not obliged to do eo. The other delegates 
already knew that, and were not likely to disagree with it 
or blame the Company for it 0 
He described the early history of the company, and said 
that after several bad years, they started to make a profit. 
But he pointed out very carefully, that the shareholders had 
not received more than a 'reasonable returnl of 8 or 9 per 
cent on their investment in the company 0 Furthermore, he 
claimed, they did not take unfair advantage of their monopoly 
over the trans-Tasman run as well they might, but charged 
instead very low rates for passengers and cargoes. 
He then said that the company could not continue to 
accede to ·all the demands made upon it by the unions 0 He 
I, 
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referred in particular to the demands which the Seamanls 
union of Australasia had made on the owners earlier that 
year, saying that he thought they had gone too far with them. 
The Union Company had been forced to join the Owners! 
Association because the New Zealand seamen were making 
"demand after demand", he saido 
The strike started in Australia, he said, when a seaman 
was dismissed from the Corinna and the union demanded his 
reinstatement. The Owners? Association refused to reinstate 
him, he told them, as it was labsolutely necessaryt for them 
to regain command of their ships and hold it. 
The maritime strike started in New Zealand only after 
the company could not get men to work their ships in Sydney 
he said. He did give Millar credit for trying as hard as 
he could to try and prevent New Zealand becoming involved, 
but said that the unions in Sydney meddled with his Companyts 
seamen there and they were forced to employ non-union labour 
to discharge their ships. The Maritime Council then called 
out all the men from its ships, he saido 
Leaving the facts of the strike as he saw them aside, 
he went on to say that the strike was a failure, for the 
I 
Union Cqmpany had all its ships that they had trade for 
running 0 This was obviously a bluff to get the unions 
call off their strike on the Company's terms, for he later 
admitted that they were short of good seamen and other 
Workers. 













After asking for their suggestions for ending the 
difficulty, he repeated the terms of surrender that he had 
previously made public 0 The employers, he said, could never 
abandon the non-union men they had taken on, and so the 
unionists would have to agree to work with them. What he 
called a 'prohibitory entrance feel to the unions will have 
1 to be reduced, he told them. 
Finally, he said that the company would not feel the 
slightest amount of bitterness against the strikers when 
they called the strike off. 
Millar, who spoke first for the labour side, set out 
more fully and clearly than on any other reported occasion 
exactly how and why the New Zealand seamen, and other 
affiliated unions became involved in the dispute. As such 
it is an important source of information on his ·thinking 
at the time. It is supprising that Salmond did not 
consider it more carefully, for as will be shown later, 
this speech makes possible a totally different interpretation 
of the strike from the one he gave. Many of the other 
delegates reiterated Millar*s views showing that they were 
wide spread in the labour mo\e~ent. 
He began by denying that the Corinna incident that 
McLean gave prominence to had anything to do with the 
AJHR op.cit. PP• 2-4 
I 
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maritime strike, and said that that particular dispute 
had merely been brought up again·on· the later occasion. 
The strike was over a much more important issu~ he said: 
1The actual dispute arose when the Shipciwnersi 
Association denied to the officers1he right to do 
as they please outside of the contract of 
services· which they had with the association. The 
whole matter lay in this: We say that 
we have the right to do as we please outside 
our contract with the employers. The right 
that was denied to the officers is practically 
denied to us, and every right that is denied 
to us is held on to by the Shipowners$ 
Association, by the Union Company, or any other 
company whi~h holds the same view ••• 
Well, the officers federated with the 
Maritime Council. If the Union Company had 
the right to federate with the Shipowners' 
Association - and I do not say they had not 
- the officers had the same right to federate 
with the Maritime Council.'. 1 
Furthermore, he said that the council realised that 
the company .had to remain a member of the Q.mers I 
Association to prevent other shipowners running ships in 
competition with them across the Tasman. Because of 
that the Council dropped its demand that the Union Company 
had to disaffiliate from that Association before a settlement 
could be reached in this country. 
But .he said that when the Union Company and other owners, 
meeting at Albury, unanimously agreed that the officers, and 
by implication any other group of their employees, did not 
1 AJHR. op. cit. p. 4 
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have the right to do what they liked in their own time, the 
strike eegan in earnest in this country. 
Later he elaborated further on this point when he said 
to McLean: 
1Y0u say "We do not object to your forming a union, 
but we will not allow you to affiliate." Why so7 
Because the men who speak thus think that they can 
deal with a branch or a single trade and crush them 
in detail.' 1 
However, later in lis opening speech, Millar qualified 
his remarks on the· origins of the strike when he said: 
1The thing that caused the strike was the Union 
Company employing non-union men on the wharf in 
Sydney. t 2 
He also said that tqe Seamen 1 s Union in this country did not 
want the strike to spread to coastal shipping, but they were 
forced to stop work on all the company 1 s ships when the 
advertisements appeared for free men for the Wairarapa. 3 
Later in the conference, Millar made a number of other 
comments on the origins of the strike and from them what he 
considered to be the primary cause of the strike in New 
Zealand·· can be gleaned. On the second day he said that 
McLean had avoided the •real point at issue' by passing 
quickly over the question of the officers. He disagreed 
1 AJHR op. cit. p.5 
2 Ibid p. 6 
3 Ibid Po 6 
L -----· 
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"1ith McLeanis contention that •the action of the wharf labourers 
in Sydney was really the cause of the present struggle'. 'The 
\-barf labourers had nothing to do with this dispute at the 
commencementt, he told them. He then described how the owners• 
flat refusal to consider the officers' demands had forced the 
tatter to strike 0
1 
Later that day he said: 
0The real point at issue Mr. McLean has touched on 
very lightly --namely, the question of unionism and 
non-unionism working together ••• , 2 
He also said th~t McLean had agreed that he would endeavour 
to get the Australian owners to allow the New Zealand officers 
to affiliate with the Maritime Council, for he realised the 
value of having all labour unions under one head, but he had 
achieved nothing along those lines at the time of the conference., 
Finally, he declared: 
'If they would only se:ttle this point, that the officers 
shall have the right and freedom to affiliate with 
any other body the trouble would be ended tomorrow.I 3 
From those statements it would appear that the main cause 
of the strike·was the officersl affiliation question. However, 
the basis for a settlement dit not mention that point, but 
rather at great length sought ways of avoiding the unionists 
and non-unionists working together. Millar, it appears now, 
considered that t~e affiliation question was the reason for the 
1 AJHR op.cit. pp. 29-30 
2 Ibid P• 31 




~nions originally going out in Australia, and in that way 
was the cause of the strike over all. But the strike in 
New Zealand, while it was partly in support of the Australians, 
was basically a strike to uphold in this country the principle 
that unionists could never work with non-unionists. 
The other delegates who spoke on why their individual 
unions went out all stressed the fact that they had to strike 
rather than work with non-unionists" Ansell, a coal miner 
from the Greymouth district said that bis union had a perfect 
right to refuse to supply coal to any vessels which were manned 
by non-union labour" 1 He also said that he did not think 
that they would have 'taken such strong steps• as they had done ha; 
they not been honour bound to support the· 'body with which• they 
had amalgamated - the Maritime Council" He re-emphasised 
the point a few minutes later when he said iwe refuse to hew 
coal in order to cut the throats of our fellow-unionists 0 •• t 
2 
Lomas, the coalmining treasurer of the Maritime Council 
was even stronger on that point. He said that for them Ito 
go on working to supply the Union Company with coal would be 









of existence. t 1 He said that he would lrather see all 
the organizations in the colony going to pieces than see 
t t k i1h .• t a2 us consen o wor w non"unionis men. 
l P. Brown, the chairman of the Lyttelton Wharf Labourersli 
'f 
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•worked the Union Companyis boats (sic) until their advertise-
ment appeared in the evening papers calling for free labour 0 
If that advertisement had not appeared in the paper•, he 
continued, 1we would still have worked on. t 3 
Captain Highman from the Marine Officers 1 Association 
spent most of his speaking time at the conference analysing 
the officers' affiliation question, but did not go so far as 
to say that it ~as the reason the strike began in New Zealand. 
He read a letter in which McLean told Millar in July that he 
was going to ask the OwnersC Association to exempt New Zealand 
from their resolutinn.against the affiliation of the officers 
with other labour organisations. But, Highman said, McLean 
















He then discussed the offic.ers 1 demands made on the 
Union Company in July and pointed out that without the aid 
of the Maritime Council, with which they were then affiliating, 
the officers would not ha¥e achieved Ian honest settlementt. 1 
Much of the rest of what he said concerned the Shipmasters• 
,Association which he said the Union Cof!1pany had s~t up and 
used to pressure officers mto lea.tl.ng the Marine Off icerst 
. t• 2 ,Associa ion. After asserting that there was a dispute, 
and that the employers, apart from the Union Company, were 
I extremely discourteous to the Government in not attending the 
conference, he sat down. 
l 
Most of the other del~gates who spoke in the first two 
days of the conference, like Millar and Lomas, a?serted that 
they would never consent to unionists working with non-uniontsts. 
Some of them attacked the other employers for not attendingo 
Others pointed out that lnew unionism' was far superior to 
Rold uninnisml because it was far stronger. The bolder ones, 
who spoke on that theme, claimed with some justification that 
the employers' associations had refused to discuss the strike 
because they wante.d to crush •new unionism t. The most telling 
remarks on that topic were made by J. Meyer from the 
Wellington Trades Council who said~ 
1 AJHR op.citu p.13 












1And I think I am right in stating that many men 
who came out of work in the first instance did not 
know what they came out for, although the great 
majority of them knew., But the few who did not 
understand what they came out for in the first instance 
fully understand it now, and the very men who were 
"shaky" about going back a week after they came 
out are the most determined to stand out until they 
have had their rights recognised so far that they 
!hall band themselves into unions or associations 
for their mutual banefit 0 ' 1 
E. Sandford, in a long analytical speech, asked why 
the conference had not taken place at the beginning of the 
trouble rather than towards the end of it. He said that the 
'labour partyi and the~ew unionists', in particular 'held 
out as practical and desirable from the commencement of the 
dispute ••• the alternative of a conference.' Furthermore, 
he said that they were prepared to abide by the results of 
b . t" 2 a;- 1tra ion. While this cannot be seen as a definite hint 
of things to come, it was one of the threads of opinion which 
were woven together by Reeves in .his arbitration bill in the 
following years. 
Apart from general comments, each del-egate brought up 
specific grievanc~s that his union had against the Union 
Company or other employers, nearly all of than .unrelated to 
the strike. McLean considered them a good diversion, it 
seems, for he went to some length to try and answer them while 
onl! dealing with the main issues briefly. 
1 AJHR op.cit. p.9 
2 Ibid 
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After two days of talking and debating the delegates 
realised that they ·were not getting any closer to a settlement. 
R..P. Johnson, another of the Wellington Trades Council 
delegates, hoping that a compromise might be possible, suggested 
that a delegation from the labour side should meet with 
McLean in camera and try to arrive at some basis of settle-
ment. His colleague, Meyer, took this up immediately, and 
suggested that Winter, Sandford, Millar, Lomas and Fisher be 
appointed to meet McLean. After heated discussion as to the 
suitability of the candidates, and the addition of Brown's 
name, the delegation was agreed upon. 1 
During that debate Fisher made some very sensible obser-
vations when he said: 
'There is nothing to be gained, in my humble opinion, 
by going into the origin of the difficulty. · It is 
here, no matter who is to blame for bringing it about, 
whether officers, seamen, wharf-labourers, or any one else. 
That has nothing whatever to do with it now~· As 
members of the community, it is our duty to try, in 
the best manner possible, to bring about a settlement~ 
Do not take into account how it arose. We might go 
on to the end of time and never satisfactorily clear 
up who was to blame for bringing it about~ The difficulty 
is here, and let us now try~ •• to ascertain in wha~ 
way we can settle this with least harm to eithe3:-' side, 
arrl with the best possible advantage to all concerned; 
and that can only be done by dropping altogether the 
question of the origins of the difficulty~ 1 - 2 
---------------------------
1 AJHB.. op.cit. p.35 
2 Ibid p.38 _ ......... _____________________________ ----~- -
- 143 -
(f) Basis for Settlement and the End of the Conference 
Fisher quietly and without comment announced to the 
conference when it reassembled three days later that the 
delegates, having met McLean as directed, had failed to reach 
an agreement with him. He said that they had proposed to him 
the following: 
1 1~ The delegates agree to submit to their principals 
a basis of settlement, conditionally upon the 
Hon. G! McLean pursuing a similar course, as 
follows: · 
2~ That a~l competent hands a: present in the 
employ of the Union Company be admitted to 
the unions without ballot, upon payment of the 
entrance fee. 
3. That the Union Steamship Company undertake to 
recognise the Mercantile Marine Officers' 
Association, and the Seamen I s Union undertake 
to recognise the new Shipmasters 1 Association, 
without prejudice to either body, and membership 
of either body be considered for mutual 
recognition. 
4. That all persons dismissed or called out shall 
be reinstated. 
5~ That in future none but union men shall be 
employed whe,;:-e the -rules of any union so prov·ide, 
except under·· exceptional circumstances to be 
hereinafter agreed upon. 
6. That a bond be agreed upon between both parties 
guaranteeing that no strike or lock-out shall 
take place for one year, or such period as may 
be agreed upon. 1 1 
McLean replied immediately, saying that .he could not 
accept the proposals because it would put the sides 'back 
1 AJHR op.cit. p.39 -
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1 e~actly to where we started from•. He also objected to 
it because it would put his company in the position of 
compelling their men to become unionists or leave their 
ships~ Thus, he argued, the proposals .amounted to a demand 
that the Union Company throw over the men they had taken on, 
and pledged to.stand by. Seeing the·other side was obviously 
determined to stick to the principle that non-union and union 
men should not work together, he told them, there was little 
use his continuing the discussion further; for prolonging 
the conference only left people with the impression that there 
was a chance of settlement when indeed there was none~ 
Finally he said that out of the strike some good will probably 
be derived~· There were employers• associations, which would, 
he believed, make for ease of negotiations~ Furthermore, 
he .hoped that the un.ions, admitting their faults, would revise 
their constitutions and so avoid such misfortunes on later 
occasions~ 
Millar in reply said that the delegates .had done every-
thing possible to reach a compromise short of abandoning their 
whole cause~ He reaffirmed more than once the determination 
of the unions not to work with non-union men. McLean's 
attitude, he claimed, showed that he was taking an aggressive 
stand on the issuee That, he contended, put the 'labour 
1 AJHR op •. cit~ p.40 
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party• on the defensive. 'The employers may complete their 
victory by some further act of aggression•, he said, 'but 
f 1 think their next balance-sheet will show that it is the 
r, 
dearest victory they ever bought in their lives.• Then he 
hinted at his possible acceptance of defeat saying that •the 
time is not far off when the men they·are employing now will 
have their union 1 , for •union is necessary for the protection 
of labour.' 1 
Other delegates expressed disappointment that the 
proposed basis {or a settlement was not accepted by McLean.· 
They continued to attack the Union Company for wanting to 
cru-sh uni-onism, and predicted that public opinion would swing 
their way once the terms had been understood~ McLean objected 
to the attacks made.on his Company, affirming again that they 
I l"ft d f" t h t • • r· 2 never i e a inger o ur unionism. He seconded a 
vote of thanks to the Chairman and then excused himself from 
further sessions of the conference. 
On the fifth and final day of the 'Labour Conference' 
. 
Millar took the opportunity of assertaining that the other 
labour delegates were in favour bf establishing a National 
Trades and Labour Council for New Zealand'~ As has been 
shown already, such a body had been discussed before the 









question did not need to be justified again at the conference~ 
ae said that it would be established by each trades and labour 
council sending two delegates to sit on an enlarged Maritime 
council. The new body would have a paid, full-time executive. 
The basic plan, he said, was already decided upon and would be 
submitted to the Maritime Council in November, and subsequently 
to the trades councils~ After that motion was unanimously 
passed, he criticised the Railway Commissioners for dismissirig 
union leaders in Dunedin, ano on his motion a deputation to 
wait on the Commissioners and the Premier asking them to 
reinstate the dismissed men was agreed to. 1 
The conference then adjourned sine die, in the hope that 
it might meet again some time in the not too distant future 
and reach a compromise settlement. 
While the conference had no real immediate effect on 
the course of the strike, it was nevertheless of great 
historical significance in more ways than one! McLean, 
Millar, and the other delegates who spoke on the reasons for 
1 ~ op.cit~ pp. 45-6 





the strike, explained in more precise terms and at greater 
1ength than on any other known reported occasion exactly why 
New Zealand became involved in what was at the beginning an 
Australian affair. Millar I s view that the strike bega·n 
primarily over the officers• dispute with the owners has 
been vindicated by later historical evidence as against 
McLean's tracing. the first moves· back to the Corinna incident. 1 
As will be seen more fully later, the fact that both Millar 
and McLean agreed that the strike in New Zealand began only 
after the Union Company had hired free men to work on its 
wharves in Sydney leads to a completely different explanation 
of the events of August 1890 than that given by Salmond 
that the strike was •essentially a demonstration of sympathy 
. h h A 1· . · · t t 2 wit t e ustra ian unionis s. On the other hand it 
supports Sutch 1 s contention that during the strike 'unionism 
3 was at stake 1 o It is clear from what was said in Wellington 
that the unionists here struck to protect their right to refuse 
to work with free labour rather than purely in sympathy. 
The decision of the employers' associations to boycott 
the conference had considerable long term contributing effects 
on industrial relations in this country. This point will 
also be dealt with more fully later. Here is sufficient 
1. Nairn op.cit. Seep~ 
2 0 Salmond Thesis op.cit. pp. 61-2, Also Oliver op.cit. Pol39 
3. Sutch Quest op.cite p.71 
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to say that their absence gave credence to Reeves• 
advocacy of compulsory arbitration after the 1890 eiection. 
It also made the comprehensive system of state controlled 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration in this country in 
the early 1890 1 s readily acceptable in his own party, with 
1a.bour leaders, and also the public at· large~ 1 
The large diverse number of labour delegates at the 
~onference, together with the unanimity of opinions expressed 
there showed once again that the labour movement in this 
country was almost without exception firmly behind the 
Maritime Council's decision to call its members out. 2 New 
Zealand labour was not divided in 1890 into 'militants•, who 
supported the strike, and •moderates•, opposed to it, as it 
was in both .1913 and 1951. 3 Orte of the main reasons for·the 
unity of opinion became clear at the conference: the struggle 
was over the basic principles of unionism and •new unionism• 
in particular. It was not a strike by a group of unions in 
support of its own particular interests, or in support of its 
own ideas, but a strike to uphold unionism itself!. As a 
consequence, only the marine engineers• association stood out 
against it. Other unions that expressed an opinion supported 
the Maritime Council in various wayse 
1 See p~. 209-19 
2 Seep~. 132-42 
1-3Se_e_p_. 228 also p. 235 
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to light the unit:y of_ the trade unions of the country in a 
clear and irrefutable manner. 
Finally the question arises whether indeed the strike in 
Ne~ Zealand could have been settled in Wellington, or whether 
the Union Company and the Maritime Council were so tied by 
their separate Australian connections that a separate agreement 
here was impossible? The New Zealand Maritime Council was 
independent of the Australasian Council and was abl-e to act 
independently~ At no time durirg the conference was any 
mention made by labour members about referring their proposed 
basis to that other body~- However the same could not be 
said of the Union Company~ The Timaru Herald made that clear 
when it said: 
1The Union Company is-not in a positbn to yield 
the point in dispute; They are connected with the 
SSOA, and could not honourably break away from the 
agreement arrived at (Albury). Thus there is no 
chance of a compromise~·• Furthermore it remarked: 
'Even if the Union Company did give way, the 
EmployersU Associations (sic) are determira:l to 
make no distinction between union and free labour~' 1 
McLean's frequent vague hints of referring points to his 
principal, the SSOA, shows how accurate the above statement is~ 
The Union Company held to the Albury resolutions for other 
reasons than that given by the Herald. They had to support 
the stand taken by the SSOA because, as Millar himself 
admitted, if they fell out with the Australian owners then 
l_ 
1 !!:! 3 Oct 1890 
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ships would have been run in competition with them on the 
trans-Tasman and New Zealand coastal trades~ Most likely 
the Australian owners would not have agreed to allow one of 
the biggest of its members to have compromised with the unions, 
and for that reason it seems that the conference in Wellington 
~as bound to fail as an attempt to achieve a purely New 
Zealand settlement!1 
---------------------
After the conference, a meeting of the labour delegates 
decided that all unionists not on strike should be asked to 
contribute 10 per cent of their income over £1 to the strike 
fund~· They then went home to report on what they had said 
and done in Wellington. 
A few days after the collapse of the conference the 
Maritime Council ordered the wharf carters, expressmen and store-
men to return to work. Millar issued instructions to that 
effect on 8 October, at the same time stating clear~y that 
the struggle would be carried on by the other unions until 
·1 
such time as a satisfactory: settlement was reached~ In 
LT 8 Oct 1890 -
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allowing those men to work with non-unionists the council for 
the first time admitted that unionists might have to abandon 
their leading principle! 
After that the strike dropped out of the news almost 
altogether for a time!· Then in the third week in October, 
the strike again became newsworthy wheri it was made known that 
a conference between the leading antagonists was being arranged. 
in Christchurch~ It is timely at this point in the story 
to look more closely at conditions in Canterbury during the 
strike to see why· that development was possible!,' 
C H A P T E R 5 
THE STRIKE IN LYTT.ELl'ON AND CHRISTCHURCH 
- A Regional Study 
1~ Conditions in Canterbury Before the Strike 
(a) The Economy 
As was- shown in Chapter 1, the depression and economic 
fluctuations of the eighties were more severe and prolonged 
in the two southern provinces~ The more varied exports of 
the North Island, such as dairy produce, coal, gum, and timber 
-1 
helped lessen the severity of the depressed periods there~ 
In Canterbury the most notable economic advancement in 
that period was the growth of the new freezing- industry 
starting in 1883{ The seven works in operation in 1890 
produced 37 per cent of the country• s frozen lamb and mutt.on 
carcasses that later year. Together with the products of 
meat preserving works, the total output of the Canterbury 
works in 1890 was valued at £423,606~ Only those in the 
Wellington province had a bigger turnover. 2 
Because of its growth during that period, the freezing 
1 Sinclair and Mandle, p.~101 
2 N,Z, Census 1891 App~B p.xxvii 
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industry was the third largest industry in the province 
-1 
recorded in the 1891 Census~ Inspite of the growth and 
expansion of the freezing industry, mariy large land owners, 
struggling to pay off debts incurred during the hectic 
seventies, were unable to borrow the finance they needed 
to change over to fat lamb production~· Furthermore, falling 
prices received for meat on the London market in the 1886-7 
and 1887-8 seasons discouraged farmers to change over, and 
·2 
pushed down the returns of those who had~ 
However the 'economic situation in Canterbury, along with 
that in other parts of the country, brightened in 1889 for 
both the farmers and businessmen~ Wool and meat export 
prices rose in London during the. 1888-9 season!- Then drought 
in Australia from the middle of 1889 increased the demand for 
New Zealand produce, notably potatoes, grain and onions!-. 
Agricultural returns ·show that Canterbury grew either the 
3 second;liighest or the highest yield of those crops that year~ 
A comparison of the shipping figures for Lyttelton in the 
years ending June 1889 and 1890 vividly illustrate the growing 
prosperity of Canterbury at the end of 1889~ Whereas ships 
leaving:in the first period carried away 99,000 sacks of 
1 !L.Z, Census 1891 App.B p.xxvii 
2 Sinclair and Mandle, p~lOl 
3 B~L. Evans Agricultural and Pastoral Statistics pp. Al8 
and A22! 
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potatoes; in the second period they took over 149,000 sacks, 
most of them to Australia!-1 Therefore, for the first time 
since 1882, economic conditions in Canterbury brightened 
considerably in the final half of 1889. Business confidence 
began to return, and the revival helped to ensure that many 
working men received a share in the -increasing prosperity! 
But 1890, which was more optimistically welcomed than any 
new year for a long time, was not quite such a-good year as 
1889. Prosperity began to wane again, and incomes levelled 
out or fell slightly. The value of exports from Lyttelton 
in the year ended Junel891 tell the tale in part; being 
·2 £100,000 below that of the previous year! By August 1890, 
the reappearance of mild depression no doubt made some 
employers anxious about the economic'situation~ They must 
have been particularly worried about the assertive· trade _ 
unions that had established themselves during t_he ,previous 
prosperous year. Concern about the increasing demands of 
the new trade unions in a time of falling prosperity helps 
explain why the employers became determined to weaken; if 
not crush, the trade unions of Canterbury that were out during 
the maritime strike!-, 
(b) Social Conditions 
Throughout the 1880 1 s unemployment was a problem for many 
r 
1 Report of Canterbury Chamber of Commerce 1890 p.27 L_ l~id_p:21 -~--
l 
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The number of those out of work fluctuated with the 
upswings and downturns in the economy~ Even in September 
of the most prosperous year of the decade (1889) 237 men were 
employed on government relief work, and unnumbered others 
were without regular work. Further evidence of the tight 
employment market in 1889 was seen when thirteen men applied 
for the rather unpleasant job of town scavenger in Lyttelton. 1 
The number employed on government relief work in 1890 was never 
published in the Appendices, but it is likely that it was 
higher that year· than in 1889 as a consequence of falling 
t • I e?.Cpor prices. Most probably unemployment in Canterbury was 
quite high in August 1890!. No seasonal work on farms would 
have been available, and the expo~t industries were in a 
slack period~-; Thus, when the maritime strike be~an the 
Canterbury employers could draw on a large pool of free labour 
that was looking for work~ 
---------------------
(c) Industries, Work and Wealth 
The steady expansion in the number and size of the 
factories in Canterbury during the eighties has been 




described by both Scatter and Morrison, and will not be 
i-1 repeated here~1 It is sufficient for the purpose of this 
account to note that at the date of the 1891 Census," there 
were 366 1manufactories 1 in Canterbury employing 4,662 hands! 
The province then employed the third largest number of hands 
in industry~ But most of the firms were comparatively small 
and employed only a few people~-1 
Thus, in 1890, Christchurch, where most Canterbury industry 
was concentrated, was an industrial and commercial centre of 
some importance ·in New Zealand!·, The dependence of most of 
the larger industries on coal supplies, principally from the 
West Coast and Buller mines, made the owners vulnerable to any 
prolonged shipping or coal strike{ That no doubt influenced 
the majority of Canterbury employers to oppose the claims 
of the trade unions during the maritime strike!:1 
--------------------
2! Lyttelton 
(a) Before the Strike 
A study of the strike in the main port of Canterbury 
reveals many details which a colonial coverage might miss 




0 :r ignoref But in particular, there were certain features 
of the strike which were peculiar to Lyttelton, a town whose 
-· 
1ivelihood was derived almost entirely from transport and 
d 
(. 
tra e. Furthermore, the employers in Christchurch and its 
ninterland were more successful in organising free labour than 
their compatriots in other New Zealand c:entres!' 
Lyttelton had 4,087 people at-the time of the 1891 
census: more than the town has today,·even with the addition 
of the suburb of Diamond Harbour~ 1 It was then the sixth 
largest town in the South Island, and even larger than 
Timaru was then!-1 It served as the export port for north 
and central Canterbury, with a!))pulation of over 113,000 
1 I 2 peop e. 
Trade through Lyttelton was quite brisk in 1889 and 1890. 
The value of exports in the first year was £2,216,000 and the 
second £2,095,000! That compares with average yearly exports 
of only £1,550,000 in the 1885-1888 period~ The overseas 
imports that went through Lyttleton amounted to just over 
£1,000,000 a year in the !885-1890 period, and did not 
fluctuate very mu~h at all. 3 
The largest group of workers in Lyttelton in 1890 was 
the wharf labourers. According to a newspaper repor·t, the 
membership of the Lyttelton Wharf Labourers• Union at·the 
1 N,Z, Census 1966 p.17 tyttelton - 3493 
2 N,Z, Census 1891 






time of the maritime strike was cpproximately 500. 1 How 
manY of them travelled from Christchurch is not known, but 
~ith relatively slower transport in those days, this number 
~as probably smaller than it is today!' 
Others worked for the harbour board, shipping agencies, 
railways, one of the several marine eng.ineering shops, or in 
the numerous hotels and shops serving the sea-faring population 
and local residents~-1 There was no doubt a number of fishermen~ 
Still others were employed by the borough council and government 
departments!,1 Then there was the group of professional men 
and tradesmen to serve the town and ships!·, Thus, it can be 
seen that Lyttelton in 1890 was primarily the entrepot port 
for Christchurch and Canterbury, and not an industrial or 
commercial centre of ai.y importance by itself~ 
---------------------
During the 1889-90 trade union revival, many Lyttelton 
men joined one of the several unions operating in the port. 
A wharf labourers• union was formed on 6 October 1889, in 
place of the previous one which had gone out of existence 
about ten years earlier. Seamen, who lived in Lyttelton, had 




most likely been members of their union since the early 
eighties!' The railway men, who, because of the heavy 
. 
reliance of rail transport to and from the port,' were in a 
keY position, were members of the Christchurch branch of the 
ASRS by the time the maritime strike started!. Together. 
with the members of the Cooks' and Stewa~ds 1 Union and the 
Officers Association in port at the time, all the above 
mentioned unionists went out during that strike!-. By August 
1890 evidently the labour force in Lyttelton, was well organised 
and generally uni-ted behind the Maritime Council. The 
strike,. which started that month, affected Lyttelton 
more than almost any other town in New Zealand, because of 
the depende~ce of the town on trade, and the strong associations 
its unionists had with ·the Maritime Council. 
fb) The Strike in Lyttelto9 
The Lyttelton wharf labourers were not drawn into the 
Maritime strike until 28 August, the day after the Seamen 
had left the Wairarapa in Dunedin!-. Three days before that 
it must have appeared to them that they woµld be able to 
remain aLoof from the dispute~ On 25 August they agreed to 
donate the fallowing day's pay to the Australian strike fund!-
This was the only reported example of such action in New 
Zealand!1 
. . 
The union President, Brown, justified their 




for them as well if their 'Australian brothers• won, while 
if the Australian unions •went to the wall they would also.• 1 
•The dispute• he was referring to obviously was not that which 
i.!1Volved only the Marine Officers• pay claims, but that involving 
their determination, and that of most other unionists to uphold 
their right to affiliate with otha:.- labour bodies without 
the consent of the shipowners!-
·.2 
collected on 26 August!' 
Altogether about £150 was 
Whether this money was ever sent to Australia is not 
clear, for the day after it was coLlected, the strike started 
in New Zealand waters!.1 None of the Union Company vessels 
in Lyttelton that day was immediately affected!, The 
Beautiful Star was only a coaster; while the other two, the 
Tekapo, and t,h.e Wakatipu, although inter-colonial steamers, we: e 
'3 
based in Dunedin! 
But on 27 August, it was announced that no cargo for· 
Australia would be loaded by the wharf :Lsbourers in Lytteltonf 
Those Union Company vessels in port that day were not affected 
by the order!'· The job of discharging the coal from the 
Tekapo continued uninterrupted! On the same day the Marit·ime 
Council made it clear that it would not stop work on the ,1home I 
steamers if a strike on them could be avoided~4 
1 LT 26 Aug 1890 -
2 LT 28 Aug 1890 -
3 LT 2-9 Aug 1890 --
4 ~ 27 Aug 1890 
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The day the strike actually started in Lyttelton, 28 
iugust, the port was described as quiet, with half the men out 
of work, and ships I scarce 1 , even though there were thirteen 
·1 
ships in the harbour~ The Dunedin based Wairarapa sailed 
from Dunedin that morning using free labour forcing the Maritime 
council to carry out its threatened stoppage of all Union 
company ships, or to back down~ 
course, though not immediately!.1 
The Council choee the former 
The Tekapo was that day 
due to take on cargo for Australia, when the wharf labourers 
refused to load it, in accordance with the Maritime Council 
directive they had received1 the day before!~ At 3 o'clock 
that afternoon, after the Union Company had hired free labour 
to load the cargo for Australia, all work on her, including 
the discharging of coal, was stopped by the wharf labourers! 
A meeting bf their union was called for that night!-1 
The men reported to be 1all rather sorry that things had come 
to a head f1 •• But at the same time they were determined to 
fight for the principle involved!'·, 2 One man hoped that 
the labour leaders would reconsider·their decision and 
I h h • • h h 1 I i-.3 revoke it as t ey ad no grievance wit t e emp oyers. 
Another was convinced that labour would be beaten as there 
-4 
was \mough "free labour" to fill the unionists places!'• 
1 p -
2 
3 S:pt 1890 3 U!Co., 7 'home I steamers, 2 coasters 
and an American brigantine! 




tnat night Brown read a telegram from Millar which told 
ttiem that the West Coast miners were out, and ordered them 
~to effect a substantial block on all Union Company Steamers• 
and not just the int~r-colonial ships!-,1 The meeting 
unanimously resolved to call the men out of all the Company's 
~essels in harbour, and work on them was brought to a complete 
standstill. 
j 
The same night the seamen on Union Company vessels made 
it clear that they would give twenty-four hours notice the 
moment 1blackleg 1 wharf labour went aboard, and the officers 
. d th ld f t . 1 wi." th . 1'2 sai ey wou re use o sai non-union seamen.' The 
strike in Lyttelton, unlike that in Dunedin 'Which affected 
the ships first, spread froµi the wharves onto the ships~-·· 
Two days after the Lyttelton wharf labourers had worked to 
supply their Australian colleagues with funds, they found 
themselves embroiled in 'thadispute 1 also~ They obviously 
did not wish to become involved, as is seen by their generous 
gesture to the Australian unionists, but they were connected : 
so intimately with other unionists in New Zealand, and adhered 
to the principles of .•new unionism I so strongly th~t they 
had no alternative but to throw their lot in with their 
fell ow unionists~- They, as Brown later said in Wellington, 
only stopped work when the Union Company advertised for free 
-3 
labourers to work on their ships! 1 
1 11 29 Aug 1890 
2 f 3 Sept 1890 1I. 29 Aug 1890 







The following day the strike spread quickly through the 
I port. The Wharf Labourers• Union placed an advertisement 
in the b_lttelton Times that. day asking men to keep away from 
the port during the strike, but their endeavours were to no 
effective avail. The Union Company was able to hire about 
100 free labourers for work in its ships~ 1 G.G~ Stead, whom 
Macdonald said was one of the most able businessmen in 
Christchurch at that time undertook the task of organising 
the free labour in Lyttelton~ He was assisted by the manager 
of the Canterbury ·Farmers I Co-operative Association; A!'lI. 
Turnbull. Stead was_pryicipally a grain merchant, and was 
obviously anxious least the then highly profitable grain sales 
to Australia were interruptedf1 After several disasterous 
years for grain sales in the early years of the eighties, 
he wanted to cash in on the high prices brought about by 
drought in Australia during 1889 and early 1890. He went 
down to Lyttelton to manage affairs personally, even though 
he was exposed to some risks;2 
The decision of the Railway Commissioners to put plate 
layers in the trucks at Lyttelton in place of the striking 
wharf labourers might have caused a general rail strike in 
the country had the ASRS not been considerably more cautious 
1 11 29 Aug 1890 
2 G~R. Macdonald Biographies Canterbury Museum Library 
Stead was also in 1890 a dir.ector of the N.z~· Shipping 
Co.; Christchurch Press Co., and Christchurch Gas Co. 
He stood for Parliament in the Avon Electorate later-in 






than other unions!1 They laid down that only railway men 
assigned to do the work of men on strike were to go out 
but there was to pe no general rail strike!. That order, 
which was extremely selfish, affected Lyttelton in the 
manner already describedr1 
The hiring of free l_abour to work the Union Company 
ships in Lyttelton forced the seamen on all the company's 
1 t . th . t' ,·2 vesse s ogive eir no ices. The officers in·turn followed 
• t 'h t . ' h' d i'.3 sui ,: e momen non-union men were ire as seamen,. The 
cooks and stewards.reld a ballot first and only after the 
members had voted overwhelmingly in favour of striking did 
,4 
they go out! However, in the intervening period they 
decided that they wo~ld not cook for non-union labour except 
those employed as i:eamen or officers~' That, as the Lyttelton 
Times was quick to point out •scotched the Union Company's 
5-
plans to feed the free labour wharfies on their ships•. 
What started in Lyttelton on 28 August as a 'Union 
Company 'boycott• became a general shipping strike the 
following day~ The wharf labourers in the port then 
decided that they would not handle any cargo consigned by or to 
the New Zealand Farmers• Co-operative, or Kaye and Carter, 
1 See p~. 87-9 
2 LT 29 and 30 Aug 1890 -3 LT 1 Sept 1890 -
4 11 5 Sept 1890 
L 





because Stead and Turnbull, the top men in those two companies 
were so prominent in organising free labour for Lyttelton.1 
The New Zealand agents hired free labour to work all the over-
seas vessels affected by the ban only to find that union men 
in all the other ports refused to work vessels belonging to 
the same companies! However, the wharf labourers showed 
that their hostility was directed against Stead and.Turnbull, 
and not the shipping companies or other employers by exempting 
the overseas ships carrying meat!'' For example, the New 
Zealand Shipping Company's mail steamer, Kaikoura, was loaded 
with coal and frozen meat by the union men as usual.2 No· 
doubt the unionists also wanted to try and win the suppor~ of 
farmers by making that vital exception. 
By the fourth day of the strike in New Zealand, the 
boycott of the Union Company to force them to abandon their 
determination to hire non-union labour in Sydney, had 
escalated into an almost general shipping and waterfront 
strike throughout New Zealand£1 A few small coastal lines 
such as that of Cuff and Graham of Canterbury, and the inter-
·3 
colonial Ellis Line were exempt! At that time. it was reported 
that there were estimated to be 800 men on strike in Lyt~elton, 
i 
though only 142 free labourers were engaged to work the wharves 
on 5 September~ It was hardly surprising that business in 
1 1! 1 Sept 1890 
2 Q121. 1 Sept·· 1890 










tbe town was then at a standstill. 
-----------------------
(c) Fr·ee Labour in Lyttelton, and ·the Effects on Trade 
The free labour force in Lyttelton was as large and as 
well organised as that in any other port in the country with 
a similar number of ships in during the strike!'.• However, 
trade was exceedingly slack at the time, and only a relatively 
small amount of labour was requir.ed!' As has been shown 
already, Stead and Turnbull by their own unaided efforts 
organised the free labour required in Lyttelton for the first 
week setting up labour bureaux in both the city and the port !-1 
However on 5 September they were relieved of their responsibilit-
ies by a Shipping Committee (sic), set up with 1 the object 
of keeping the trade of the port going•{ It consisted 
of prominent Canterbury farmers and business men such as 
Lfi Harper,', J! Gould,' P!'.1 Cunningham, J~ Kinsley (owner of 
several coastal vessels) and J f' Grigg!. That group met the 
Master Mariners, Messrs!· Cameron, Talbot, Stevenson, 
and McClelland, and gave them authority to engage permanent 
7 Sept 1890 (PA) 
I 
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1 pa.nds whenever they could be obtained. These instructions 
seem to indicate that much of the free labour was casual and 
11 ot engaged permanently, or else had proved to· be 
. -2 
unsatisfactory!1 Turnbull and Stead were heartily thanked 
b.Y the new committee for their work up till then!-1 
Special ~rains.were run each day to carry the free labour 
from Christchurch to the port. About 400 men caught the 
train to Lyttelton on 29 August though not all of them were 
1' 
free labourers. Some well known unionists also went down 
to watch ev·ents· therel; They were, it appears, well entertained 
by the 'green• free labourers, especially those unloading 
coal from the Tekapo. About five hundred people saw the 
train off from the Christ~hurch station, while many more 
stood and watched tt go by at each crossing~ 3 
The new men began discharging the coal from the Tekapo 
at 2 p~m. on 29 August and by 5 p.m 0 had managed to fill only 
I 
eight trucksfi The Lyttelton Times reporter ridiculed the 
workers,- describing the scene as I laughable 1 !' He lost count 
of the number of times the coal from the basket was either 
lost over 'the side of the ship or scattered over the wharf! 
According to him more coal went over the side or on the 
deck than went into the trucks~ He took great delight in 
telling how, when the basket fell off the hook on the Number 2 
1 f 6 Sept 1890 
2 See PP• 166=74 















derrick, and the hook was caught up at the top, work on that 
bold had to stop because no one was 'able seamen enough to 
be able to "shin''. the mast and release the hook'. Whereas 
the free labourers took up to half an hour to load a truck, 
be wrote, the union men in comparison were working slowly 
if they only filled four in an hour .• · 
He continued: 
'Every time the poor unf ortUJ:1ate '~fr.ee labourer" 
succeeded in "landing" his basket, the "moral _ 
supporters" of the employers of. labour encouraged 
him with a good clap and cheer, which made the 
poor fellow's:> nervous that in four cases out of 
five his next attempt would prove a failure, -
thus giving the cr.owd of sympathisers of the men 
on str,ike a turn to clap and cheer~ • 
The policemen, he wrote, who were protecting the free 
labourers kept well clear of the :truck being. loaded!·· The 
crowd, he said, was orderly in th~ extreme!, 1 
The Press reporter saw the scene in Lyttelton from a 
different.angle~ Instead of describing the spectacle in 
detail he argued that, the free labourers working on the 
Tekapo •could hardly be expected to become experts at hauling 
coal at -a mom·ent • s notice 1 ! 'But they did 1 , he continued, 
'display stern determination, which showed they felt deeply 
on the matter!. 1 He thought they were working well under the 
circumstances~' They only made mistakes now and again that 
.he noticed, and not two-thirds of the time as the Times reporter 
claimed. 
1 l=I, 30 Aug 1890 












The fress reporter no doubt exaggerated as much as his 
rival had done when he wrote, 'The banter discontinued when it 
~as seen that coal buckets were being loaded into the trucks 
~ith a precision that would have done credit to a great 
many union menf1 • He ended by declaring 
1To any unpracticed eye, the position on the wharves 1 was the same as if no strike had taken place at all.' 
However, most other leading papers in the South Island 
reproduced the Lyttelton Times• account of the Tekapo incident, 
though in a more moderate form~ The generally anti-labour 
Timaru Herald printed the following Press Association cable 
from Lyttelton: 
'Their awkwardness caused great amusement~ Much 
of the coal was scatteredcbout the wharf and some 
dropped overboard~ 1 All stuck pluckily to their 
work ano an improvement was manifest towards 
evening!'• 2 
This later account probably describes the scene better 
than the other two •. Its editor had obviously tried to 
reconcile the conflicting accounts sent by the Christchurch 
newspapers!, 
The whole incident and particularly the way it was 
.handled by the newspapers shows how dangerous it is to rely 
on only one account of the strike, particularly one written 
from a partisan point of view~ The last was not heard of 
the Tekapo fiasco when the final 1:asket of coal was slung out 
1 r 30 Aug 1890 








Just over three weeks later the Lyttelton Times 
stated that several men on strike were getting a good price 
for the coal from the Tekapo that they were managing to dredge 
·,1 
from the harbour~· The Tekapo stole the limelight and 
hardly anything else was reported about how the men on the 
other ships managed~ 
During the first week of the strike several organisations 
were set in motion to muster large numbers of farmers, their 
sons and farm labourers for work on the wharves~-, Some 
people confi?ently expected that over 1,000 men could be raised~ 2 
For most of the opening three weeks of the strike more men 
turned up than were needed!. 
The Press said that the surplus of labour made it plain 
to see that the effects of .the strike were negligp.ble right 
' 
from the start~-, However on 19 September it had to admit 
that there was a shortage of ]a)our even though 230 men were 
·3 
employed and shipping was regarded as being slack! Its 
platitudes about how •the owners were very happy with the 
work' and 1 the non-union men were doing a great job' could not 
hide the fact that the strike was having a widely felt and 
significant effect on Christchurch and its hinterland~ 
1 LT 26 Sept 1890 
2 1! 30 Aug 1890 See Farmers and Strike pp. 110-13 











The Lyttelton Times attacked the Press_ on thi.s point, 
continually pointing out as many instances as it could muster 
of ways the free men did not match up to unionists. On 19 
September its reporter commented that on busy days in the 
past all 500 unionists were engaged in Lyttelton, with 
assistance from the ships' crews. Thus he went on 'if 
sufficient free labour cannot be obtained to work when eo 
little shipping traffic was going on, it is not altogether 
easy to understand what ground there is for saying that 
"matters with regard to the strike are practically over as 
far as Lyttaton is concerned"•' He admitted that the free 
labourers were 1doing quite well 1 but he went on to comment 
that 'even those working with them shake their heads very 
decidedly when asked if matters are going on as if no labour 
dispute exi sted 0 a l. 
The inefficiency and cost of free labourers came to 
light on several different occasions. At the end of the 
first week the Lyttelton Times concluded that the free 
labourers only managed to unload about a third as much cargo 
. 2 
in a given time as regular men would have done. Five days 
later, seamen were said to be so scarce that up to £8 per 
month was being offered for competent men for the 1home 1 
run. 3 IA man who should know (nameless) (sic)Z told a 
1 LT 19 Sept 1890 
2 LT 11 Sept 1890 
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Lyttelton Times reporter on 20 September that while 'things 
were going as well as could reasonably be expected ••• the 
strike was not practically over.' Even if it was, the 
reporter went on, both this informant and his partners Swish 
it had not happened; for they found their work was costing 
just about double what it would have cost but for the strike. 
The cost of each men (wharf labourer) was 15/- per day and 
three men were needed to do one man•s work.' When the seamen 
and miners were considered also it could be further seen that 
the strike was 'far from practically overt. 1 On the same 
day it was reported that trade in Lyttelton was at its lowest 
2 ebb, as it was in much of the rest of the country also. 
Durin~ the following week the Times printed letters from 
H. Williams, Master of the ketch, Clematis and J. Johnson, a 
merchant, both complaining about the way ifree labour' .had 
held them up or delayed their goods. Williams protested 
against the way the railway authorities delayed his ship by 
using free labour, contending that at the rate then being 
worked, it would have taken six to seven days to complete 
the job. Commenting.on lfree labourl .he mocked 'free in 
their case meaning I suppose freedom from strength and ~kill. 
It is perfectly pitiful,' he went on, ito see these men trying 






to work. 1 Johnson was extremely irritated about the length 
of time it took to get--his goods from Lyttel:ton to Christchurch 
(ten days). He concluded from his experience that such 
delays could only mean 'that little or no work was being done 
at all. 12 
At the October meeting of the Lyt:telton Harbour Board, 
the wharehouse manager reported that in the pr~vious month 
13,000 bags of grain had been tput out' by non-union labour 0 
However such work was lboth expensive and unsatisfactory. 1 
The best men that could be obtained were not suited to carrying 
grain, having to be changed daily because they grew so tired. 
Since 10 September his repo~t continued, 1,386 tons of grain 
had been sent out, but at a considerable loss; the cost 
increasing from 7d. per ton to l/l\d0 per ton. This cost 
was further increased by the fact that the men had to be 
paid a full dayts pay though of ten they only worked for six 
3 or seven hours a day. 
Two days later the Lyttelton Times reported that, 
1Work is progressing in much the same ship-shod, 
unsatisfactory manner as has characterised the working 
of the port for the past five weeks 0 No doubt the 
end of the-unfortunate strike will be hailed with 
satisfaction by ail but certain free labourers. 1 4 
Further evidence of the way the strike had seriously 
disrupted trade was published three days later by the Times 
1 LT 22 Sept 1890 -
2 1I 26 Sept 1890 
3 LT 2 Oct 1890 
4 bl'.. 4 Oct 1890 









and not denied by the Press as being untrue. Comparing the 
period 27 August to 30 September 1889 and 1890 the Times 
stated that coastal shipping into Lyttelton fell from 59 
vessels (28,210 tons) to 30 vessels (12,048 tons) while the 
coal they brought in fell from 7,657 tons to 1,602 tons. 
Likewise only eight inter-colonial ships (10,218 tons) left 
Lyttelton in the later period taking away, among other things, 
3,987 sacks of grain and 24,929 sacks of potatoes, compared 
with the nineteen ships (19,378 tons) which left in the 1889 
1 period with 6,607 sacks of grain and 41,141 sacks of potatoes. 
However, these figures are not strictly comparable, for 1889 
was a much better year for trade through Lyttelton than 1890. 
While Lyttelton Times throughout the strike supported 
its editorlts contention that strikes hurt both employers and 
2 . 
workers to a considerable extent, the Press continued to 
maintain that progress in Lyttelton was satisfactory, and 
indeed that the strike was effectively over. 3 However, the 
Press gave no specific evidence to back up its case. From 
that it can be seen that inspite of the Press's attempt 
to gloss over the unpleasant facts of the situation, the 
.free labourers were in fact far from satisfactory in a 
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the port open during the strike it was only at a considerably 
higher cost, and at a much slower rate than normal. Those 
factors no doubt influenced the decision of the Canterbury 
employers and farmers to attempt to reach an agreement with 
the unions at the end of October, just a week before the 
strike ended. 1 
(d) Violence in Lyttelton - Special Constables Sworn in 
From the first day of the strike in Lyttelton extra 
police were sent to the port to protect the free labourers 
2 from harm.. The free labourers were greeted with a barrage 
of mocking and lgood humoured chaffingt when they first 
arrived in Lyttelton- and this was kept up for some days. 
The wharf labourers' Union also maintained pickets on the 
wharfo 
A minor disturbance early in September raised suggestions 
that the permanent Militia, based in the port might be used 
to keep the peace, but this was rejected outrightly by the 
Mayor of Lyttelton, J.B. Milsono He told the Minister of 
Defence that the 'labour party pickets were sto~ping any 
disturbances by larrikins and boys.i 3 The labour leaders 
1 See PP• 180-7 
2 LT 30 Aug 1890 -
3 P 5 Sept 1890 
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naturally did not admit to any association with the trouble. 
The previous day, he reported, when Turnbull and Stead were 
insulted and threatened, they went to the office of the wharf 
1abourers 1 union, whose leaders agreed to put exrra pickets 
on the wharves to protect them. This was another example 
of the firm de1:dre of labour leaders to keep the peace, even 
to-the extent of protecting their opponents. Stead that day 
assured the Press that no wharf labourers were involved in 
the disturbances. 1 
However, pea·ce was not maintained for very longo On 
8 September a series of assaults took place on free labourers on 
the wharves in Lyttelton, on the Bridle Path, and in Wilsons 
Road in Christchurch0
2 In response to these incidents the 
Lyttelton Harbour .Board, in conjunction with the Borough 
Council, decided to appoint and pay 'special constables to 
maintain order on the wharves•. P. Brown, the President 
of the union, recommended to them that certain respectable 
married wharf labourers might be appointed though nothing 
seems to have come of this. 3 However, this decision was 
rescinded two days later when the Government stepped in and 
appointed 102 specials. Th'ey were sworn in by R. Beetham, 
the·Resident Magistrate, and Inspector J. Pender of the 
1 f 5 Sept 1890 
2 LT 9 Sept 1890 















Police Department at a public ceremony in Lyttelton, and 
issued with their badges of office and batonsf The' 
whole force was put under the control of Inspector Pender. 1 
The appointment of specials effectively brought the violence 
to an end! 
In conjunction with the various assaults on 8 September 
eleven men were arrested, amongst them two prominent unionists 
W !"r !. Barnes and J. McGerty !·· They were charged with conspiring 
to assault free ~abourers, and with the actual assault of 
certain of them!' The conspiracy charge was dropped.by the 
prosecution, as was the assault charge against several of the 
The court room on the day of the trial was over-crowded, 
,, . 
and several times the magistrate, R~ Beetham, R."M., · had to warn 
the spectators against booing prosecution witnesses or cheering 
'J 
defence witnesses~ McGerty and several others were convicted 
of the Wilsons Road assault arid sentenced to two months in 
gaol. 
In this address after passing sentence, Beetham condemned 
the unionists for 'insulting and hooting' at free labourers, 
which, he said, wa~ almost as bad as assault!:, Furthermore 
he believed that such behaviour increased the likelihood of 
trouble in the community!-1 In an unhappy metaphor which must 
have delighted union supporters, he said, 1 it was necessary to 





surround the free labourers with police and herd them like 
scabby sheep.' Barnes was acqu:il:ted of all the charges 
along with several other men. Four others, all unionists, 
were sentenced to a month in gaol for the assaults on the 
Lyttelton wharf, after pleading guilty. 1 Although only 
minor those incidents are significant·in that they amount to 
all the real violence that took place during the 1890 maritime 
strike. 
3 •. The Effects of the Strike on Christchurch 
A brief survey of the .effects of the strike in Christchurch 
reveals certain features which were common to the country as 
a whole. - But it is also of interest to look at the strike 
in Christchurch during October because :its merchants and 
employers made a serious attempt to reach an amicable settlement 
with the union •• The collapse of the Christchurch Confenence 
at the end of October was the last significant event before 
the strike was called off. 
As in other cities and towns of New Zealand, the strike 
brought the majority of the employers together into a 
t . t" 2 permanen organisa ion. The Canterbury Employers• Association, 
1 1I 12 Sept, 17 Sept, 25 Sept 1890 




wnich was established in the first week of September, was 
among the most successful in the country. By 1 November 
it .had 130 members. 1 It was largely responsible for the 
organisation of strike breaking activities in Lyttelton. 
The other visible effects of the strike on Christchurch 
nave been dealt with elsewhere in a general way. One WS'S 
the closure of local industries as a result of dwindling 
coal supplies. The manufacturers most hit by the coal stoppage 
were the Kaiapoi Woollen Mills, which closed both its factories 
by 14 September, the Belfast and Islington freezing works, 
various flour mills, nearly all of the iron and brass 
foundries, and several engineering shops.2 The local brown 
coal that was available was not suitable for keeping these 
firms going, and was far too expensive during that period 
of coal scarcity. What happened to the men thrown out of 
work by these stoppages was never mentioned once by either 
paper. It:is probably safe to say that they did not go to 
Lyttelton seeking work, or the Press would have been only 
too glad to say so. , Besides, most of these men were strong 
unionists, who would never allow themselves to be used against 
their fellow unionists. 
Apart from th~ closing of these industries, the coal 
shortage affected the railways and the Lyttelton Harbour 
1 .Q!2I 1 Nov 1890 
2 J: 1 Sept 1890 LT 9 Sept 1890 -
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Board. The men at the Addington Workshop were put on a 
four day week inspite of strong protests from their union 
and opposition members of parliament. 1 On 15 September it 
was reported tpat there was only sufficient coal to keep the 
harbour board's dredge going for a few days, and the electric 
lights for three weeks. A letter was sent to the Grey Valley 
Coal Company, which was trying to charter ships, requesting 
the fulfillment of the current contract, or the payment of 
the penalty it specified. 2 What happened after that-was 
never made clear,' though it seems that the harbour board somehow 
\ 
obtained further supplies, for its lights kept burning throughout 
September and October. 
4" The Christchurch Conciliation Conference, and the 
End of the Strike 
An amicable end to the strike must have seemed remote 
indeed after the delegates to the labour conference went home 
after it had ended." The labour leaders reported to their 
1 See p. 96 
2 LT 15 Sept 1890 ~ 16 Sept 1890 
l__ 
-~- ---~ -- -- ---- --~ 
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0 rganisations, which almost to a man supported the stand 
they had taken in Welling ton. The Lyttelton Wharf Labourers' 
Union was among the first to endorse without any reservations 
wtiat Millar and their delegates had said and done. 1 
While spirits were still high in their public utterances, . 
the situation of the unions on strike grew more desperate 
each day., Very soon after the conference ended, the 
Federated Wharf Carters' Expressman and Storemen 2 s Union v 
d . b . 2 instructe its mem ers to return to work., They, toge,ther 
with the unions ~ot on strike, were required to donate ten 
per cent of their income to the strike fund. 3 
Apart from the return of that union, and the collapse 
of the coalminers' unions, little of significance if anything 
at all happened during the second and third weeks of October. 
The Press ceased to devote a separate column to the maritime 
strike on 11 October partly to support its contention that 
the strike had effectively collapsed, and partly because it 
printed so. little news about the strike as such. The public 
were probably speculating about how long the labour side would 
hold out before it was forced .to surrender and call the strike 
off. But Millar was apparently determined to hold the seamen 
and wharf labourers out until a settlement, if any, was reached 







9 Oct 1890 
1sO p. 
p .. 151 
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However, hopes that an amicable settlement might be 
found were revived by a report on 22 October that the Shipping 
committee (sic), which had been established to arrange free 
1abour for Lyttelton was to meet with representatives of the 
unions on strike •. 1 The whole episode was otherwise veiled 
in secrecy, and little can be discovered about it today except 
what was subsequently reported in the papers. Hopes were 
further raised when it became known than P. Brown, the 
Lyttelton Wharf Labourers• Union repre~entative on the Maritime 
Council had gone to Dunedin on 23 October to consult with 
members of the parent bodyo It was conjectured that he 
might have been given authority to act on behalf of the 
. . . 2 Maritime Council and settle the dispute. Christchurch, and 
indeed the whole of New Zealand waited in nervous hope for 
news that the strike might be ending 0 
But after a week of waiting all hopes were dashed by an 
announcement on 30 October that the negotiations had been 
3 broken off. Only then did details of the past week 1 s 
proceedings come to light. It was revealed that •r.epresentat-
ives of the labour party• (sic) had asked the Shipping 
Committee for a conference almost immediately after they had 
returned from Wellington. The Shipping Committee conferred 
1 LT 22 Oct 1890 
2 LT 24 Oct 1890 





~ith its principal, the Employers• Association, which 
agreed to hold negotiations 0 Certain conditions for a 
settlement were drawn up and accepted with only a few 
minor reservations by the labour representatives. A member 
of a disinterested union acted as mediator. The conditions 
for settlement were never made public. Subsequently, a 
sub-committee of the Shipping Committee consisting of L. 
Harper, G.G. Stead, A.M. Turnbull and G. Lambie was appcinted 
and charged with the task of trying to arrange a general 
conference at which the difficulty could be finally settled 
for the whole colony. The conference, it was agreed should 
meet on 3 Novembero However, at that point the Employers• 
Association executive put an end _to the preliminary initiative 
by resolving only I to confer with those unions directly 
interested in the matter; and not to treat with the Maritime 
Council on the grounds that that body had interests outside 
New Zealand.' They refused to accept Millar as a delegate 
to the Conference, for he could not be disassociated from the 
Council. This was a blatant attempt to crush the Maritime 
Council, the strongest of the 1new union' labour federations 
of the period. · Millar had been chosen as a delegate to the 
conference by the Seamen's Union. The other labour representat-
ives strongly objected to Millar, their leader, being singled 
out for exclusion,and maintained that the Seamen's Union had 
the right to choose whom so ever it thougltwas best fitted 
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to represent them. Rather than allow Millar to be victimised 
theY withdrew from the Conf-erence altogether, and .passed a 
unanimous vote of confidence in Millar. 
----------------------
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At that point the Council decided that there was only 
the smallest hope left that a settlement might be reached. 
Telegrams were sent out instructing the wharf labourers to 
~eturn to work, even if they had to abandon the conditions 
that they had previously insisted on, notably their inability 
to work with non-unionists. 1 Only the Seamen's Union, the 
first to go on strike,remained out 0 Millar did not give 
the seamen orders to return to work until 11 November, the 
·day cfter the last Australian unionists, also the seamen, had 
ended their strike~ Millar and his colleagues held the seamen 
out as long as they possibly could, like a gambler trying 
his luck again with the help of a friend in the hope that he 
would not go home completely empty handed. When the friend 
was ruined and admitted his loss, the game was over for the 
gambler·also. 
The 1890 Maritime strike ended in this country the day 
after the Australian strike of the sa:ne name, with the once 
proud labour organisations which concucted it mere shadows 
of their former all powerful selves, with only enough influence 
left to instruct their members how to vote in the general 
elections a month later. 
----------------------












The last attempt at a settlement was made by the 
canterbury employers possibly for one of two reasons~ Firstly 
theY may have realised that the strike in Lyttelton was 
seriously slowing down shipping and making it far more costly, 
even though it did not stop the movement of goods altogether~ 
They might well have been anxious to end the strike before 
the 1890-91 export season began. Then again, they may have 
believed, with some justification, that their failure to attend 
the Wellington conference had left people wondering whether 
indeed they were·not the aggressors who intended to crush the 
unions. The Christchurch conference might have bee~ an 
attempt to make up for the mistakes they might have thought 
they made through being absent from the Wellington conference. 
Whatever the reason, it was a failure before the delegates 
even assembled, and only deserves mention because it marks 
the beginning of the very last phase of the 1890 Maritime 
strike~· 
The day after the orders went out from Christchurch (1 
November), the Wharf Labourers I Unions in various ports of 
the country met~ Each decided to return to work uncondition-
ally~ They had to acknowledge that they could no longer 
refuse to work with non-unionists and the strike ended~·l 
However, in a last gesture of defiance the uni·ons were told 
by their leaders not to recognise the employers• associations 
! 
J 1 11 ODT 1 Nov 1890 j _____ -______________________ __ 
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but to deal with each employ~r separately. Whether anything 
came of that order did not get a mention in the main South 
Island newspapers in the following week. 
5~ The End of the Strike and the Example of Post-Strike 
Events in Lyttelton 
The Lyttelton wharf labourers offered themselves for work 
again on Monday 3 November, after having b.een on strike for 
just over two monthsf Only a few of them were taken on at 
that time!- The rest, to their dismay, found that the 
labour bureau, which had organised wharf labour during the 
strike was to be permanently retained; The men objected to 
the labour bureau, because they believed that it would be 
better if foremen, who knew their capabilities on various 
jobs selected those they thought were most suitable, instead 
of having the bureau just send out the required number of men. 1 
But what in fact they were against was that the labour bureau, 
stuffed as it was by some of their strongest ·opponents, 
discriminated against them. 
On 18 November a deputation of uninn wharf labourers 
went to the Lyttelton Borough Council and told that body that 
they could not find employment on the wharves~ They believed 




that their former employers would gladly hire them, _but for 
the fact that they were prevented by the labour bureau, 
through which all labour, including that for the railways, 
1· 
was employed. It· seems that the unionists were indulging 
in wishful thinking when they thought the removal of the labour 
bureau would solve their problems~ T.he wharf labourers• 
deputation went on to complain about the way free labourers 
were brought from Christchurch each day in special carriages 
converted into smoke rooms while they waited to be allotted 
work. The free men, they a1so,said, were givenj::,bs ahead 
of unionists! The Lyttelton Borough Council agreed to wait 
on the Stevedores• Association and see whether any of the 
union men could be given work. 1 Two days later when both 
the Borough Council deputation and that from the union waited 
on the Association, they were told that the labour bureau 
was to be continued~ It was claimed by the Association, and 
probably correctly, that many unionists were then being 
employed~ But the Association, went on to make it clear 
that they could not dismiss the free labourers who had stood 
by them .during the strike!'., Hence they said that all the 
unionists could not be re-employed!2 
The Stevedoring Association was one of the two new 
organisatiom establi·shed in Lyttelton on 1 November, the day 
1 11 19 Nov 1890 
2 g; 22 Nov 1890 
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it was decided to end the strike!. It was in effect a 
permanent form of the Shipping Committee~ The first directors 
of the Association Wet:' e the members of the Shipping Committee. 
According to its initial pro:spectus, profits paid out to 
shareholders were to be limited to six per cent~ Any profit 
left over were to be used to pay benefits to its employees, 
or.to establish a reserve fund for·them! It was to control 
the entire working of the port, and its subscribers, who were 
the principal shipping companies and merchants of Christchurch, 
undertook to obtain all their wharf labour from the Association. 
Thus, in effect it became the sole employer of wharf labour 
1 in Lyttelton~ 
The other organisation set up at that time was the 
Lyttelton Lumpers 1 Association w!;lich was in reality a bogus 
union~ The Chairman of the Stevedores' Association was also 
Chairman of the Lumpers 1 Association, and the executive 
of the latter body was made up of the Chairman, together with 
three representatives of the Stevedores• Association and three 
12 3 representatives of the workerse ' Between them these two 
bodies effectively squashed unionism on the Lyttelton waterfront 
until after the 1894 Arbitration Act had given the workers the 
1 LT 31 Oct, 1 Nov 1890 
2 LT 5 Nov 1890 
3 Stead himself was Chairman of the Lumpers 1 Association in 
1892~1 Johnson op! 1cit~ p. 92 
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protection they needed to establish their own trade union. 
Similar organisations were established in most other major 
ports of the country and had a similar effect on unions 
the ref 
C H A P T E R 6 
REPERCUSSIONS OF THE STRIKE 
1~-, The Trade Unions Involved 
A number of the unions w.h.ich called out their members 
--. 
appear to have qisintegrated before the strike ended on 10 
November, though it is not possible to say exactly when 
any of these collapses occurred~'.i Nor is it possible to 
determine precisely what happened to the surviving unions 
after that datef1 Newspapers did not report when a union 
had ceased to function, partly because such details were 
extremely difficult, if not impossible,to discover;. and partly 
because in the month after 10 November the approaching general 
election dominated the news columns!; Furthermore there 
seemed to be something like a tacit agreement to bury the 
strike beyond recall. But from what little information 
that is available a sketchy picture can be constructed of the 
ways the unions involved failed to operate after the strike! 
Virtually all the unions which had not collapsed by the time 
the strike ended apparently disintegrated soon afterwar~s!1 
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The Marine Officers' Association and the Cooks• and 
Stewards' Union both became ineffective bodies· during October.~ 
NJaither of them was represented in Christchurch at the labour 
conference held there! Furthermore neither union in any 
-way officially ended its part of the strike~ Both had been 
-weakened by defections from early September, and apparently 
did not survive through to the end of the conf lictl:1 The 
Federated Wharf Carters I Expressmen I s and Storemen I s Union, 
which had returned to work.unconditionally early in October 
was never mentioned in the Christchurch morning newspapers after 
that!~ 
The Coal Miners• unions likewise ceased to receive any 
publicity from about the middle of October. The Denniston 
and Brunnerton Unions were virtually annihilated during that 
month by the influx of free labour into the mines~ Former 
union men, 'Who were not re-employed after their strike ended, 
were turned out of the company owned houses they had lived 
inf1 As a result they Wet:' e forced to leave the districts to 
look for work in other parts of the country, and in some cases 
-2. 
overseas! An unsuccessful attempt was made about the 
same time to establish a co-operative mine with finance 
from Australia but this was soon abandoned!-1 The actual 
union organisation seems to have lasted until the middle of 
1 The ShipMasters I Association formed early in September under 
the auspices ·of the Union Company effectively controlled 
the officers after the strike and prevented them forming 
another union~ 
2 Globe 15 Oct 1890 
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1891, but it was ineffective!. The owners, by blacklisting 
' 
prominent unionists throughout New Zealand, were able to 
frustrate all attempts to re-organise the coalminers!' The 
miners had to wait until the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act provided them with sufficient protection 
from interference by the owners befDre they were again cble 
to establish viable unions!'1 
The wharf labourers• unions in several ports appear to 
have disinteg~ated even before the strike ended for them on 
1 November~ Those in the four main ports, and Timaru were 
I 
reported to have met and decided to go back unconditionally 
that day, but nothing was mentioned about other portsf The 
way the Lyttelton waterfront was·reorganised, mostly to 
prevent further strikes, and also to destroy the wharf 
-2 
lcbourers' union there, has been described already~· A similar 
organisation which also excluded members of the local wharf 
1 b I • . N . 13 a ourers union, was set up in apier. In Wellington a 
'Free Labourers• Association was established from which 
members of unions affiliated to the Maritime Council were 
, . '4 
debarredl~ All new members had to be approved by the employers~ 
The Timaru employers very early in September had pledged 
1 Salmond, P-P• 68-9 
2 See pI>• 187-9 
3 Globe 24 Oct 1890 
4 Globe 3 Nov·1890 
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themselves not to make any distinction between free and uriion 
- '1 labour, and hence not to recognise the unions!1 That 
decision had brought the wharf J.cbourers 1 union there out on 
strike and kept them out right to the end of October~ In the 
end they had to go back on the employers• terms and their union 
soon afterwards broke up. The unions in the other ports of 
the country all appear to have ceased to function about the 
same time, though whether any- anti-union organisations were 
set up was never mentioned in the papers listed in the 
bibliography !1 
According to Salmond the only seamen's unions to survive, 
- -
and then only in a much weaker form, were th'Oee in Dunedin· 
and Wellington~ A fresh union was not established in 
- ·2 
Auckland until 1897~ The shipowners remained firm in their 
determination to stand by the free labour that had served 
them during the strike~ Consequently there was very little 
work for former union seamen after the strike, and many of 
them drifted overseas!~ looking for employment!·· 
Early in January 1891 the'Wellington Trades and Labour 
Council wrote to J ~-1 Mills; Managing Director of the Union 
Company, complaining bitterly about the way that firm was 
discriminating against unionists on the wharves and on its 
ships£; The Company denied this allegation, asserting that 
1 1l! 2 Sept 1_890. 
2 Salmond, p. 65 
Also see p. 105 
j 
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the best men· were being given the available jobs!-, However 
it revealed that discrimination was a fact when it went,on 
to allege that some _of the unionists who had been engaged 
were sowing disaffection among the 'free I men!,1 Later on 15 
. -
February, the Company informed the Council that no members of 
the Seamen's Union or the Fishermen's Union would, in future 
. -
be taken on, for those already employed had shown no loyalty 
to the Company!; Millar, who had been conducting the struggle 
from behind the scene, than wrote to the Council asking them 
1 not to press the 'matter any further. 
About that time the Union Company decided to follow the 
example of the merchants of Christchurch by setting up a 
bogus union too. The Seamen I s Mu·tual Benefit Society was 
established, and membership was made compulsory to all seeking 
work on the Company's shipsf The Union Seamen, who called 
.. 
it 'The Deaf and Dumb Society• correctly saw it as a deterrent 
against men paying their union dues, and consequently worked 
vigorously to have it abolished~ Several years later it was 
r2 made optional and disappeared.soon after that.1 The Seamen's 
Union, which was apparently the only worke:r's organisation to 
survive the strike in working order, used.most of its energies 
afterwards campaigning to have the Shipping Acts amended, and 
gave up industrial action almost entirely~ 
1 Salmond, p. 136 
2 Ibid p. 138f See also Glob~ 
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As far as the Maritime Council itself was concerned, 
nothing was heard of it after the strike had endedf' Millar 
concentrated his efforts attempting ·to get himself elected 
to parliament for Chalmers~ After he had lost that battle 
with Mills also, he began the task of rebuilding the Seamen rs 
'l Uninnl 
Federations of laJour were discredited with even the 
trades councils-becoming· suspect!'i No one dared to advocate 
maintaining the links between Australian and New Zealand 
labourl'; The movement towards Australasian unionism was 
brought to a grinding halt by the maritime strike and never 
again regained the momentum of 1889-90. These points were very 
vividly made by Dl,'P. Fisher; the former president of the 
Maritime Council on 6 January l89lf He advocated that ~~ch 
centre should have complete control over its oR!'l affairs•. 
At the same time he deprecated the federations of unions with 
other countries!~ It is significant that he ended by stressing 
the recessity for labour to take an active part in political 
t . . t. n2 ac 1.v1. 1.es. 
At least some of the unionists left unemployed a: the end 
of the strike found a perman,nt niche in society~ They took 
up land near the For1¥ Mile Bush under •special settlement 
1 He was made a J.P. in 1892 ,, and was the successful candidate 
for Chalmers in 1893~' Mills retired from Parliament that 
year.!1 · 
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d • ,.,.e_ I ,·1 con iuuns • The only way the 'labour party• took part 
in the 1890 election campaign wa~ probably the other 
most important repercussion of the strike along with the 
collapse of the trade unions that were involved in it!. 
2~ The Strike and Labour Participation in the 1890 Election 
The Maritime str.ike, although probably the major event 
that occurred in.New Zealand in 1890, was never more than an 
incidental issue in all but one electorate in the general 
election held on 5 December th&t year!~, Only in Port Chalmers, 
where Mills of the Union Company and Millar stood against 
each other,' was the strike debated at any length!·, In other 
electorates the strike appears to have been only mentioned 
occasionally in passing,· if at all~ Candidates concentrated 
on the main issues of the day, notably proposals to encourage 
closer settlement of the land, including compulsory repurchase, 
land tax, and leaseholds; and proposals for labour legislation. 
The neutrality of the government during the conflict no ' 
doubt helped to keep the strike question out of the political 
arena!·; 'Opinion was growing in support of the state 1s playing 
an active role in industrial disputes, but it was not strong 




enough by the time of the election to make the government's 
lack of action a real criticism for 10pposition 1 or 'Liberal' 
candidatesl-1 
' . 
The 'Opposition• had reaped about all the 
benefits they me likely to get as a lESUlt of the strike during 
September~ They gained their advantages by attacking the 
government, firstly because its servants allegedly interfe:r::ed 
in the dispute on·the side of the employers, and secor1dly 
because it failed to actively conciliate between the parties 
as the 'labour party I wanted it to~· The 'Liberal' candidates 
must have concluded by November that the strike question was 
stale,··and they had little to gain and most probably would lose 
support, by harping on about itf They were fully awa~e that 
the policy issues of the day, particularly the land and condit-
ions of labour questions, were more likely to influence the 
votersl-, 
In Port -Chalmers, the only place where the strike seems 
to have been discussed at all, Millar and Mills competed 
vigorously for votesr Unfortunately they never debated the 
question on the same platform; and the few news reports that 
exist do not contain full replies from either manf 
Undoubtedly the most important speech on the topic was that 
I 
made by Millar in which he said that: 
• In his own speeches he had studiously _avoided 
touching upon the late labour troubles, believing 









political opinions, having had enough of the 
Labour question during the past three monthsl~• 1 
While it might well be said that he was merely trying to play 
down .the part he played in that disasterous event, nevertheless, 
the fact.that the strike was not discussed at any length if 
at all in other parts of the count~y show that his statement 
has a considerable validity to itf 
Mills raised the topic first, when at a meeting on 24 
November, he laid the blame.fa~ the strike squarely on the 
' ' 
Maritime Council,. even going so far as to accuse Millar and 
his colleagues of attempting ~o crush capitalism•! The Council 
had; he believed,-, 'become altogether too aggressive•~-, 
Deliberately.appealing for labour .support too, he upheld the 
right of men to form unions~ However he was careful to make 
it clear that unions ought to be open to all, and should 
under no circumstances resort to strike~ Hence, it was 
clear that the unions he advocated wee to be weak~ mutual 
benefit societies rather than trade bodies with strength 
sufficient to enforce their demands on employersf He went, 
on to declare openly his support for conciliation councils, 
and arbitration appeal board composed of three judges~ 2 
' 
That, one of the few statements of support for such 
institutions, clearly shows that he felt conciliation and 
1 Globe 4 Dec 1890 
2 .Q!2I. 25 Nov 1890 
j _____________________ ] 
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arbitration rather than strik~s to settle labour disputes, 
was supported by some of the electorate at that t·imef 
Miilar replied.on 3 December by blaming the Union 
Company for the strike!; But before discussing the strike at 
length he made clear .l:is position on certain political 
questions such as support for land tax, and female franchise 
which he 'believed the electors wished to hear about•! It 
was, he argued,- 'the Union Company's aggressive acti~ns in 
Sydney which were responsible for the strike here!-. They 
- -
had taken such action 1 , he believed,' •to protect their 
. . . 1 I - -
monopoly.• From the reports of these two addresses it 
-
appears that even in Port Chalmers the strike was only discussed 
briefly and never debated at length or as the main issue; 1 
" The insignificance of the strike as an issue is borne 
out by the voting in Port Chalmers in 1890 ~- Mills won by 
the quite comfortable margin of 227 votes; receiving 57 !-'5 per 
cent of those votes cast .by the 66 per cent of the elect9rate 
who bothered
1
to vote.i~2 Millar, on whose shoulders the majority 
of New Zealand newspapers laid the blame for·the strike, did 
nevertheless succeed in reducing the majority of 704 the 
sitting member for the old Port Chalmers electorate had on 




Globe 4 Dec 1890 
AJHR · 1891 H-2 ,• 
'James Green, member Otago Provincial Council 1867-75; Chairman 
Waikouaiti County Council 1877-93; Member of House of Reps!1 
Port Chalmers 1878 .... 9., Waikouaiti 1882,..9, 1893-6; and M~mbfr of 
otago Education Board 1878-96 and many other local bodiest He 







The changes ineiectoral boundaries and the abolition of plural 
voting in 1890 make a complete comparison of the two elections 
However, at thoee booths which were in the same· 
place for both elections there was a moderate to substantial 
swing against Mills, even in the rural sections of the 
electorate!' Millar was ahead only at two booths~ Even 
though he lost Port· Chalmers with its large labour population, 
he cut Mills' majority there from 467 in 1887 to a more modest 
195!11 These figures show that Millar did well to lose by as 
little as what he did to the sitting member for the old 
electorate, and further show that the prominent part he 
played in the strike does not, seem to have visibly damaged 
his electoral appeal even in rural areasf 
However, it cannot be said that the strike did not affect 
the 1890 election in any wayf It did have an indirect impact, 
it seems, though not as great, or as significant an impact as 
has been generally attributed to it!' Those historians who 
have dealt with the subject nearly all agree that 1the failure 
f • d • 1 . • d th • • 1•t• I I o in ustria action cause e unionists to turn to poi ics ••• 
and their votes along with those of other discontented elements 
in society 1the Liberals (sic) were swept into office!'' 2 
1 See Appendix H 
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Salmond, who dealt with the subject as fully as anyone, 
wrote, 
'The unionists were conquered in the srrike I • • • The leaders of the unionists held that instead of 
wear~ng them.selves out in costly strikes, the 
working class would do better by appealing to 
legislation; !~. to that which it would inspire 
if it could serv~ power by the vote, and control the 
drafting of laws~' The working -classes all over 
the colqny, especially in the South Island, adopted 
new tactics and vigorously participated in the 
election of 1890, Y1I1ich proved such a victory for 
the workerq ,i's to counter balance their def eat in 
the strike!! 1 1 
Lik.e Scholefield '_and Reeves before him, and many writers since, 
' . 
Salmond insisted that the.bloc vote of the unionists after their 
industrial defeat. decisively helped place 1the liberal Party 
-
led by John Ballance in power•. ·He.supports his contention by 
-
pointing out that •a turnover of one hundred and fifty votes 
in those electorates with small majorities would have continued 
in office the Conservative Government!'• 2 Crooks supports him 
in this contention, asserting that the union leaders counselling 
their followers to vote for the 1Liberals 1 after the strike 
failed was 1 the most important direct influence on the electionf• 3 
This cause and effect argument, because of its simplicity 
has appealed to a number of other writers, who have adopted 
. t ,·4 
i • Undoubtedly it is partially true, but it does not tell 







Harry Crook 'The Significance of the 1890 Election p~12 
Sinclair,·· History p!166; Oliver p. 138; Sutch Quest, p.73 
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1890. Indeed, the story of iabour•s political activities 
began in. 188-9 and increased continuously in tempo right through 
to the election of 1890; 
The growth of trade unionism in New Zealand, more than 
anything else, increased the political knowledge and awareness 
of the co 1 ony '. s workers! From the end of 1889 onwards unionists 
I 
were being urged by their leaders to get themselves on the 
roll, and select and vote for candidates in 1890 who shared their 
political aspirationsf At a public meeting of the Tailors• 
Union in Christchurch held eleven days before the Maritime 
Council was established, a prominent local unionist, F~ Guinness 
urged everyone present I to see that they were put on the 
electoral roll, and when the elections trook place to return 
representatives who would secure their rightsl-·• 1 Nearly two 
months later, another Christchurch unionist, J.M~ Douglas was 
reported to have moved that a political association be formed· 
(12 
to return more working men to Parliament~· An article in 
.the Lyttelton Times on 22 March 1890 recommended that 1 the 
power of unions should be directed to one object, that of 
securing the return of men on whom reliance can be placed for 
carrying out the desires of labour!1• Such a view was obviously 
too narrow for many unionists, but it did point for them the 
direction they were to follow laterf This w~s Reeve's appeal; 
1 LT j 18 Oct 1890 -
2 1I 7 Dec 1890 
---- -----~-
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that labour should vote for his party, but the Christchurch 
leader. was probably encouraged to make it by the already 
strong interest of labour in politics!· 
Another aspect of labour's political activities came to 
light on 31 March when Lomas spoke of how the Maritime Council 
was watching all Parliamentary labour legislation very 
carefully and had arranged to meet the Ministry on such 
subjects as the Mining Act; Seamen I s Act and others!,1 The 
-
labour bills, which Atkinson's government allowed to lapse 
were an important stimulant to labour activities. When it. 
became clear during August that the government did not intend 
to push them through, the trade unions moved into the field 
more forcefully, pressing them upon the attention of the 
•Opposition•. The 'Opposition• took up the labour bills, 
thereby gaining the support of most labourers before the 
Maritime.Strike even started! The large amount of support 
the 1Liberals 1 already enjoyed from the labour movements was 
revealed at a mass meeting of workers held in Exchange Hotel, 
Dunedin three weeks before the strike began. The meeting, 
vhich was addressed by Grey, Seddon, and Fish, gave its 
thanks •to the Liberals for endeavouring to obtain the rights 
1 1- I 1 of the peop e .... 
The campaign to enrol qualified electors began in earnest 
during August! The Amalgamated Labourers' Union secretary was 
1 1I. 5 Aug 1890 
J___~------( 
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instructed to obtain enough registration forms to enrol all 
1·1 
manbers. D~ring the same month the-°Lyttelton Times Company 
ran an extensive voter registration campaign, folding forms into 
copies of its paper, and collecting them at its offices~ They 
pointed out that 0 it was imperative that everyone re-register 
because the constituencies had all been changed by the reduction 
. ·2 
in the number of members!' 
Then oh 23 August a People's Political Association was 
launched in Christchurch at a meeting held in the Trades Hall. 
It was in effect a political front for the Trades and Labour 
Council, several executive members of that council doing nearly 
a11 · the organising!. However, it was slightly wider in scope 
than the councilo. When several members wanted to change 
the name to Operative 1 s Political Association, and objected to 
. . • I I. 
an employer, G.w. Russell, being on the committee, it was 
pointed out that E. Jones, another employer was also on the 
. . (3 
committee. A m,ajority f_avoured keeping Russell on the 
committee and retaining the existing name~ As a consequence 
the P !.P.A. was a more inclusive body than the W .M. P f'A! s which 
1 1'!'.. 11 Aug 1890 
2 1,I 20 Aug 1890 
3 Scholefield Biographies, op.cit!·· Vol. 2, p.264 Russell 
contributed to the Lyttelton Times, founded the printing firm 
of Russell·and Willis! 1 He withdrew his nomination for the 
Heathcote seat as a 1Liberal 1 in 1890 in favour,of Tanner~ He 
was returned for Riccarton 189.3-.6 and 1899-1902!' He was elected 
for Avon in 1908, beating Tanner, and remained a M.P ·• until his 
defeat in 1919! · He became Minis.ter of Health in Mackenzie's 
government of 1912, and Minister of Internal Affairs, Health and 









were formed before the 1881 and 1884 elections in Christchurch~·.l 
Nevertheless the P.P.A;· was predominently a labour organisation. 
All members of trade unions automatically became eligible for 
membership of that bodyf• It was cnother step in the direction 
of putting working men in th3House of Representatives, or at 
least ensuring that they were adequately represented!'' Like 
nearly all the labour bodies in 1890 it worked to ensure that 
11 1 . "bl t . t d 1·,2 a e igi e vo ers were regis ere. 
On the day the meeting was called, Reeves in an editorial 
in the Times suggested that the promoters of the P.Pf1A.. •ought 
to consult the Liberal Party leaders before laying down a 
platform 1 !; He though that the 'labour party• had a great deal 
. 
to thank the 'Liberal in Parliament and the Liberal section of 
. 3 
the press for. 1 Later Reeves was to co-operate closely with 
P ;p !.A!, getting that body to help run his election campaign!:4 
A second labour organisation, the New Zealand Federated Industrial 
Political Union, was ·set up in Christchurch, but was enjoined 
1-S so as not to split labour votes. 
Apart from that meagre mention nothing more appeared in the 
newspapers about the basis or purpose of that body!· 
1 See pp. 19-20 
2 LT 25 Aug 1890 -
3 1I 23 Aug 189q 
4 Sinclair filR p.114 
5 11 18 Sept 1890 















c!·J~· Rae, the best known local 'radical I was chairman 
of P!.P!.A!-1 and E!·. Sandford, treasurer and secretary!1 A 
month after it was established the P!·P~-A~ released its platform, 
which had been sent to Reeves and Perceval for their 
approval~ Clearly, by this time, the Liberal-Labour political 
alliance under Liberal leadership, was in existence in 
Christchurch, though the exact steps by which it was formed 
• I • 
cannot be reconstructed.' The platform included proposals for 
closer settlement of land, reintroduction of the whole of the 
' . 1 
Labour Bills (sic) rejected or dropped by the late Parliament, 
eight hour day legislation; maintainence of triennial 
parliaments and also the secular school system~ railway management 
reform; land tax and an elected Legislative Council. This 
platform was recommended to all unionists and others throughout 
Canterbury for their support!-1 Every candidate was to be 
asked to subscribe to the'platform, and if more than.the 
required number did so, a ballot was to be held to select the 
2 'labour candidate•. Similar bodies were established, or were 
in operation in the other main centres with Liberal and labour 
organisations!-J 
In Canterbury where both groups were very well organised, 
subsidiary organisations were established in Lyttelton, 
R • d Ka
0 
• 
4 angiora an iapoi. 
1 It: was not made clear if this included Downie Stewart's bill. 
2 1I 25 Sept 1890 
3 OTLC in Dunedin, ATLC in Auckland, and Special Committee in 
Wellington. 
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:Early in October joint meetings of the P. P ~-A!. and Canterbury 
T fL~C!. were held, at which the candidates whom 'labour• 
would be urged to support were selected! Those named were: 
W.P! Reeves, W~B! Perceval, and R.M. Taylor for Christchurch 
City, W. Hoban, president of ASRS for Kaiapoi, E. Blake for 
Avon, w~·W! Tanner for Heathcote~ F!·s. Parker CTLC President 
for Hal.swell, and J. Joyce for Akaroa which ilrl.uded·Lyttelt·on. 
Of these only Hoban and Parker failed to secure election. 
I 
Similar selections were carried out in other cities-and 
towns by the local unionists or trades and labour councils, 
their candidates also having a considerable measure of 
,·1 
success. 
In Auckland and Wellington, where the 'labour parties• could not 
fully agree on a list of candidates, split voting allowed a 
1cnnservative 1 to be elected from each city~2 
All that·poli"t:ical activity by labour had begun long before 
the strike!-1 It gradually became more intensive as the election 
. . I . .. 
approached, and its momentum was not decreased by the f a'ilure 
of the strikeI· No doubt the collapse of the strike did 
stimulate the unionists, whether they ~re out or not, to seek more 
actively a political solution for their grievances! 1 But the 
machinery which they used to achieve their victory was established I 
and set in motion by their leaders with aid and encouragement 
1 Salmond, p~cit~ pp. 152-9 





from their 1Liberal 1 friends, before and during the strike~ 
Furthermore, given the degree of unity in the ranks of labour 
revealed during the strike, it was highly likely that the 
unionists would have voted en bloc for the 'Liberal' candidates, 
who agreed to pass the labour bills of 1890 and promote closer 
settlement of the land by legislative·and fiscal measures, even 
if the strike had not failed!-· 
The failure of the strike certainly must have added 
momentum to labour's efforts to have favourable candidates elected 
in 1890, but can· not' be said to have been the cause of ···labour I s 
. turning from industrial to politic~l. action~. Both the unions 
that went out and those that did not were clearly determined 
to participate fully in the 1890 election by the time the 
strike began!. Historians who have not taken account of 
pre-strike• activity have presented a picture of a sudden and 
massive switch from industrial to political activity, but that 
is a partial and misleading interpretation of events~--
3!· The Strike and Compulsory Arbitration 
The passing of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act in 1894 was a personal triumph for its sponsor, William 
Pember Reeves, and marked the highest point of his career as 









which Sinclair.has described as •one of the nineteenth century 
. ' 
legislative measures most decisive in moulding New Zealand 
society 1 ,' established the first compulsory system of state·· 
! 
arbitration in the world~-l It was also designed 1to encourage 
the formation of industrial unions and associations• of both 
labour and their employers in principle, but the former in 
practice!1 The form that bill took, and its acceptance by 
the Liberal party after 1890 were both very largely consequences 
of the failure of industrial action during the 1890 Maritime 
Strike, and the disruption of many trade unions after that 
·2 
· event!' 
During 1889 and 1890, as the .trade union movement grew 
stronger in New Zealand, and became more aggressive, so too the 
. . 
number of industrial disputes and strikes increased! Strikes 
were not widespread or a really serious problem, but they 
were numerous enough to prompt several men into suggesting 
that some form of conciliation and arbitration might very 
profitably be established i~ the colony~ Foremost amongst 
those w.ho did were the Dunedin labour leaders, J !·'A. Millar, 
. . 3 
R. Slater and D. Pinkerton. 
1 Sinclair Historv pp.179-180 
2 fQ_ Vol. 110 p! 38 (1899) Millar 1 s comments on the influence 
of the strike on arbitration!' 
3 Slater was president of the Otago Trades and Labour Council; 
Pinkerton was president of Bootmakers I Union and Tailoresses 1. 
Union, and was Member of Parliament for Dunedin City 1890-3~ 
See Scholefield, Biography. 
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In February 1890 Millar argued before the Sweating 
Commission in favour of an arbitration court presided over 
by a Judge appointed and paid by the governmentf: The 
decisions of this judge, he thought, should be binding on 
b~th parties for a certain period of •say six months'. He 
seems here to have been supporting a system of arbitration 
very similar to that enacted in 1894f1 He did not, however, 
say it should be compulsory, and, indeed stated that the 
trade union movement as a whole could well bring pressure 
to bear on any society which refused to obey the court, thereby 
implying that the system was a voluntary one!'1 
Slater, on the other hand, certainly did •not approve of 
Boards of Arbitration that would take the power of striking 
out of the hands of the Union•~ 2 He was supported in this 
by Pinkerton, who suggested 1that the unions should not be 
f_orced to go to arbitration in any case, but that they should 
do so only by agreement between the contending parties!-, One 
very important reason he gav.e why labour might be forced to 
refuse arbitration, was that they •might be called upon to 
submit matters affecting the existence of our Un~.on - such 
as the employing of non-union men£1• He too thought the court 
should be presided over by a judge whose decision should be 
l ~ 1890 H - 5 p~ 4 











binding, appointed by the government~·l 
Other labour witnesses also approved of arbitration to 
prevent strikes, but none stated that it should be compulsory~ 
The Commission itself recommended 1 that steps be taken to 
-
establish at an early date Boards of Conciliation and 
Arbitration based on the equal representation of labour 
and capita1~ 12 The implication was that such boards should 
be voluntary!~ Other people in the colo~y voi~ed similar 
opinions to this at various ti.mes in the following months!,' 
Lomas was firmly-in favour of concil'iation and arbitration 
rather than strikes when he spoke in Christchurch at the end 
-3 
of March!1 
The edit.orials of the Lyttelton Times, most probably 
Reeves I s work, were strongly in fa,our of arbitration, even 
going so far as to suggest compulsory arbitration. 4 However, 
all this was to no avail as_long as Atkinson's government 
and indeed the ·colonial parliament remained unsympathetic to the 
demands of labour!' Besides, as the Maritime Council grew 
stronger in June and July and gained in confidence, it began 
to favour negotiating directly with employers to achieve 
the ends it sought to achieve, and regarded arbitration with less 
favour!·, 
In July 1890, the member for Dunedin West~ William Downie 
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of Conciliation Bill. 1 This measure was intended to 
establish government boards of conciliation and arbitration 
to which disputes could be ref erred if both parties agreed!-; 
I 
The arbiter was to be. chosen by the parties, or if they 
could not agree on a man, a resident magistrate!1 Introducing 
the bill, Downie Stewart pointed out that arbitration could be 
made compulsory simply by changing 1may 1 to 1 shall 1 while 
the bill was in committee~· In this way he initiated a full 
scale debate not only on the bill in question, but also on 
compulsory arbitration~ 
Reeves, who was:in Wellington at the time did not speak 
in the debate although he was known to favour compulsory 
arbitration at that time;· The clue to his silence can be 
found in the manner the leader of his 1party 1 , Ballance and 
othsr prominent 'Opposition• or 1Liberal 1 members strenuously 
. -
opposed the_bill, and were even more opposed to making 
arbitration compulsory!·· Ballance did not think a system of 
voluntary arbitration would be any improvement on the existing 
law, which allowed p'arties to submit thei:r disputes to arbitration 
by mutual consent! He countered Downie Stewart's contention 
that the refusal of one party to go t9 arbitration would 
expose its case as weak by saying that there was more than 
one reason why one party might refuse arbitration~ Here he 
was possibly supporting Pinkerton's statement before the 
Sweating Commission! On Downie Stewart's suggestion that 












arbitration might be made compulsory,r:e argued that such a 
system •would prevent any trade union from acting, and would 
create suspicion in the minds of. the working classes that the 
Bill was passed in the interests of the employers~- 1 As a 
result, whenever anyone tried to enforce compulsion the trade 
unions would simply refuse to submit .and the law would become 
- -1 
a dead letter!' 
The 1oppositionist '. H!s~· Fish (Dunedin South) was certain 
that the labour.unions would,.if asked, •at once give a 
negative to this Bill.' Even more he thought they wee 
opposed to a system of compulsory arbitration~ He concluded 
by saying: , 
'Whilst the unions themselves have the power, as they 
have now, to go to arbitration, there was no need to , 
legislate on that matter~' 1 
Dr{ Frederick Fetchett (Dunedin Central) who often supported 
the Opposition, declared that it was 1!a Bill to suppress strikes'~ 
James Fulton (Taieri) spoke in favour -of the .Bill~- He had ·been 
the chairman of the Sweating Commission and devoted most of his 
speech to quoting the union opinion in favour of arbitration 
given before that commission~ However as it was Slown above, 
it seems that those labour leaders had altered their opinions 
b th t t · · · t t t from 4t ."'
3 y a ime, swinging o some ex en away ~ 
1 fQ Vol~ 68 pp!, 121-4 
2 Ibid p ~-'125 
3 See pf 212 
Fulton 
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gave one of the prime reasons for that change when he 
remarked: 
'Where unions were strong and well-organised 
they did not demand or need these courts, out where 
they were weak they wanted them to lean onl;• 1 
Ballance, Fish and Fitchett were most probably expressing 
the views of labour at that time!- Labour leaders then 
believed their unions were strong enough to get along without 
state aidf If they were, then Reeves was isolat.ed from the 
mainstream of labour thought on arbitration, and deliberately 
did not take part in the debate for this very reason! The 
editorials in the .!::.lttelton Times during July strongly suggest 
that his faith in arbitration remained firm~ The debate 
on Downie Stewart I s Bill very intere'stingly also revealed that 
a month before~ Maritime Strike, a number of leading 1Libera1 1 
I , 
or 'Opposition 1_ members were firmly opposed to any state 
interference in indus~rial disputes, mostly because their 
union friends appeared to be strong enough not to have to lean 
on the sta tel1 
The Maritime Strike chang'ed the views of those 1Libe:t:a ls I 
-
and probably others too. By the end of the first week the 
imminent collapse of the strike showed just how weak were the 
unions in reality. As a result Ballance and his followers 
began to try and support the strikers, at first by urging the 
government to keel? aloof fro·m the issues in dispute, and later 
l 
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by appealing to the government to arrange a settlement which 
would be favourable to the unions!! Their efforts in this 
direction have been dealt 
-1 
with already!' 
At the same time the attitudes of certain of the most 
outspoken 1Liberals 1 during the debate on Downie'Stewart's· 
On 1 September Ballance modified his 
/ 
previous stand, declaring 1this Government could not have done 
better than to have brought down at the beginning of this 
session a Bill for the establishment of boards of con·ciliation! •2 
Later that same month, announcing his platform for the ensuing 
general election, which was adopted by most of the 1Liberals 1 
he declared himself to be firmly in fa~our of b tribunal that 
-
would command the confidence of both parties• and as such would 
be 1 the one great remedy for all strikes.• 'Because nearly 
all strikes are decided by compromise• he asked why they should 
I 
not all be decided at the beginningf He finished by hoping 
that the then current strike would be the last one that would 
. th. t 1:,3 cccor in is coun ry. 
The other 'Liberals', notably Fish, also came to favour 
. -/+ 
a state arbitratio~ system! The Press noted early in 
September that •the Liberals' had 1changed·their tune for 
political reasonsf• While that was partially true, the main 
reason for this about-face on their part was simply as Ballance 
1 See pp. 125-7 
2 fQ 1890 Vol.69· pp. 394-5 
3 fil 24 Sept 1890 














declared, 1 I have found that unionism !.'£'. is exceedingly anxious 
for arbitration in every case of dispute.• 1 This substantial 
shift in 1Libera1 1 thinking had come about almost entirely 
as a direct consequence of the lessons learnt from the failure 
of the· Maritime Strike{' · 
The trade unions also came to favour arbitration mostly, 
though not entirely, as a result.of their experiences during 
the 1890 strike~ During the debate on Downie Stewart's Bill 
the 'Liberals' had objected to compulsory arbitration then 
because it prevented the union from striking, and also because 
the unions were not likely to submit to unfavourable decisions!· 
However, in any case, the strike had left the unions too weak 
to strik.e and that abject failure _made them willing to submit 
to any authority which would gain them anytbm.g at all. Reeves 
when writing about comptisory arbitration declared, 'disaster 
and reflection have impressed upon the Labour (sic) party! •• 
the justice and necessity of compulsory arbitrationf• Thus, 
the labour unions in New Zealand were willing to submit to a 
system of state arbitration because they were left too weak 
after the 1890 strike for a long time, if ever again to strike~ 
Arbitration could not yield more unfavourable decisions than 
unrestrained victorious employers!. 
Both the 'Liberals' and labour came to accept, and indeed 
favour a system of 1compulsory 1 arbitration basically for the 










same reasons£! Labour had proved to be too weak to be 
able to force the employers to submit to conciliation or 
arbitration during the strike!·. But the most important 
event during the strike which ensured that the system of 
arbitration proposed by Ballance in 1890 would be compulsory 
was the uncompromising refusal of all the employers except 
the Union Company to even attend the Wellington Conference, 
let alone sit down and discuss their differences with the 
Furthermore, McLean refused to even seriously consider 
the proposals the Unions put forward at the Conference as 
. -1 
a basis for settlement~ On at least four occasions, 
I 
Reeves hinted or s:tated that the employers would regret their 
unconciliatory stand! On the eve of the Wellington Conference 
he wrote 'Time.will be on the side of those who think that 
discussion, conferences, boards of conciliation, and tribunals 
of arbitration are the true means of escape from industrial 
'. 2 
disputes and wars!' Summing up the events of the previous 
year and evaluating them at the beginning of the new year, 1891, 
he offered the opinion that: 
'Whether the extreme tactics pursued by the Employers• 
Association in declining to hear arbitration!~~ will. 
ultimately be represented of by their side!' •• the future 
will show!!• 
He hoped: 
'the "capitalist" class will yet come to see that; this 
sweeping reaction of all mediation was a mistake!• 3 
1 Reeves considered them to be fair proposals LT 7 Oct 1890 
2 LT 29 Sept 1890 





Again when justifying the compulsory clauses of the Bill in 
the house in 1892 he referred to the.conduct-of the employers in 
1890 as his prime example of refusal to submit to conciliation. 
The very magnitude of that strike, he declared, had so stirred 
up public opinion against strikes that the government had been 
called upon to effectively prevent them in the futurelJ 
He repeated this contention a fourth;time in his Review of Reviews 
article two years later. 2 From this evidence it may be s;en 
i 
that the compulsory nature of the arbitration system in New 
Zealand estaolished by Reeves, Is. BJll. arose partly out of the 
pragmatic nature of New Zealand p~litical action of that time, 
but mostly out of the vivid failure of voluntary efforts during 
that strike!-, 
The acceptance of the industrial conciliation and arbitration 
·system, first effectively,promoted by Reeves in 1892 and 
eBtablished in 1894, was largely a result of the failure 
of industrial action during the 1890 Maritime Strike!; The 
actual provisions of the Bill,. particularly its •compulsory·• 
aspect was very much an attempt'to P:tevent a repetition of 
the abortive conciliation conference called by the government 
during that dispute~ 
Finally, the weak state the unions were left in after 
1890 and the general disorganisation of labour that was a 
feature of the post-strike period explain why it was necessary 











to •encourage the formation of industrial unions and associations• 
in the Act!~ The 1890 Maritime Strike in these ways was 
responsible for the establishment in New Zealand of the 
world's first comprehensive system of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration~ That measure has had decisive and far reaching 
effects on New Zealand society ever since~ 
4! 1 The Maritime Strike in New Zealand and Australasian 
Political Federation 
The Maritime strike also infh,ienced the New Zealand decision 
to remain aloof from the Australasian federation movement, though 
not as directly or as decisively as it determined the nature of 
the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act!·, Without.a 
doubt the declining importance of New Zealand trade with 
Australia was by far the most important reason why this 
country did not combine with the other colonies of Australasia~, 
The strike had the effect of confirming the fear many New 
Zealanders had even before 1890 that joining a federation with 
the Australian colonies would be nothing but disadvantageous 
for· this country~- It had that result because it was widely 
believed by many contemporaries that it had spread to this 
country primarily as a result of New Zealand unionists striking 
in sympathy with thos·e in Alfstralia! Although, as has been 
shown already, th1s explanation of the beginning of the strike 
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in New Zealand was somewhat mistaken, nevertheless it was 
firmly believed by a number of influential men at the time;·l 
Others held more moderate views, arguing that New Zealand 
was dragged into the Australian dispute by a dual federation 
2 of ccp..tal and labour. 
Whatever the basis of views, most contemporaries were 
convinced that New Zealand had been implicated in a purely 
Australian dispute, in which workers in this country had no 
interests w.hatso~ver, as a result of the various Austral'asian 
connections that.existed. The Lyttelton Times began to urge 
that labour in this country should 1break with that highly 
; ( 3 quarrelsome country as soon as poss1..ble.11 The Otago Daily 
Times drew ev.en inore far reaching· lessons from the strike 





1The experience which we are now undergoing as 
a result of an industrial federation can hardly 
fail to strengthen the feeling that a-political 
federation with Australia wo4lq work to the 
disadvantage of New Zealand.}'.~\ The fact remains 
that federation implies the subjection of the will 
of New Zealand to the joint will of Australasia! 
The present experience shows that in an important 
part of the industrial world New Zealand circumstances 
are so different from Australian as to make the 
results of federation terribly oppresive to New 
Zealand!· But even without such lessons it is 
abundantly evident that, whatever may be the case 
in the future, there is not sufficient community 
either of circumstances or feelings to make any such . 4 
delegation of our liberties either desirable or workable.• 
See Chap. 3 Se.ct ion 3 
11 11 Sept 1890 
LT 20 Sept 1890 .---












Hence for the Times the experience of the 1890 strike confirmed 
its view that New Zealand would gain no advantages, and 
indeed might suffer if the colony joined the then proposed 
Australasian federation. 
The .same day the parliamentary reporter of the Press 
wrote that the reason the motion to send seven New Zealand 
delegates tp the Federal Constitutional Convention to be held 
in Melbourne in 1891 was defeated,-was tl:at the general strike 
was held to have been caused by the Maritime Council's 
affiliation with' Australia. Hence, he commented, members 
did not want Ito commit New Zealand to anything 0 _• ( sic)
1 
New Zealand did send three delegates to the 1891 Convention, 
but after that, its interest in federation was almost entirely 
t . J.0 f J.0 t . t t t 11 2 nega ive, was exis en a a • Although, as Tapp has 
shown,economic fears, feelings of sentiment for New Zealand 1 s 
close links with Great Britain, and certain other factors were 
the primary reasons for that lack of interest, the adverse 
economic and social effects of the Australasian maritime 
~trike was another reason that New Zealanders, particularly 
employers and farmers, could cite to show that their country 
was likely·to lose as a result of federating with the 
A. 1· 1 . 3 ustra ian co onies. 
1 f 10 Sept 1890 
2 Grey, Atkinson and Russell 
3 E.J. Tapp 'New Zealand and Australian Federation 1 , NSANZ 
Vol. 5 No. 9 pp. 244-253 
l 
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Labour unions also had good reasons to keep aloof from 
entanglement with Australia. They had found that instead 
of federation with Australia strengthening trade unionism 
in this country, it had dragged New Zealand labour into what 
had proved to be a hopeless and disasterous struggle. Besides 
that, New Zealand unions gave up direct action as the means 
of improving their wages and conditions for over a decade, 
concentrating instead on exerting political pressure in the 
New Zealand Parliament, and appealing after 1894 to the 
Arbitration Court for awards. Both these were essentially 
confined to New Zealand and made federation or affiliation 
with Australia unnecessary. Because the strike had a direct 
bearing on the establishment of the Arbitration Court, it can 
be said to have in that way cut New Zealand labour off from 
Australia more effectively than public opinion, which was 
definitely against any Australasian labour federation after 
the strike. Thus, the failure of the 1890 Maritime Strike 
can be seen to have contributed to the New Zealand decision 
to remain aloof from the Australasian federation movement 
in the 1890's, and in that way has had another long term 












CH APT.ER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Trade unions, legalised in 1878 by Stout's bill, collapsed 
soon afterwards, when the depression of the eighties began. 
The depression was not uniformly bad for the whole of the decade, 
nor did it extend over the whole country at the same time, 
except in the very bad years of 1887 and 1888. Conditions 
brightened in 1889 and for a brief time it looked as though 
the depression had ended. In the confident atmosphere of 
that year, a number of trade unions were re-established on 
this country, and those that had been formed earlier grew 
considerably stronger. 
During the eighties unemployment was a constant problem, 
getting worse each time ~he economy slumped. As a consequence 
they lost their bargaining powers and their trade unions fell 
apart, or were rendered ineffective. Labour conditions and 
wages declined, and industries expanded to exploit the 
relatively cheap labour. Many people left the country, 
particularly during the last years of the years of the decade, 
when so many people left that the emigration has been known 
1 
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as the 1exodus t. 
Not all trade unions were ineffective during the generally 
depressed eightieso The seamen and the coal miners, assisted 
by their Australian counterparts, formed viable trade associations 
and were able to improve their conditions. The most notable 
success of the seamen's union was achteved in 1887 when it 
forced the Northern Steam Shipping Company to agree to its 
terms during what is known as the 'Jubilee Affair', the first 
significant event in the career of J.A. Millar as a labour 
leader. He was. to be a prominent figure in New Zealand labour 
history in various capacities for the 25 years after 1887. 
Labour took part in politics in 1881 and 1884 when groups 
of workers were formed in both Dunedin and Christchurch and 
drew up platforms which were submitted to the various candidates, 
though they seemed to have little effect if any. Otherwise 
union activities were largely non-existent up to 1889 9 
While trade between Australia and New Zealand continued 
to decline as a percentage of the total trade of both countries, 
nevertheless the links that joined this country with the 
colonies across the Tasman became more numerous, and in certain 
ways stronger during the eighties. The Union Company expanded 
rapidly to become one of the largest shipping companies in 
Australasia by 1890. They had joined the ASOA in 1884, but 

















become binding until just before the maritime strike. At 
that time they were among the most influential members of that 
association. During 1889 labour's connections with Australia 
grew stronger when the wharf labourers, the cooks and stewards, 
and the Maritime Council here all affiliated with their 
counterparts across the Tasman. In those ways New Zealand 
became much more of an Australasian colony at the time men 
trade links across the Tasman were declining and the 
Australasian federation movement was getting underway. 
Labour orga~isations of the 1new 1 unionism school revived 
in New Zealand in 18890 That set of ideas spread here largely 
from Australia. 'Newl unionists endeavoured to unite all 
working into one labour federation, and they believed that 
direct negotiations with employers, backed up if necessary by 
threats of strike action was the best way to improve the 
conditions of workers rather than forming mutual benefit 
societies" As a consequence strikes were more frequent in 
the period of new unionist activities after 1888, and those 
strikes that broke out involved a larger number of men. 
The main reason for the revival of trade unionism in 
New Zealand in 1889 was the improvement in the economy. By 
the end of that year mout 20,000 workers were members of a 
trade union and that number had risen to 25,000 - 30,000 in 
June 1890. Even then only 20 per cent of the population were 




as also did the stiil numerous unemployed. Both the London 
Dockers 1 Strike in 1889 and the sweating agitation encouraged 
workers to form unions, and at the same time helped make 
combinations of workers more acceptable to the population in 
general. The full time trade union organisers co-ordinated 
and directed the efforts of labour in. that memorable period of 
unionist strength. 
Towards the end of October 1889, the 1new 1 unionist 
muvement in New Zealand reached a significant stage of 
development when a Maritime Council was formed here after a 
series of secret meetings in Dunedin. Originally comprising 
the Seamen 1 s Union, the Amalgamated Coal Miners• Association, 
and the Wharf Labourers• Union, it was intended to strengthen 
the influence of each union in both the industrial and political 
spheres of action by united power and concerted pressure. In 
the first half of 1890~ the Wharf Carters' Expressmen 1 s and 
Storemen 1 s Union, the Marine Officers• Association, and the 
ASRS all affiliated with the Council, by which time its 
membership embraced over 20,000 workers or approximately two-
thirds of all unionists in the country. 
Led by moderates, the council did not really show its 
teeth until after the first half-yearly general meeting of 
the body held in May 1890. But after gaining. confidence 
in Wellington and feeling that the power of united labour was 
·almost overwhelming, the officers of the Council, with the 
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tacit approval of rank and file members, began to actively show 
its strength and influence 0 The proceedings at that first, and 
as it proved only, public meeting of the Council, reveal 
clearly that its members were not marxist revolutionaries 
as were the leaders of the 1913 strike, but rather very moderate 
'fabian socialists'. 
The first intervention of the Maritime Council in the 
industrial field was completely successful. It settled the 
Petone Woollen Mill dispute entirely by conference 0 The . 
strike at the S~ag Point mine was a more difficult problem 
to solve. A new weapon, the •complete boycott• had to be 
used to force the owners to give up the use of non-union men 
to break the strikeo 1The complete boycott 1 can be seen as 
a New Zealand version of the Marxian 1general strike' but with 
the essential difference that the former was directed against 
a single employer or group of employers to obtain specific 
i.ndustrial objectives, and was not like the latter a political 
weapon intended to be used to change the social and economic 
structure of an entire societyo That essential helps explain 
why the men who took part in the first large-scale waterfront 
strike and those who supported the strikers or were sympathetic 
towards them were able to succeed in the elections following 
the strike, while their counterparts in 1913 and 1951 were 
defeated at the ballot-box afterwards. 
1 
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In July the council was able to pour oil on troubled 
waters and prevent a strike by the Marine Officers• 
Association in support of their claims by submitting mutually 
acceptable terms to both them and the ship owners in New 
Zealand. By refusing to support a strike by the officers to 
gain more extreme proposals, the co~cil showed clearly that 
it understood that that weapon was only to be used in the 
most extreme circumstances. 
The Whitcombe and Tombs dispute, which resulted when that 
firm determined .to run its business on non-union lines, was 
discussed and the union concerned supported at the May conference 
of the council. By the end of July when no progress had been 
achieved, the council called for _a •complete boycott• of the 
company's activities. However, the Union Company and the 
Railway Commissioners, faced with the possibility of legal 
action, and more importantly, growing apprehensive cf the 
increasing power of united labour, refused to co-operate. 
They threatened to dismiss any staff who would not handle the 
company's goods and the action of the council had to be called 
off. Millar then, rather foolishly it later turned out, 
hinted at the possibility of closing the port of Lyttelton to 
all cargoes to block Whitcombe and Tombs, but quite likely he 
was merely trying to get them to agree to a conference and did 
not intend to hav~ use that weapon. However, when the ASRS 
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made it known that they would not support such action the 
'general stoppage' had to be publicly abandoned. Not only 
did the idea of such a conflict loee the council favour in the 
eyes of the public, but also it weakened the credibility of 
the counci1 1 s threats. As things turned out, that series of 
encounters in the early part of September set the mood for the 
maritime strike later that month. 
The tense relations which existed between employers 
generally and the labour unions of New Zealand passed snapping 
point soon afte~ the Australian maritime strike began on 16 
Au§ust. That strike began when the Marine Officers• 
Association there went out in support of their claims rather 
than withdraw from the labour federations they belonged to. 
The setting up of a bogus officers• union by the ship owners 
fanned the long smouldering dispute into an inferno. It 
seems clear that the owners hoped to isolate the officers and 
then reject their claims, as a means of holding the rising costs 
of shipping. That was certainly the way the unions interpreted 
their action·s. The seamen's unions followed by wharf labourers• 
unions, cooks' and stewards 1 unions, some coal miners• unions 
and other unionists went out in support of the officers• 
association. The owners and other employers responded by 
employing non-union or as they called them 'free labourers•. 
The strike spread to New Zealand the day after the ASOA 
met at Albury on 23 and 24 August and agreed to not recognise 











free men they had employed. They also re-affirmed that the 
officers would have to break their connections with the 
labour movement if their claims were to be even discussed 0 
At that point the strike became even more a strike to defend 
the basic principles of unionism than it had been when it 
started. No mention was ever made in the newspapers whether 
the Union Company, which was a prominent member of the ASOA, 
was bound by those resolutions, though the Lyttelton Times 
apparently thought they were. Whatever their position, the 
day after the Albury resolutions became known ~n New Zealand 
they hired free labour to unload their ships in Sydney. 
Before that the crews of the vessels had done the work themselves. 
Although they later tried to justify their action by saying 
that the seamen were too slow, the unionists here interpreted 
their action as identifying1he Union Company with the stand 
taken at Albury. The New Zealand seamen in Sydney went out 
rather than work with non-unionists. When that move failed 
to sway the Union Company, Millar as secretary of the Seamen's 
Union called out the men from all the company's inter-colonial 
steamers, and the strike began in New Zealand waters. Whether 
the Union Company was coerced into taking the stand they did 
by the threat of the ASOA members to run ships against them 
is unknown, though it can be said that they never denied the 
frequently made allegation to that effect. 
Both sides rushed into print as soon as the strike had 
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begun in New Zealand waters, mostly hoping to court public 
support rather than convert the other side. The Union 
Company, in its manifesto issued on 27 August, said the 
strike began because the unions were determined to try their 
srrength against all employers of labour" Because there was 
no dispute in New Zealand, they concluded that they had no 
alternative but •to fall in with the resolutions of the 
Steamship Owners Association and other employers ••• and to 
support them (>oo in opposing the encroachment of the labour 
unions by every ·possible means ••• 1 Therefore they had no 
hesitation in blaming the unions for the dispute. The Maritime 
Council replied, saying that the Union Company had forced them 
to go out because it employed 1blacklegs 1 in Sydney. Then, 
they continued, while they wanted to keep the New Zealand 
coastal trade open, the Union Company had shown it was determined 
•to assist in crushing the labour unions• by employing 
'blacklegs' in New Zealand, and they could not expect labour 
unions to continue working for them after such conduct. 
The strike spread quickly until all the unions affiliated 
with the Maritime Council, with the exception of the ASRS, who 
only partly went out, had stopped working for the Union 
Company. The 'Union Company boycott• became an almost general 
shipping strike when the unionists stopped working for most 
other shipping companies after they or their agents had helped 
- 233 -
the Union Company. The 1890 maritime strike was the nearest 
to a 'general strike' that New Zealand has experienced. 
However there was no Marxist ideology abroad in 1890, and 
even if the strike had become general, it would not have been 
a strike to overthrow capitalism. Indeed, the union leaders 
in 1890 seem to have been unaware that any economic, social 
system other than capitalism, moderated by a dash of Fabian 
socialism existed. They struck defensively to force employers 
to maintain their recognition of the principles of unionism, 
and in particular the maxims the unionists could not work with 
non-unionists, and that unions had the right to affiliate with 
what ever other unions they liked. They were not striking 
aggressively to change the government and the social system, 
and indeed were firm advocates of the use of the ballot box to 
change things. 
It was the second maxim on unionism listed above: the 
right of unions to federate that the employers objected to. 
Those men who said that, including Sandford in Wellington, 
were never contradicted. 
Yet the employers themselves formed federated associations 
and joined forces with the farmers to combat the strike. 
Primarily set up to organise a supply of free labour the 
employers' associations were also seen as a part of the 
mechanism of a system of voluntary conciliation and arbitration. 
But because the employers refused to even talk with the unions 
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during the 1890 strike, and because the unions were not 
equal in strength afterwards, Reeves transmuted the employers' 
concept of a voluntary arbitration board into a compulsory 
one. He was attempting to restore some balance between 
employers and labour. 
Many employers saw the strike as an opportunity to deal 
with the federated unions, which they regarded as being too 
assertive and aggressive, in the way that Whitcombe and Tombs 
had succeeded in doing so. Whether they were thinking along 
those lines before the strike was never made public, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that employers were plotting together 
as a group beforehand. 
Free labourers were recruited from the unemployed, who 
were numerous when the strike began, and from the country 
districts where work was slack in August~ Middle class 
volunteers swelled their numbers. While employers were 
interested in disciplining the unions and breaking up labour 
federations, farmers were more concerned to ensure that their 
produce was sold at a profit and not wasted on the wharves. 
The possibility of visible waste caused the farmers almost 
to a man, to be against the strike. The farmers' opposition 
to the strike shows that the small farmer, labour 'alliance' 
at the polls in November was in spite of not because of the 
maritime strike. 
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Free labour proved to be both more expensive and slower 
than union men had been. As a result freight rates had to be 
raised by 50 per cent soon after the strike breaking effort 
began. A minor riot in Dunedin and a few:instances of assault 
on the hated 1blacklegs 1 in Lyttelton and Christchurch early in 
September resulted in the government appointing 'special 
constables• to keep the peace. After that their presence, 
and the exhortations of union leaders for their members to keep 
the peace prevented further violence. Rather than open 
fight between specials and unionists as occurred in 1913, 
many of the latter enrolled as specials and protected those 
who were working to defeat them. The moderation of the 
unionists and the overall absence of violence helps explain 
why the small farmers were prepared to support the country 
1Liberals 1 while their town colleagUes were openly appealing 
for support from the former strikers in the 1890 general 
election. 
The Union Company had 34 of its 43 steamers running at 
the end of September, and the rest were laid up largely 
because there was no work for them. Several weeks before 
that evidence that the strike was failing to achieve anything 
for the Maritime Council had begun to build up. As a 
consequence, the 'Liberal' friends of the 'labour party' in 
parliament began to press the government to intervene and 
help arrange a settlement. On 15 September they were 
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successful when the government accepted a motion by Perceval 
and agreed to arrange a conference of the parties. The 
house then approved the measure by 51 votes to 11. A large 
number of labour delegates were present in Wellington when the 
'Labour Conference' started in October, demonstrating that 
nearly all unionists, whether on strike or not supported the 
defensive stand taken by the Maritime Council. That was in 
sharp contrast to the situation during the 1913 strike and 
the 1951 waterfront strike or lockout, when in both cases the 
labour movement was deeply divided over the strike question. 
The unity of the labour movement in 1890 helps explain why it 
was atie to get many of its favoured candidates elected in the 
December general election. The elections after both the later 
two strikes went strongly against the labour voters~ The 
reason for the support the Maritime Council received was revealed 
at the labour conference, when nearly all delegates who spoke 
reiterated that they could not agree to unionists working with 
non-unionists, and maintaining the right of unions to federate. 
Thus they all realised that the struggle was in defence of the 
basic principles of unionism. The collapse of the ASRS after 
the strike without a fight suggests that the unions would have 
been defeated if they had not fought, and that no doubt was 
realised by all concerned. 
In spite of a real willingness on the part of the unions 
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to find an amicable settlement to the dispute, the conference 
was abortive~ McLean from the Union Company was not 
interested in a negotiated peace, but rather in the surrender 
of the unions~ He rejected out of hand all proposals put 
forward by the labour side for a settlement, and said in effect 
that his company would accept ndhing short of complete 
surrender from the unions on all points in dispute~ 
The real interest in the conference for the historian is 
not so much what it failed to achieve, but rather what it revealed 
about the dispute~ From what was said there it is possible 
to see that the New Zealand unionists considered that the 
owners• insistence that the officers' association disaffiliate 
before they would discuss their differences with them was the 
primary cause of the strike in Australia, but only a secondary 
and quite minor reason for their going out in this country. 
The strike spread to New Zealand, they said, because the 
Union Company was trying to force them to work with non-unionists. 
That they could not allow! At no time was sympathy for their 
counterparts mentioned as a reason for the strike here by 
either side! 
Nine years after the strike Millar elaborated further on 
why the strike had begun in New Zealand saying during a 
Parliamentary depate on Legislative Council Reform: 
'What caused the maritime strike was this: the 
principle was denied that a man outside of his 
contract with his employer had a right to do whathe 
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liked. The officers in New South Wales 
belonged to a union •••• The employers said 
they must not affiliate or associate! •• with 
anybody else! ••• Now, as far as I am personally 
concerned~ •• at the time the acting-manager of 
the Union Company, Mr! David Mills, and myself 
endeavoured to keep the strike from spreading 
to New Zealand~ But pressure was brought to 
bear here by the Shipowners' Association on the 
Union Company by threatening to run in opposition 
to them, and pressure was also put on the Seamen's 
Union, and we had to fall into line~ •• that is 
what caused the strike to take place in New 
Zealand!;• 1 
This explanation of events is quite at odds with the 
traditional view of the strike enunciated most fully by 
Salmond when he wrote: 
'In this dispute the workers of New Zealand had 
no direct interest~ They had no wish to strike 
in sympathy with the workers of New South Wales, 
and they only did so because their teaching had 
compelled them to. They honestly felt that to 
have withheld their sympathy at that moment would 
have st~uck a blow at labour co-operation in its 
infancy! 1 2 
Later he aaid that: 
'It developed into practically a struggle to settle 
the relative authority of employers and unions 
in all lines of business! 1 3 
He also drew a picture of increasing tensions between employers 
and unionists resulting in the clash th~t occurred. 
he concluded: 
1 Ell Vol 110 (1899) p~38 
2 Salmond op.cit~ PP• 61-2 






'The inevitability of the struggle eventually 
became apparent to the leaders of both parties, 
though it is an almost impossibility to apportion 
adequately the responsibility for the commencement 
of the disasterous upheaval. 1 1 
Salmond and those who have taken their account of the 1890 
strike from his thesis all seem to have missed or ignored.the 
statements made by Millar and others, both at the Wellington 
Conference and later, for they arrived at a gross mis-represent-
ation of events. While it appears that Salmond was correct in 
saying that the New Zealand workers had no wish to strike, it 
cannot be said that they struck almost purely in sympathy 
with their 'Australian brothers'. Rather it is apparent that 
New Zealand labour and to an even greater extent the Union 
Company, were drawn unwillingly into the Australian dispute by 
their respective connections across the Tasman. Once the 
strike had begun in New Zealand the unions connected with the 
Maritime Council had to strike defensively for the principles 
of unionism. 
The notion that the strike was almost entirely a display 
of sympathy on the part of the New Zealand workers was popularly 
promoted by nearly all the newspapers at the time and that may 
well be the source of Salmond 1 s judgment. However, contrary 
to what was written then, there was a real dispute from the 
beginning over the principles of unionism. Indeed it can be 
said that ·the strike in New Zealand was not inevitable, but that 





once it had been forced upon labour and the employers 
here, they deicded to try their strength against one another! 
After the Wellington conference had ended., apart from the 
news that the wharf carters, storemen and expressmen had been 
ordered back to work, and the end of the strikes of various 
miners• unions the strike became a dead issue for a long 
time~ Then in the last week of October an announcement that 
a conference was being arranged in Christchurch revived interest 
. h . k ,-, int e str1 e. The Canterbury merchants, concerned as they no 
doubt were about the slowness and inefficiency of free labour 
and with the new export season approaching and also feeling 
the pinch of stagnated trade, had agreed to talks being held~ 
But they were called off at the last minute because the 
employers in that town refused to talk with the Maritime 
Council or its leader, Millar, whom the unionists wanted to 
be theref 
Immediately after the Christchurch conference was abandoned 
the Wharf Labourers• Union was ordered to return to work. 
Millar kept the Seamen's Union out until the day after the 
last Australian union had returned to work on 10 November~ 
He apparently held the seamen out right to the last possible 
minute just in case a unionist victory in Australia allowed 
him to operate another 1Jubilee 1 type steamship company to 
force the Union Company to concede the demands of the council. 
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However that strategy was never tried, for the Australian 
strike collapsed and on 11 November the seamen were ordered 
to return unconditionally to their ships. 
In Lyttelton after the strike, many of the strikers were 
blackballed by the new labour bureau, and a bogus union with 
an employer as president was set up to prevent the formation 
of an independent union among the new workers on the waterfront! 
The wharf labourers' union in that port, and also those in 
every other port in the country, seems to have collapsed, and 
new unions were not formed until after the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act was passed in 1894f Every 
other union affiliated with the Maritime Council apart from 
the Seamen's Union, either collapsed, or was subjugated by its 
employers~ Like the wharf labourers' unions the others were 
not re-established until after 1894!-, Federations of labour, 
inter-colonial, colony wide and regional, were discredited and 
fell apart~ It was not until the early years of the twentieth 
century that new nation wide federations of labour were 
est ab 1 i shed!-, 
--------------------
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The strike, probably the major event in New Zealand in 
1890, was not an election issue that year except in the 
electorate of Port Chalmers, where Millar stood against 
J. Mills, the managing director of the Union Company!:, There 
Millar gained ground on the sitting member indicating that 
his leadership of the striking unions did not lose him favour 
with the electorate, which was interested in more vital 
issues than a moribund strike!'' The neutrality of the 
government, and the staleness of the issue were the main reasons 
why the strike was left out of the political arena~ The 
urban Opposition 1Liberals 1 had gained practically all the 
advantages they were likely to from supporting the strikers 
in September and October! 
But the strike did not have some indirect effect on the 
oucome of the election~ No doubt the strike stiffened the 
defeated unionists' resolve to have favourable candidates 
elected, so that they might gain from politics advances for 
labour that had after the strike been denied them in the 
industrial field~ However to say as Scholefield, Salmond, 
Crook, Oliver and Sinclair among other.s have done, that the 
unionists turned to politics after they had been beaten is a 
mis-representation of the course of events[ In fact the 
strong, vigorous trade unions of 1890 had themselves been 




long bef_ore the election, and had been organising to try 
and ensure that their picked men were elected~ The tempo 
of labour's interest in politics increased as the election 
approached, and not as the strike crumbled~-, The example of 
the People's Political Association in Christchurch vividly 
illustrates that point!' That body was planned before the 
possibility of a strike was seriously considered in New 
Zealand and steadily planned from the middle of August for the 
election campaign~ Only in the isolated case of Millar himself 
did a labour leader really turn from industrial to political 
action, and that might well have been the source of Salmond's 
misapprehensionsf 
One result of labour's increasing political awareness, 
and its more active participation in politics, what Reeves 
called the 'Labour-Liberal alliance• was formed in various 
centres of New Zealand during the months before the election, 
most notably in Christchurch!'' While it is true that the 
alliance was formed 'without any formal negotiations or 
settlement, w~thout even the dictation of terms•, it cannot 
be said that 1Had they stuck to strikes as a remedy, an 
alliance between them and the Liberals would have been 
• • bl I (1 1.mpos s1. e •' Reeves, in making that judgment, appears to 
have forgotten the strong insistence the Maritime Council had 
that 'all the labour bill before Parliament should be passed~, 
1 W!Pf Reeves, l,.he Long White Cloud p.280 
- 244 -
as early as May 1890. Labour would have supported the 
'Liberals' in 1890 even if the maritime strike had succeeded 
or never taken place simply because those men agreed to press 
through the House the labour bills, which would have helped 
the workers improve their conditions much more easily than 
striking, a weapon they were reluctant to use when others 
were available!. The 1Liberal 1 candidates would have received 
the votes of workers who, schooled by their leaders, supported 
the land and taxation policies of those men, because their 
adoption would have remedied unemployment and all the social 
ills it caused!·· 
In Australia, the situation of labour was quite different~ 
Labour unions were strong and well organised for many years 
before the strike, and they had come to believe firmly in 
the value of industrial action. by 1890. There it seems to 
have been true that the unions, defeated in the strike, turned 
to political action, which they had largely ignored or 
repudiated beforehand though the same cannot be said of those 
in New Zealandf1 The Australian unions were also more 
advanced than their New Zealand counterparts, and received 
less support from liberalsf Thus, they set up separate 
labour parties to fight the first election in each colony 
after the strike ended. 
Nine years afterwards, Millar was in agreement with 
Reeves as to the most direct and lasting effect of the maritime 
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strike on New Zealand !-1 Speaking in Parliament he said: 
'I say nothing ever happened in this country 
that Wqs of greater advantage~han the maritime 
strike!' It had this effect: it showed the 
people of the colony that striking was not the 
method _in order to obtain redress for their 
wrongs~ 1 1 
It is clear that the maritime strike convinced many 
influential men in this country that Reeves• concept of compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration as a means of avoiding strikes should 
at l~ast be tried~ As a consequence the 1894 Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act became lawf At that time 
there were only a few weak labour organisation in existence, and 
those seem to have supported Reeves I s measure!- Labour was not 
in the position it was in in July 1890, when the first 
Conciliation bill was introduced to parliament by Downie 
Stewart, to look on the bill as 1a measure to suppress strikes•~ 
Since 1894, the Reeves 1 s bill has, apart from during the 
pe:iods before the 1913 and 1951 waterfront strikes, been the 
main regulator of trade unions in this country~ In that way 
it largely superseded Stout's Trade Union bill. However, 
protecting trade unions and giving them increased bargaining 
power, it has also been described as 1 labour 1 s iron leg' in 
. t. ,-.2 prosperous imes. On two such occasions a number of labour 
unions revolted against the arbitration systemfi Reeves 
1 fQ Vol 110 (1899) p. 38 
2 P.O'Farrell Harry Holland 
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anticipated those revolts when he wrote: 
'History would seem to warrant us in anticipating 
that they (the unions) may not always be in so 
pacific a frame of mind!1• 1 
The future of the 1890 Maritime Strike becauee it broke 
up the trans-Tasman labour federations, ended the last 
Australasian phase in the history of New Zealand in the 
nineteenth centuryf In that way it contributed to the 
decision of this country to remain aloof from the Australasian 
federation movement after 1891, and to this country's 
remaining independent in 1900. 
Millar 1 s influence on the New Zealand labour movement 
did not end in 1890, as did that of Lomas! He was a member 
of parliament from 1893 until just before his death in 
1913, and during that term held amongst others the portfolio 
of labour from 1906-12 during some of the most troubled years 
of labour agitation!-, He was so much against the use of 
strikes by the unions that were rebelling against the arbitration 
system that his conservatism drove them further from the 
'Labour - Liberal alliance• that he had helped to create in 
1890. 
There were a number of times when Millar was called upon 
to explain why he, the one time strike leader, should have 
altered his opinions so completely~ At least twice he 
maintained that while he was indeed a leading figure in the 
1 Review of Reviews article op.cit~ 
_ .... ______________________ ~-. 
..__ 
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1890 strike, he was merely carrying out the wishes of his 
union that paid him when he called the men out~-, The 
second time during a debate on a bill he had introduced to 
try and curb the rising incidence of strikes he said: 
1 It is well known that as far as the strike is 
concerned I did all I possibly could to prevent it 
taking place in New Zealand at all, bu~, being 
a paid servant of a union which carried a resolution 
to strike, I did the best I possibly could for them 
after the resolution was carried: but it was 
carried against my desire and viewsr• 
From what was shown earlier about his moderation before and 
during the strike that appears to be a very plausible 
explanationf1 Hence it can be seen that Millar, the leading 
figure during the 1890 strike is by no stretch of the 
imagination in the same class of men as those who led the 
1913 and 1951 strikes respectively!'' He was a moderate with 
a conservative streak right to the end of his days~-; That 
can be seen most vividly by the way that Millar climbed out 
of a sick bed to vote McKenzie out of office and put 
in Massey, who was to prove to be an even s:ronga:-opponent of 
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NEW ZEALAND EXTERNAL TRADE ... Total 1865-93 
I m p o r t s Ex p o r t s 
Aust 0 & Aust. & 
British British 
Xfilll: Britain Colonies Total* Britain Colonies Total* 
1865 206 2.6 5.6 1.2 2.4 3,,7 
1866 2.7 2.8 5.9 lo7 2.7 4.5 
1867 2.8 2.3 5 0 3 20 0 2.6 4.7 
1868 2.3 2o2 5.0 20 0 2o3 4.4 
1869 2.5 2ol 4.9 2.1 2.0 4.7 
1870 24'.7 1~ 7 4.6 20 4 2.1 4.8 
1871 1.8 1.8 4ol 2 .. 7 2.5 5.3 
1872 2.7 2.1 5.1 3.3 1.5 5.2 
1873 3.8 2.2 6.5 3.7 1.5 5.6 
1874 5.5 2.1 8.1 3o7 1. 3 5.2 
1875 5.1 2.2 800 4.2 1.3 5.8 
1876 4.5 1.1 609 40 5 o.8 5.7 
1877 4!!5 1,.9 7,.0 5.3 o.8 6.3 
1878 5.3 2.2 8.8 4o7 1 .. 1 6.0 
1879 5.3 2ol 804 4.1 1.4 5.7 
1880 3.5 1119 6112 4,,8 1.4 604 
1881 4.5 lo9 7.5 4.5 1.0 6.1 
1882 506 1.8 8 0 6 4117 1.3 6.6 
1883 5.2 L,6 8.,0 5.4 1.1 7.1 
1884 4.9 1.6 7.7 5111 1.6 7.1 
1885 5.2 1.2 7.5 4,.9 lo3 6.8 
1886 4.5 1.3 6.8 4.6 lo7 6.7 
1887 4.2 1.0 602 4.8 LA 6.9 
1888 307 1.2 5 .. 9 5.7 1·.5 7.8 
1889 4.1 1.1 6.3 6,.6 2.1 9.3 
1890 4.2 1.0 6 .. 3 7 .,4 1.6 9.8 
1891 4.4 1 .. 0 6.5 7.1 1.7 9.6 
1892 4.,8 L, 1 6.9 7.5 L 3--
9.5 
1893 4.5 1.4 6.9 7 .. o 1 .. 2 
9.,0 




NEW ZEALAND MIGRATION PATTERN 1865-93 
I m m i g r a n t s E m i g r a n t s 
British Thousands British 
Colonies Colonies 
Year - Britain & Aust, Total* Britain & Aust 2 Total* 
1865 9.8 8 .. 5 18.9 .5 50 9 6.6 
1866 4.3 · 10 4 . . 14.9 .s 6.4 7.3 
1867 4.4 6.3 11., 1 .6 s.o 6.2 
1868 3.0 5~1 8.7 .5 6.7 7.9 
1869 2.7 5119 8.9 .7 4.3 5.3 
1870 4.0 4.6- 9.1 .6 4.3 5.5 
1871 3.1 4.0 10.1 .7 3.8 5.3 
1872 5.4 3.4 10.7 .6 4.1 5.8 
1873 8.9 3.8 13.6 .4 3.5 4.8 
1874 36.4 5.5 44.0 .9 4.7 5.9 
1875 21.8 6.3 31.7 .8 4.3 6.5 
1876 11.1 5.0 18.4 1.1 - 4.3 6.5 
1877 7.6 4.5 13.0 1.0 4.9 6.6 
1878 9.2 6.3 16.3 .8· 4.3 5.8 
1879 16.7 6.4 24.0 87 4.2 5.2 
1880 8.5 5.9 15.2 .7 6.5 7.9 
1881 3.5 5.6 9.7 ,,7 6.8 8.1 
1882 3.2 7.0 10.9 .,5 6.3 7.5 
1883 10 .4 8.1 19.2 .9 7.4 9.2 
1884 9.9· 9.1 20.0 1.5 8.2 10.7 
1885 7.2 7.9 16.2 1.9 9.1 11. 7 
1886 6.9 8.1 16.1 2.4 11.7 15.0 
1887 4.9 8.1 13.7 2,,1 9.6 12.7 
1888 4.1 8.8 13.6 2.0 19.6 22.8 
1889 3e3 11.2 15 .4 2.0 12.1 15.2 
1890 2.8 11.5 15.o 1.9 13.9 16.8 
1891 2.4 11.1 14.4 1.7 15.,0 17.6 
1892 2.6 14.7 18., 1 1.6 10.7 13~2 
1893 2.9 22.4 26.,l 1.6 13.3 15.,7 
Compiled from N,Z. Statistics 1865-93 
''-'Totals include 10thers 1 
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APPENDIX C 
NEW ZEALAND PER CAPITA EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
.(1870-1890) 
x~ Exports£ Imports£ 
1870 ~9/17/2 19/2/1 
1871 20/5/4 15/12/11 
1872 18/19/10 18/16/5 
1873 19/9/11 22/9/4 
1874 16/7/6 25/6/6 
1875 16/9 /9 22/7/6 
1876 14/12/10 17/16/5 
1877 15/9/11 17/1/6 
1878 14/14/1 20/13/6 
1879 12/16/4 18/13/9 
1880 13/7/10 12/19/10 
1881 12/5/8 15/2/3 
1882 13/1/5 16/18/1 
1883 13/8/2 15/1/3 
1884 12/16/8 13/17/4 
1885 12/1/5 13/4/9 
1886 11/9/3 11/12/2 
1887 11/10/3 10/9/2 
1888 12/16/7 9/16/4 
1889 15/4/5 10/5/6 
1890 15/13/8 10/0/2 





The Organ of Union.ism, A weekly Journal 
published in the interests of the Workers 
of New Zealand by the Combined Trade Unions 
of the Colony. From each according to 
his ability to each according to his needs. 
Saturday 
Why The Trade Unions Should own a Paper 
The Advantages of Having one Purely 
Labour Organ 
1890 
The majority of the newspapers of New Zealand advocate, 
directly or indirectly, the cause of Capital. The whole of 
them are owned by Capitalists, great or small, and even the 
most advanced Liberal organ in the Colony only advocates the 
cause of Labour as a matter of policy. Why, then, should not 
Labour have its own special organ, in which its rights could 
be fearlessly advocated because of their inherent justice, 
and not merely as a matter of expediency? At any moment a 
change of ownership in a proprietary paper, no matter how 
truly Liberal it might have been could cause a change in its 
policy 0 Why should not the trades unions of New Zealand own 
a paper which should be steadfast to their, cause, 'because 
wholly owned and controlled by them? Capital has many mouths 
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proclaiming its cause. Should not labour make absolutely 
certain of at least one mouth through which to proclaim its 
just claims? 
It is inevitable that Unionism, when it has reached a 
certain stage, must have an organ of its own. Seeing that 
New Zealand uninnists now number between 30,000 and 40,000 
that stage appears to have been reached in this colony. The 
wants of such a body of workers must find a1exponent in some 
way, and without a purely labour organ, a full and free 
exposition of their cause is impossiblee Unionism, without 
a journal absolutely its own, must be almost as dumb as a muzzled 
Capital, by closing its iron grip upon every printing 
press in the colony, attempts to place its muzzle upon us, and 
only an energetic effort will secure for us absolute liberty 
in expressing our views - a privi1edge which is S) essential to 
our cause. 
Isolated attempts to give newspaper representation to 
small sections of unionists are practically useless to help the 
cause as a whole. But a combined effort of the unionists of 
the colony to establish a large journal of weight and influence 
would ensure respect within and without the ranks of labour, 
and such a paper would prove simply of incalculable advantage 
to the party for all timeo The capitalists are fully alive 
to the immense importance of such a paper, and already attempts 
have been made to deter the projectors of this useful scheme 
from proceeding with their workQ We call upon the workers of 
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New Zealand to stand firm, shoulder to shoulder, and, as one 
man, resist this imposing of the capitalist gag by declaring 
with one voice that they will support "LABOUR". Every effort 
will be made to stop its publication and lessen its:influence. 
The most insiduous plan of all is to set the various 
provincial districts of the colony by the ears, and encourage 
petty jealousies by fostering the establishment in each centre 
of a necessarily weak and short-lived labour paper, for none of 
our centres of population are half large enough to support a 
labour paper of their own 0 Each would attempt, of course, to 
secure a circulation outside its own town, thus fostering 
competition - the greatest curse which Unionism has to fight. 
Thus would be fostered and promoted the disunity which, if 
encouraged, will shatter Unionism. If Unionism is to remain 
a living power after the first heat of its establishment has 
cooled, it must have a colonial organ, thru which the whole 
party can be reached, counselled, advised and guided by the 
ablest of its leaders in all parts of the colony. We are not 
going to be content with comparatively paltry victories as 
to pay and hours of work. We hope to march on to far grander 
conquests in the future, and without a journal which every 
member of the party will read, the task of marshalling the great 
army of workers and ensuring harmonious action would be almost 
impossible. No real friend of the worker can oppose the 
establishment of a paper owned solely by the workers, and 
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conducted solely for the workers, of New Zealand. Every loyal 
unionist must therefore support "LABOUR" until it becomes as 
essential to every working man and woman as their weekly 
Union fee" 
Some excuse can be found for a worker tiring of a trivial 
little rag only taken from a sense of duty. "LABOUR" will be a 
paper he will have every cause to be proud of, and in taking 
which he will get a better threepence worth than he receives 
from any other threepence he spends. The district he lives 
in will receive as much attention as anyd:her part of the colony, 
and writers of his town will share the work equally with those 
of other places in New Zealand" 
"LABOUR" will in every sense be a model of Union principles. 
There will be no boy-labour, no long hours, no half-pay, no 
free setting of type upon it such as give a handle to capitalists 
to speak ill of some labour organs" It will be conducted 
rigorously on Union lines at Union rates of pay - neither more 
nor less. And above all, there will be no profit-mongering 
·upon it" It will be purely co-operative in the broadest sense 
of the word. 
That end can only be attained by the unionists of the whole 
colony not only supporting the paper when it has been established, 
but by helping vigorously to establish it on the above basis 
- and on no other will it be permitted to start at all. Unionism 
has already raised the pay of each unionist on an average ls" per 
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dayo Surely, then, a majority of unionists can find 5/-
either down or in easy instalments, to secure the immense 
advantage of such a journal, especially seeing that ever~ share-
holder will receive his paper as long as he lives 2s. per 
annum cheaper than outsiders, and will also have his original 
5s. returned to him out of the early profits of the paper. 
Above all, every unionist should be proud to be able to 
assist in establishing a Defence Fund, to which profits of the 
paper will be wholly devoted, and this Defence Fund will be 
used to fight the cause of labour in time of trouble, and to 
assist weak Unions. And all these advantages can be attained 
b~ each unionist advancing a mere trifle, the loss of which he 
would never feel • In the words of a very prominent 
. leader of the Labour Party, 'On these lines, your paper will 
be the biggest thing in the history of Labour these colonies 
or any other country has ever yet seenJ 1 The responsibility 
of making this a true prophecy rests with each individual 
unionist~ 
I 
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(Covering some of the significant dates in the history i11l 
of the Union Line), iJ I 
11 
First meeting of provisional directors at Dunedin, ii' 
Union Steam Ship Co. of N,Z, Ltd. (Jas, Mills, Managing Director) !1 
commenced operations by taking over Harbour Steam Company Ii 
steamers (Maori I Beautiful Star and Bruce) together with Ha wea '!
1
j 
and Taupo which were built for the Company, The paddle steamer 11 





)Fortnightly- service fr~m Port Chalmers to Manukau 
)(Onehunga) and return via Lyttelton, Wellington, 
Picton, Nelson, and Taranaki (New Plymouth) , 
Bruce )Weekly service from Port Chalme~s to Lyttelton 
Beautiful Staz,and return via Timaru and Akaroa., 
Samson 
Maori 
Twice weekly service from Port Chalmers/Dunedin 
to Oamaru and return, 
Monthly voyage around the South Island - Port Chalmers, 
Bluff, Martin I s Bay, Jackson I s Bay, Hokitika, 
Greymouth, Westport, Nelson, Picton, Lyttelton with 
each alternate voyage in reverse order of ports, 
Certificate of Incorporation issued, Initial nominal Capital 
was £250,000 but paid up Capital on commencement was £83,580. 
Purchased New Zealand Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. Wellington 
(Phoebe, Ladybird, Taranaki and Wellington), 
Acquired coastal trade of Albion Shipping Co. (Taiaroa) 
Wakatipu (under Union Line management) left Port Chalmers for 
Sydney via Wellington inaugurating intercolonial service of Union. 
Line. 
Rotorua left Port Chalmers for Sydney via Manukau (Onehunga) 
inaugurating the first intercolonial service of the Union Line 
by a Company vessel. 
Wanaka left Port Chalmers on excursion voyage around South Island, 
including West Coast sounds - the first summer cruise run by the 
Company. 
Wanaka left Port Chalmers for Auckland and inaugurated three 
weekly service via East Coast ports (Akaroa, Lyttelton, Wellington, 
Napier, Poverty Bay, and Tauranga), 
Taiaroa commenced mail service from Sydney to Noumea under· 
contract to Government of New Caledonia (25/1/1888 - contract 































Appointed agents throughout New Zealand for Orient Line. 
Purchased l\lelbourne - New Zealand service of Mcl\'leckan, 
Blackwood and Co. ~lelbourne and took over Albion, A:rawata, 
Ringaroomaand yararua, and the coal hulks Sampson and§!! 
Harrv Smith), · 
Rotorr.ahana l1rnnched, First ship in the world to be l:;iuilt of 
mild steel and fitted with bilge keels. 
Purchased remaining interests in Oamaru and Dunedin Steam 
Co. Ltd. Dunedin. (Waitaki). 
Nominal Capital increased to £500 ,OOO ·and agreed to establish a 




Purchased Trans-Tasman steamer service of Grice, Sumner & Co.:,{0 ~ 
Melbourne together with Hero • ., .. , " 
~:~:;::~:t~:~z~~:~:~?:E::~r~~,f~::~~:i~~:·:: it /~-

























Purchased Auckiand Steam Ship Co. Ltd. Auckland (Southern Crcissh. · 
together with goodwill of New Zealand & Fiji trade and Government .,/:,i 2 l 
subsidy for the service. (Southern Cross left Auckland 28/9/1881,~·: 
20/12/1881 
and arrived Levuka 1/10/1881). :.j, 
Manapouri launched - First merchant ship in the world to be 
fitted throughout with incandescent electric light, 
:-~. 
19/1/1882 - Acquired Margaret St, Wharf I Sydney together with stores.and oth~~i 
buildings from Australasian Steam Nav. Co. Ltd, Sydnfly, .;/h~.· 
'·:.\\,~ .. 
13/12/1882 - Purchased the goodwill or Melbourne - Fiji Service from J, McEwan~. 
& Co., Melbourne together ,:i-ith Suva. . . ,' ;}i\t_ 
19/11/1883 - Commenced first steamer express service in Australasia by.running~'£' 
Takapuna on regular passenger schedule from Lyttelton to Onehunga;~ · 




Wairarapa left Auckland on first excu.rsion by the .Company to the 'Ff/ 
South Sea Islands. '""'' 
Took over Black Diamond Line, {Capt. W.R. Williams) Wellington''}t{ 
:_,~Jfi 
together with Koranui coal mine, steamers Grafton, Koranui, •·:~J~? 
Maitai, Mana'!Yatu, Mawhera, sailing ships and hulks. ',@;4 
4/12/1885 - ~::rt~\~;~tg;~~~:. ;::n7::!;:~t\:~~:i: 1~;~;;~::s)~!!~!ten 1{;~ 
~:;~a~!n:r ~~8~c~:~. Steamship Co. San Francisco for the --\:~ 
6/9/1886 ::.::::.':n::zce (;n lieu fortnightly) to Sydney via Auckland ,dj: 
7 /2/1887 - Sold Koranui coal mine· to Westport Coal Company Ltd, Dunedin .,,·,. 























Tekapo left Wellington for Calcutta, First Indian voyage of Union 
Line. 
)1/8/1888 - ,Acquired Brunner Coal Co. Ltd. Crc) 1-:-:0;.;.~t. (Martin Kennedy) and 
the three mines involved - Wallsend, Coalpitheath and Brunner 














(converted to hulk). On 237fili888 the Tyneside mine owned by Jas. 
Kilgour, Greymouth was also purchased along with the steamer Oreti. 
The ships were transferred directly into the Union Line fleet bu_t __ 
the mining interests were merged into a separate concern called Grey 
Valley Coal Co. Ltd. - the Union Line and the Westport Coal Company 
I,td. being joint owners, 
Mawhera left Auckland commencing Auckland - Tonga - Samoa 
service. 
Acquired Peninsula and Akaroa Steam Nav. Co. Ltd. Lyttelton 
(Banks Peninsula). 
Taviuni arrived Melbourne direct from Greenock via the Cape of 
Good Hope. The longest continuous steaming time to that date, 
12,400 miles at 10! knots - 48 day_s, 17 hours, 40 mins. 
Nominal Capital increased to £1,000,000. 
Tasmanian Steam Navigation Co, Ltd. Hobart to be taken over by 
Union Line - the arrangement to date from 1/4/1891 (Corinna, 
Flinders,~, Mangana, Moreton, Oonah, Pateena and Talune) 
A local Board established at Hobart. 
Penguin commenced'at least two round trips per week between 
Wellington and Lyttelton and became the first ship to be used 
exclusively on the Inter-Island steamer Express service. 
Entered Auckland-Rarotonga-Tahiti trade - Taupo making first 
voyage. 
Purchased T .A. Reynolds '& Co. Hobart - west coast Tasmanian 
services (Glenelg, Bellinger and Banks Peninsula (the latter sold 
direct to Northern Steam Ship Co. Ltd. Auckland) 
Thrice weekly service commenced between Wellington and Lyttelton, 
each way, with Penguin. From 1/11/1900 a daily service was run 
each way, excluding Sunday, and the winter months, butfrom 1905 
an all year round daily service, excep! Sundays, was instituted. 
Company acquired goodwill of Donald and Edin borough, Auckland 
service to Rarotonga and Tahiti and took over Richmond. 
Tahitian Government voted subsidy for Inter-Island service, 
Sold wharf and interest in.Blenheim trade to Fell Bros. and 
Captain Thos. Eckford. 
Company's tender to extend Tahiti Inter-Island service to 
Marquesas accepted. 
28/9/1897 - Sold Company's interest in Wellington-Wanganui trade to Wellington 
ea. Steam Packet Co. Wellingtp!!_ t
0
qg~~h°fr with Oreti and Moa, 
UNIVEF-SITY C,° CANTERBURY 








28/10/1900 - l\·loana arrived at Sydnev and terminated direct San Francisco --:~.i.1.,.f.'..'., ~~~I 






















Acquired half share in Canadian Australian Royal Mail Line, 
,'\,f~l\'v,nrne running ser:dce from Sydney to Vancouver and took 
over management of the line effective with sailing of Aorangi from 
Sydney to Vanc.ouver 25/3/1901. 
Orowaiti commenced first regular Union Line service in N. W. 
Tasmania between Launceston, Stanley, Burnie and Devonport. 
Mail contract Melbourne - Launceston accepted. 
· .. ~ . ·.:,_:...~. 
Loongana launched - first ship in fleet and also Iirst in Aust:z:alasian·( 
waters to have steam turbine propulsion. .· '~--
Deed sealed for Superannuation Scheme for office staff. 
First issu( of monthiy journal '?;e Ret Funnel." ~~,)~ 
Ce~sed publication 1 7 1907 )}}·: 
Actual commencement oC daily Wellington/Lyttelton ferry service_ ;:J§ 
with Rotomahana and Pateena - Ma~aroa replaced Pateena 20/10/19~'. 
:\~~f 
Formed Wairau Steam Ship Company with Johnson & Co., Wellingtoti;.t:' 
to work Blenheim trade. : ,.:ff:: 
' .. ·~~< 
Company acquired quarter interest in Invercargill Shipping Co. Ltd~· 
Dunedin. · · :-~{;,_. 
James Mills made Knight Batchelor (Kt.) (K.C.M.G. :- conferz-ed 
1909). 
Decided to purchase Wellington Patent Slip - Wellington Harbour 
Board proposed Bill providing for compulsory sale to the Board 
but agreed that Union Line remain in possession for 25 years, 




Koonya left Lyttelton with Nimrod (Shackleton Antarctic Expedition)~~: 
in tow and became first steel vessel to cross Antarctic circle. · 
First group of cadets joined Dartford, the Company I s sail training ship. 
Manapouri recommenced service from New Zealand to San Francisco ,,,;;,. 
by transhipping cargo and passengers at Tahiti to vessels of Oceanic:":t, 
Steamship Co. . _C\ 
Arranged with Northern Steam Ship Co. Ltd. Auckland to run 
Rarawa on joint account in Onehunga - New Plymouth trade (Rotoiti 
withdrawn) - arrangement terminated 9/6/1930. · . 
... ~r~---
·, 
Acquired remaining interest in Canadian Australian Royal Mail Line.\;, 
.. ,.1; 
19/10/1910 - Aorangi left Wellington, commencing again a direct service fro_m 




1910-1911 Steam laundry, Workshops and Stores- built for the Union Line at 
Evans Bay, Wellington. The workshop building when completed 




































































19 /1/1 tion) 



















Tahiti left Sydney for San Francisco via Wellington, Rarotonga 
and Papeete, thus extending service to Sydney. 
Acquired interest in Opouri Steamship Co. Ltd. Christchurch. 
(Opouri) . 
Union Line acquired from New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. London, 
the former Australasian - United Kingdom service of Houlder Bros. 
Ltd. London and took over Limerick, Roscommon, Tyrone, and 
Westmeath. 
Sold Squall to Richardson & Co. together with Auckland - East 
Coast Bay trade. 
Chartered Steamer Canada Cape (became Waihemo) left Newcastle 
N. S. W. and inaugurated regular Union Line purely cargo service 
between North Pacific coast ports, Australia and New Zealand 
and return. (Sailed San Francisco 27 /10/1913 and arrived Wellington 
28/11/1913) . 
Original Company wound up (30/9/1913) and new Comp=.ny · 
identically named was incorporated with nominal capital of £3 1 000 1 000. 
Local Board established at Sydney. 
Built Grand Pacific Hotel, Suva (Sold 1959). 
Purchased Maoriland Steamship Co. Ltd. Wellington. 
(Kahika, Karu and Kokiri) • 
Peninsular and Oriental Steain Na v. Co. London acquired all 
the ordinary shares in Union Line. 
21/6/1920 - Waitemata arrived Sydney to deliver the first cargo of oil (1000 tons) 
to the newly established Balls Head Oil Dept. in which the Union 
Line had a substantial interest. The first oil depot in New Zealand -
the converted hulk Adderle;r - received initial oil delivery on 
5/7/1921. · 
19/1/1921 Decided that names beginning with "K" be alloted to single deck 
ships and 11\V", to·tween deck ships. 
25/8/1921 - · Hauraki launched - first motor ship in the fleet. 
22/12/1921 Tasmanian Steamers Pty. Limited, Melbourne incorporated. 
· (See P. 3 5 ) 
1/i/1922 - Head Office and management transferred from Dunedin to Wellington. 
The registered office, however, remained in Dunedin until June, 1945. 
1/4/1922 - Union Line took over the carriage of coal for the Blackball Coal 
Co. Ltd. London, purchasing four hulks and taking colliers 
Ngahere, Ngakuta and Ng)toro on charter (Ngakuta and Ngatoro 
being purchased 31/1/1942 • . 
5/1923 Purchased property at Miramar, Wellington with two oil tanks 
thereon and first delivery of 7600 tons taken on 3 /7 /1923 when 
Orowaiti commenced ~umping ashore. Three more tanks on this 
















Tasmanian Government steamers purchased (Pool ta ar,d ~,1.:lLvu:.. x:.;~! ... 
- latter sold for conversion to hulk). . f . 
. '.'-·}~}' . 
The Trans-Paciric Passenger Agency Ltd. London formed to carr/Jr 
on the business of the Company's West End passenger office. _::, 
.· .. 
Indo-Pacific Shipping Co. Ltd. formed in London. (See Page 35),, 
Purchased remaining interest in fleet of R.S. Lamb & Co. Ltd. ._ 
;/3/ rr 
11/ }5) 
Sydney and took over Gabriella, Kalingo, ~ and Kini -~ 






Rangatira launched - first turbo-electric vessel in fleet. 
Canadian Australasian Line incorporated (See Page 35 
First commercial air service in New Zealand established between ':~1t:. 
Napier and Gisborne by East Coast Airways Limited, Gisborne. 'i:r 
Union Line .ha~ acquired a major interest in this Coml?any 2/8/1934 .. '.~, 
and were appointed agents throughout New Zealand 5/1935. ·±;i.,: 
_--.~~~ 
Union Airways of .New Zealand Ltd.· formed - wholly owned subsidiaryi 
of Union Line. · ~ti· 
. . . .. . .·,:,;~' 
Cook Strait Airways Ltd. Nelson in which Union Line had majority·· .:--0 ,; 
interest commenced inaugural flight between Wellington, Blenheim, and 
Nelson. · 
First New Zealand air service commenced by Union Airways of 
New Zealand Ltd. between Palmerston North and Dunedin. 
23/l/1936 - Death of Sir James Mills, K.C.M.G. in England. (Retired as 




Awatea · launched - largest (13 ,482 tons) and fastest (23 knots) ship· 
specially built by the Union Line for the Trans-Tasman service -
Sy~ey to Wellington and Auckland. 
Australian National Airways Ltd. Melbourne, formed - Union Line v 
having 20'% share! 
Union Royal Mail Line San Francisco/Australia, N.Z. Passenger 
service operated by Union Line 1885 - 1900, 1910 - 1936 ceased on 
Makura I s arrival in Sydney. 




Appointed _agents in New Zealand for Imperial Airways, London. · 
Purchased remaining interest in East Coast Airw_ays Ltd. Gisborn~. 
Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. formed to operate Trans-Tasman 
air service - 38% shares held by Imperial Airways Ltd., 23% by 
QANTAS Airways and 39% held by Union Airways, but of the latter 
20% taken up by N. Z. Government. Management of T. E. A. L. was 
vested in Union Airways. 

























































;0/4/1940 - Tasman Empire Airways Ltd. inaugural commercial flight from 
Sydney to Auckland by flying boat "Aotearoa." 
:S/ 4/1944 Maritime Officers I Superannuation Fund ina~gur:::.tcd. {.::C:.:e-,lvus 
attempt in 1909 rejected by some.Officers and Engineers.) 
; ,'J/1945 Superannuation Scheme for permanent regular weekly employees 
inaugurated (Foremen, Tally Clerks, Women etc.) · 
11/1946 Acquired 25% interest in Eastern and Australian Steamship Co. Ltd. 
London (E & A capital reconstructed). (This interest taken over 
by P & O 1966). 
;10; 190r;.9/1/1947 -
n:'3/1947 -
Canadian Union Line formed in Vancouver. 
Union Airways went into liquidation, their services being taken over by N. i 
National Airways Corporation 1/4/1947 in accordance with N.Z, Governmen1 
Act. passed in November, 1945. Union Airways Ltd. interest in Tasman 






















Purchased shipping interests of Captain A. F. Watchlin,Auckland 
(Port Ta uranga and Port Waikato). 
Company appointed general Agents in New Zealand, Australia and 
Fiji for Canadian Pacific Air Lines. 
Aorangi arrived Sydney concluding Canadian-Australasian Line's 
passenger service from Vancouver fo Australia and New Zealand. 
Nominal Capital increased to £5,000,000. 
Monowai arrived A'..'.ckland from Sydney terminating Union Line 
Trans-Tasman passenger service. 
Nominal Capital increased to £7 ,000,000 • 
Under Union Line management, Aramoana rail ferry owned by N. z. 
Railways, left Wellington for Picton on trial voyage. First 
commercial voyage however commenced on ll/8jl962. 
Union Line I s Picton - Wellington Passenger ferry service ceased on 
arrival of "Tamahine" at Wellington. 
Seaway Queen launched - First "roll on-off" ship for Union Lin.e. 
(Commenced service Melbourne to Hobart 13/6/64. -
Seawaf King - sister ship - commenced service Sydney - Hobart 
1/9/64 • · . 
Trial voyage of converted Maori on Inter-Island service. First 
roll on .:. roll off passage in Wellington-Lyttelton Steamer Express 
service. Maori commenced regular roll on - roll off service on 
16/12/1965 .---w"ahine commenced regular service on same run 1/8/1966. 
i/4/1967 - Waitemata arrived :punedin and terminated regular cargo service 
commenced in 1913 between North Pacific Coast ports, Australia 
and New Zealand. 
/11/1967 - Hawea left Auckland for Dunedin via Lyttelton inaugurating weekly 







COMP ANY COLOUR SCHEME 
..,. Bronze Green with y1;11low band and red boot-topping. 
(Note - The Boot-topping was originally pink - 1875-1948- . 
and the yellow band thinner than at present). 
UPPERWORK_S - White 
MASTS, SAMSON POSTS AND DERRICKS - Buff 
FUNNEL Red with black top, two thin black bands on red. 
(Note - some of the early ships, such as ROTOMAHANA, 
PALOONA, MAITA!, WAINUI, MANUKA, MOERAKI, 
MOURA, PUKAKI, TALUNE, PATEENA, OVALAU, 
MONOWAI {1) and WAKATIPU all had three black bands on the 
funnel collars while at one time the MARAROA had four 
bands. MONOWAI (11) only had one band for 8; period). 
Following the purchase of the Black Diamond Line in 1885, the hull_ 
colours of the purely cargo carriers were left as black with an orange-buff :~~7,;'f;;" 
upperworks although the e:xact colour scheme varied from ship to ship. The Jiff 
passenger ships in the fleet as well as the tugs NATONE and TERAWHITI (but ~;rf.: 
not the more recent tugs TAPUHI and TAIO.lv1A which were in black and buff colours}f·:_ 
continued to be painted in the normal colours, In 1960 the Company reverted to .·.,-£;, 
painting all the ships with the bronze green and white colour scheme as detailed :~:;:-~,.;. 
above. Vessels of the Blackball Coal Co. and R.S. Lamb & .Co •. Ltd. :retained thei;i-:1!. 
own funnel colours for some time after being purchased by the Union Line. The :7· 
tankers OTOKIA and OROWAITI 'were painted in Wm. Cory & Sons Ltd. colours ''.,Jli 
(blaclc funnel with white band and black diamond on white. Hull black with red . f-, 
boot-topping). . , -~~ 
Over the years a number of ships on special service1, have been painted ·,i\ 
differently. Some of the ships on the Pacific Island services have had white hulls ,4L 
instead of green. (These include SOUTHERN CROSS (1896-1901), MAWHERA .··-
(1901-1902), WAITEMATA (One voyage only in 1910, WAIPAHI (1932-1936) MATUA 
(1936-1950) and NAVUA (1955-1958). Apart from the periods stated these ships 
were painted in the black or green colours applicable, Between 1948-1949 the 
Trans Pacific liner AORANGI was given a white hull with green band and dark 
green boot-topping but she then reverted to the normal green hull etc •.. , . 
MANAPOURI, which for a short" time from 1909 ran under a subsidised 
service between Fiji-Australia was painted in the colours of the Australasian United 
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (Grey hull, black funnel with two white bands). Between 
1928-1930 the MOERAKI also ran on this service and·although she had a grey hull, 
the Union Line funnel marking was retained. 
Directot 
~ 





J.R. J(it .... 
H. Mcl';til 




J.M. Ritchi ,. 






















These notes are applicable to peace time services only as during (C.B.E, 19'.J , 
World War's 1 and 11 ships were painted in accordance with the wartime role they filled. . 
. · ,· L.M. Wright 
COMPANY MOTTO PER MARE 
{By .sea 
"- PER CAELUM 
By Skyways) 
(The Company's earlier rnott~ EN AVANT (Forward) was 
superseded by the present motto in 1940). 
·. ·: (Kt. 1957} 
\.N. Leslie 
F' .K. Macfarla 
p .B. Marshall f 
(C.B.E. 1965 1 

































DELEGATES TO WELLINGTON LABOUR CONFERENCE 
OCTOBER, 1890 
Federated Wharf Labourers• Union D.P. Fisher, P. Brown, 
R. Seymour~ 
Mercantile Marine Officers' Association - Captain Highman, 
Mr~' Cornish! 
Amalgamated Miners' and Labourers• Union J. Lomas, 
Mr. Ansell .. 
N.Z. Typographical Association T. Mills, F~cf Millar. 
Wellington Trades and Labour Council H.C. Jones, Mr! Meyer, 
Mr .. Hutcheson, Mr .. Mudge, 
Mr~ Avery, R.P~ Johnson, 
J. Graham. 
Messrs! Winter, Hoban and Elvines! 
Canterbury Trades and Labour Council Messrs~ Parker and 
Sandford. 
N.Z. Federated Wharf Carters I Expressmen I s and Storemen I s Union 
Messrs~ Williams and Dobson. 
Operative Bootmakers• Association, Dunedin Branch - Mr. Tees; 
Wellington Branch - Mr. Browett. 
FederatedSeamen 1 s Union of N.z., Federated Stewards' and 
Cooks' Union, Auckland Trades and Labour Council - J.A. Millar' 
Greymouth Labour Union Mr. Boase~ 
Union Steamship Company, Northern Steamship Company - Hon~ G~McLean 
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APPENDIX G 
THE BIAS OF THE NEWSPAPERS AND THE STRIKE 
The newspapers of 1890 had widely different views on the 
maritime strike. The bias of each paper was reflected in the 
news sto~s it printed and the comments by journalists and 
others it reported, as well as in its editorial and correspondence 
columns. No attempt will be made in this appendix to analyse 
the outlook of papers throughout the country, but rather 
I the widely divergent views of the two leading Christchurch 
:! morning papers will be looked at as an example of opinions 
throughout the country. 
The Press was one of the staunchest allies that the 
employers had in Christchurchv That no doubt resulted from 
the influential position that G.G. Stead occupied as .a director 
1 of the Press Company. 
It gave reasonably balanced reports on the strike in the 
rest of the country, printing virtually the same Press 
Association cables as the Lyttelton Times. However the reports 
its own reporters sent in from Lyttelton were clearly biased. 
A perusal of them shows that the reporters spent as much time 
arguing the employers case as they did reporting the situation 
in Lyttelton. The stories they wrote could not be described 
in any way as balanced or full accounts of events in the port. 
1 Macdonald op.cit. 
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The editorials of the Press were invariably hostile to, 
and critical of the trade unionists on strike~ That paper 
was so intent on discrediting Millar that it failed to see how 
its arguments were in fact logically inconsistent at times. 
For example on 28 August it blamed Millar 'for dragging 
New Zealand labour into a purely Australian dispute•. Then 
later, when its opposition to the strike became stronger, the 
Press said that the strike was: 
I a desperate attempt on the part of certain leaders 
(or self-appointed agitators) to consolidate their 
power, whatever the consequences may be to those who 
will suffer at their commands~ ••• The. success of 
the strike would mean the Autocratic rule of the 
Maritime Council and the destruction of local 
industries.• 1 
Without the slightest justification, the 'mistake' of Millar 
had been turned into a 'plot•~ 
Moreover the Press firmly held that 1 the steps taken 
were not justified' even if the •trouble had arisen over a 
question involving a real grievance I ~·2 Thus that paper 
sought to condemn both the ends and means of the Maritime 
Council, being more concerned to keep up a barrage of criticism 
than to present a considered case~ Furthermore seven.of the 
eight letters to the editor it published from August to 4 
September were against the strike, showing that the Press 
1 f 13 Sept 1890 
2 f 13 Sept 1890 . 
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was to a considerable extent reflecting its readers• opinions 
in its editorial columns, as well as the views of the editor 
and management! 
The Lyttelton Times, while it also was critical of the 
Maritime Council's decision to strike, nevertheless remained 
firmly on the side of the trade unions throughout the struggle~ 
Its viewpoint was so radically different from that of the 
Press because its editor was the· 1Libera1 1 member of parliament 
for St~ Albans, W.P~ Reeves, whan the .f!~ labelled sneeringly 
·1 1The working man's friend'. His attitude on labour has been 
seen already!; He was openly sympathetic to labour but at the 
same time 'firmly deprecated strikes'~ 2 He opposed strikes 
because they benefitted virtually no one at all. 
Even before the strike broke out, the Lyttelton Times 
had a pro-labour flavour about it. During the strike, its 
reporters filed stores which ridiculed the free labourers as 
incompetent weaklings, and discredited the employers, or as they 
often called them, •capitalists'• The letters published in the 
first week of the strike were in the same vein as the reports 
from its own journalists! Four of them were justifications 
of the actions taken by the Maritime Council while only one 
voiced criticism of the strike. The most persuasive was written 
by a compositor who worked for the Times, E. Sandford! His 
letter set forth in detail the thesis that the strike was a 
1 Sinclair, Reeves op~ cit. p.80 
2 LT 1 Apr 1890 
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result of a plot by employers to crush the trade unions~ He 
described the strike as a 1pitched battle between capital and 
labour• saying that 1the labour party was left with no option 
but to act on the defensive~ •• with a firm front and readiness 
for action'. Finally he looked forward to the day when some 
means would be devised to prevent strikes for all time. 1 
Whether Reeves wrote the editorials on the strike or not, 
they certainly would have been approved by him. While the 
paper remained sympathetic throughout, it continually t.pbraided 
the unions for striking hastily without any real grievance to be 
t d ,.2 correc e. It agreed with Millar 1 s description of the strike 
as 1a trial of strength between capital and unionism• f•3 It 
believed that New Zealand had been drawn into the Australian 
b h Id 1 f d . f • 1 d ,A- I ;-4 dispute y t e ua e eration o capita an .Ia.JOUr. It 
used that fact to warn of the dangers political federation with 
Australia would have for this country~
5 
Australia was described 
6 
as 1that highly quarrelsome country'. 
The most consistent and forceful theme propounded in the 
editorials of the 1!~ was the need for an amicable settlement 
• I . of the dispute. While it was aware that the Union Company's 
bond to stand by the ASOA made it difficult to arrange a truce 







1 Sep 1890 
12 Sept 1899 
28 Aug 1890 
20 Sept 1890 
11 Sept 1890 
20 Sept 1890 
cf~-, the Press called the strike 1The Labour Wt:' i 
; 
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sincerely did not wish to lcrush out unionism' they would 
attempt to get the bond modified to allow a separate settlement 
here. 1 Strikes were, in its view, 'almost unmitigated 
misfortunes 1. The Times went on to argue that 'the sooner 
Parliament devises some means of arbitration the better it would 
b I 2 e • 
Finally the Times severely criticized the employersll 
associations and the Railway Commissioners for refusing to 
attend the Wellington conference and warned them: 
iTime will be on the side of those who think that 
discussions; conferences, boards of conciliation, 
and tribunals of arbitration are the true means 
of escape from industrial disputes and wars 0 l 3 
Both the Otago Daily Times and the Timaru Herald took a 
slightly less partisan stand on the strike, but they both tended 
to lean towards the side of the Press .. The Globe in Dunedin was 
even more strongly for the strikers, continuing to use the term 
[bl k 1 1 h h h d" t 4 It tb. 1 t ac egs t roug out t e ispu e. was eon y rue 
la~our paper in New Zealand in 1890. 
From the above example of the two leading Christchurch 
morning papers, it can be seen that the newspapers were divided 
over the strike question. Probably no other two papers were 
so sharply and overtly divided as those two, which makes them 









11 Sept 1890 
29 Aug 1890· 
29 Sf:'lpt 1890 
p.74 
Their different approaches to the strike 
J..... _______________ __ 
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show that on an issue as emotionally embroiling as it is, 





GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR ELECTORATE OF 
PORT CHALMERS 
BREAKDOWN BY POLLING BOOfHS 
l§11l 
Green 
Port Chalmers 54 
Ravensbourne 45 
St. Leonards 8 
North Heads 4 
Blue skin 98 
Purai:amu 24 
Sawyers Bay 26 
Lower Harbour 0 
Mount Cargill 22 
Total 281 
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Minute Book of the Cooks 1 and Stewards• Union. 
(Seamen's Union Office, Dunedin). 
II. Printed 
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Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
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New Zealand Statistics, 1860-1900. 
New Zealand Official Hand Book, 18920 
New Zealand Censuses, 1886-1896 0 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1890-1908. 
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Economic Journal, Vol. 1, 11891) p. 713 ffo 
-
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The Globe, Dunedin 1890. 
The Lyttelton Times, 1889-1891. 
The Otago Daily Times, 1889-1890. 
The Press, Christchurch, 1889-1890. 
B. SECONDARY 
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